



Social and Cultural Disaster of Contemporary Iran

1960s-2020s era
Kavos Navidan

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Author & Translator: Kavos Navidan

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Table of Contents

Title	page
Preface & Abstract	6
First part - social and cultural developments before the Islamic revolution	8
Chapter One	8
Cultural and social dimensions of the second Pahlavi regime	8
Social and political crisis in the royal regime of second Pahlavi	24
Second part -cultural and social developments after the Islamic revolution	29
Chapter Two	29
A sociological look at the 1980s (1360s Iranian calendar)	29
Cultural achievements of the Islamic Revolution in the domestic dimension	33
Chapter three	42
The cultural and social situation of the 1990s era (1370s Iranian calendar)	42
The role of newspapers in the cultural invasion of the 1990s	44
Chapter Four	47
Social and cultural situation in the 2000s era (1380s Iranian calendar)	47
Chapter Five	51
Social situation and health status in 2010s era (1390s Iranian calendar)	51
Environmental, cultural and social damages in the 2010 era	57

chapter six	60
Social and environmental events of the 2010s era	60
Oromo lake drying up and environmental pollution	69
chapter seven	93
Social disasters in the 2010s era	93
Earthquake disaster and the roots behind earthquake in 2010s era	97
Fatal overturning of student's bus of Azad University of Science and Research in 2018	101
Chapter Eight	109
The most important events of 2019 in Iran	109
Floods in northern, central and southern provinces of Iran in Nowruz 2019	109
The story of the high price of gasoline on November 15, 2019	113
Spread of the corona virus in Iran since the winter of 2020	116
Mass Poisoning in Girls' Schools in Iran	125
Chapter nine	131
Huge socio-cultural displacements and life movement in Iran	131
The latest evaluation of democracy in Iran	145
Sources and references	147

Preface & Abstract

The contents of this book narrate the social and cultural history of Iran from the 1950s to the 2020s, covering seven decades of social and cultural transformations and the catastrophic social changes from 1961 to 2021. The book discusses the events, conditions, and cultural and social changes during different periods, both before and after the Islamic Revolution in Iran, as they have impacted the life of the author. To demonstrate and compare these social and cultural transformations, the book provides information on the social and cultural dimensions of different periods and the reasons and methods of executive management in Iran's cultural and social sectors. These are based on the author's personal experiences during their educational and professional life, as they were directly involved in and affected by the cultural, political, and social changes in Iran. Below is a summary of the contents presented.

In the section on social and cultural transformations before the Islamic Revolution, it is explained that Iran faced a cultural crisis due to censorship from the 1950s until the mid-1970s. During the 1960s and 1970s, under the rule of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, censorship of publications and the press reached its peak. By the mid-1970s, all books and publications in Iran were under the control of SAVAK (the secret police), and the issuance of licenses for newspapers and magazines was exclusively subject to the approval of this organization.

The social and cultural situation in the 1980s, which coincided with the Iran-Iraq War, was dominated by war-related news. Every day in this decade seemed to bring a new and difficult event, making it feel as though the decade was not just ten years but a century. The 1980s were a period of consolidation and survival for the Islamic Revolution in Iran. The Iranian society in this decade was eager to conquer new horizons in all areas. In the 1990s, the cultural and social situation was marked by the disarray of cultural institutions. During this decade, there were three or four decision-making authorities responsible for reviewing and approving cultural works, each operating with its own distinct perspective. This resulted in a vast number of works being submitted without thorough evaluation. Many newspapers played a significant role in what was referred to as the "cultural invasion" during this time. In the 2000s (1380s in Iranian calendar), many of Iran's intellectuals and experts were largely ignored. Political and executive authorities held a pessimistic view of expert opinions, leading to the implementation of policies such as absolute liberalization, open economic policies, full integration into the global economy, and the unchecked expansion of free trade zones in Iran. These policies, which were based on non-committal expert opinions and possibly ill-considered expert opinions, was

given to the decision-making system to reach the implementation stage. In the early 2010s (1390s in Iranian calendar), Iran faced severe challenges, including various diseases and shortages of imported medicines due to economic sanctions. During this decade, environmental and social damage reached its peak in Iran. Examples of these crises include the pollution of water, soil, and air, the drying up of Lake Urmia, and the death of thousands of birds in wetlands. Additionally, in the late 2010s, several tragic events occurred in Iran. These included earthquakes in the northern and western provinces, the deadly overturning of a bus carrying students on the campus of Azad University, severe flooding in several provinces, the killing of young protesters who opposed the rise in fuel prices, the horrifying death toll from the global COVID-19 pandemic, the acid attacks on several women in Isfahan, and the deliberate and widespread poisoning of schoolgirls in some provinces of Iran.

The purpose of writing this book is to inform and enlighten young people and those interested in the social and cultural conditions of this ancient land, Iran. I have made every effort to broadly depict the transformations and changes in Iran's social and cultural landscape over the past six decades. My aim is simply to present the events and catastrophic realities of various decades for young people and those interested in the social and cultural occurrences in Iran, not to criticize any organization or group. I have no doubt that the cultural conditions of the pre-revolution era and the social and environmental tragedies of the decades following the revolution have been accurately and faithfully described. In writing about the social and cultural transformations and changes, I have used references and sources from social and historical books and widely circulated newspapers of that time in Iran. I would like to emphasize that the primary goal of this writing is merely to recount a summary of the historical social and cultural developments in Iran. Of course, there may be some errors in these writings, for which I apologize to the esteemed readers in advance.

I present this book to friends and those who are interested.

Kavos Navidan
Spring of 2024

First part - social and cultural developments before the Islamic revolution

Chapter One

Cultural and social dimensions of the second Pahlavi regime

The intensity and effectiveness of ideological power is one of the components of soft power that receives attention and emphasis in every political system. The success of a political system in spreading its ideology across various sectors of society has a significant impact on the continuity and stability of that political system. During his reign, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who began his monarchy from one of the weakest political and social positions, sought to manage the crises threatening his rule to his advantage by expanding the ideology of Iranianism and gaining ideological legitimacy through various cultural institutions.

Iran's cultural situation from the 1950s to the mid-1970s was marked by a crisis of censorship, where censorship and cultural suppression were longstanding phenomena accompanying political tyranny in the country. This state of affairs extends into contemporary Iranian history. The practice of censorship began with the emergence of newspapers and publications, and later extended to the translation and authorship of books. As newspapers proliferated and intellectual, philosophical, and political dimensions grew, censorship took on a broader scope and reached its peak during the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. Following the start of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's reign, the press expanded rapidly, with hundreds of newspapers and magazines being published in the country until the coup on August 18, 1953 (28 Mordad 1332 Iranian calendar). During this period, despite relative political freedom, the media failed to defend the fundamental rights of the people as expected. Over the twelve years of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi's rule, there was regular monitoring of book printing and publication. However, after the August 18, 1953 coup, books faced a fate similar to newspapers and magazines. During this time, the military governor of Tehran pressured newspaper owners, cautioning them against printing any material critical of the ruling political system. Many journalists and media managers were threatened, attacked, and assaulted during this period. This trend persisted with full intensity throughout the mid-1950s until the establishment and commencement of SAVAK, it continued with full intensity with the end of military governorship. Managers of certain publications and newspapers adapted to the new conditions and collaborated with the political system of the time, receiving government support and attacking dissenters. Among the most well-known journalists was Amir Mokhtar Karimpour Shirazi,

who was arrested after the August 18, 1953 coup, subjected to prolonged torture in prison, and eventually murdered. During the years of publishing the newspaper named "Shuresh," he fiercely criticized the royal court and became a target of resentment and animosity from the Shah and Ashraf Pahlavi. Another famous journalist, was Dr. Hossein Fatemi, who sentenced to death due to his severe attacks against the Shah in the "Bakhtare Emrooz" newspaper. Dr. Hossein Fatemi served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Mossadegh's government. Towards the end of Mossadegh's tenure, he launched intense attacks against the Shah of Iran. After disappearing for a period, he was arrested, tried, and executed. during Mossadegh's premiership, significant legal restrictions or censorship regulations on the press did not exist. However, in August 1955, the National Consultative Assembly (Majlis) passed a law defining the scope of journalistic activities and imposing penalties for press-related crimes. this law was subject to broad interpretation, allowing security and judicial apparatuses to pursue media dissenters based on their own interpretations of its provisions. SAVAK, from its inception, played a primary role in monitoring the press and newspapers. At the time of its establishment, other reputable newspapers and publications were no longer being circulated, and many opposing journalists and newspaper owners withdrew from media activities. However, this newly established organization focused more on monitoring and preventing the formation of independent media. The issuance of licenses for newspaper and publication distribution became solely subject to this organization's approval. During Timur Bakhtiar's presidency over SAVAK, censorship and control over the media intensified, instilling complete fear and terror in the press landscape. In the final four years of the 1950s, SAVAK monitored newspapers and journals nationwide. during this period, most newspapers and publications in the capital fell under SAVAK's scrutiny, with Taimur Bakhtiar personally involved. SAVAK played a role in directing media content, but towards the end of 1960, newspapers regained some vitality. Censorship also relaxed to some extent towards the late March 1961 (end of the Persian year 1339). This trend continued with fluctuations until the end of Ali Amini's premiership. In the early 1970s, concurrent with General Hassan Pakravan's leadership over SAVAK and the beginning of Ayatollah Khomeini's movement, a new phase of confrontation between SAVAK and the media and press under the governance apparatus began. During the period of Prime Minister Asadullah Aalam, around eighty periodicals and newspapers were shut down under various pretexts. Those publications that were permitted to continue faced heavy censorship and strict monitoring by SAVAK. From the mid-1960s to the early 1970s, Iran experienced cultural crises and censorship that were part of an extended period of cultural repression and political authoritarianism. During the premiership of Amir Abbas Hoveida (from 1964 to 1977), Iran experienced its harshest period of censorship and control over organized media and newspapers. Media owners and journalists were constrained to operate

strictly within the framework set by SAVAK (Iran's intelligence agency) and the governing authorities. The censorship phenomenon and cultural repression persisted alongside political tyranny. The practice of censorship evolved with the emergence of newspapers and publications, as well as the translation and composition of books. As the spread of newspapers increased and intellectual, philosophical, and political components grew, censorship expanded its scope. During the reign of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, censorship reached its peak through various cultural institutions. Instead of smoothing economic growth, policies emphasized population growth, self-sufficiency. On the other hand, at the beginning of the year 1961, a campaign known as "Medinat Fadilah" (the ideal city) was initiated in Iran's media, unprecedentedly and openly promoting Israel's interests with orchestrated planning by Mossad (Israel's security organization) and the active involvement of intellectuals associated with SAVAK (the Pahlavi government's security organization). During this period, a well-organized program of visits to Israel by various Iranian delegations commenced, including several intellectuals sympathetic to socialist ideals and writers such as Khalil Maleki, Daryush Ashouri, and Jalal Al-e Ahmad. Maleki and Ashouri considered the "Socialism" they observed in Israel as an advanced example of socialism upon their return. However, Jalal Al-e Ahmad wrote articles exposing the nature of Israel. It is necessary to recall that the insidious infiltration of Zionism into Iranian culture began during the reign of Reza Shah and was, in fact, one of the goals of the resurgence of ancient ties between the Iranian and Jewish peoples in opposition to the Arabs. During this period, one of the astute and well-planned actions by the Israelis to expand their influence, both politically and culturally, was to create favorable conditions for the travel of government officials, prominent figures, intellectuals, academics, and journalists of that era to Israel. This included facilitating and encouraging such trips. For this reason, Mayer Amit, the head of Israeli military intelligence at the time, reported in 1962 after his visit to Iran, reminding Israeli political authorities that Israel was despised among the Iranian people. He added that in the coming years, new forces in Iran would rise and prosper. Mayer Amit recommended efforts to establish contact with academics, journalists, and opponents of the Shah regime. This new approach marked the beginning of a new process by Israel to engage with the media and intellectuals in Iran. Initially, these trips were conducted with the knowledge of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but as the Foreign Ministry sometimes refrained from granting permission due to various considerations, these trips began to occur without official notification. The Israelis used special methods and channels outside the Foreign Ministry to pursue these trips. For example, in 1965, 25 cultural women traveled to Israel without notifying Iranian Foreign Ministry officials, thanks to permission obtained from the director of the Haifa International Training Center during their visit to Tehran, facilitated by Ashraf Pahlavi. Additionally, during the Persian New Year (Nowruz) holidays, Israelis regularly planned to invite

Iranian officials to spend the holidays in Israel. For example, during the Persian New Year (Nowruz) in the year 1963, the Deputy Prime Minister and his wife, along with several officials and members of parliament, as well as some university presidents, were among the invitees. Additionally, many trips were taken to participate in scientific and student congresses. For instance, participation in an international seminar for students held in Israel in 1961, where Abolhassan Banisadr and Khakham Ashouri were among the invited guests. During this decade, another significant initiative by the Israeli government in terms of cultural relations between Iran and Israel was the establishment of the Persian section of Israel Radio. The primary reason for founding this section was to facilitate communication with the Jewish residents of Iran regarding migration matters. Consequently, during this period, this radio section played an important role, enabling direct communication between Israel and the Jewish community residing in Iran. Moreover, this Radio section gradually assumed a more important and significant role, which was to counter the extensive propaganda of Israel's adversaries. Given Iran's relationship with Israel, using Iranian newspapers for the propaganda of Israel's enemies in Iran was not feasible. However, the Persian section of Israel Radio played a very prominent role. It was almost the only public relations channel of Israel that was undoubtedly successful. Although it was a small section, it competed effectively with the widespread propaganda efforts of enemy countries. Additionally, the number of Iranian students receiving scholarships in Israel noticeably increased from the early 1960s. By 1964, the number of Iranian students on Israeli scholarships exceeded one hundred. Some of these students were Muslim, while others belonged to different religious groups, including Iranian Jews. The number of Iranian students in Israel continued to increase in subsequent years. By the late 1960s, the number of Iranian students in Israel exceeded 350, studying at various universities across Israel. Due to this increase in the number of Iranian students in Israel, the Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, in a letter addressed to the Minister of Education in 1965, expressed concerns about scholarships granted to Iranian nationals by Israel. The Minister of Foreign Affairs highlighted that, due to the activities of the youth leadership organization regarding the allocation of scholarships to Iranian citizens by Israel, it was not in Iran's best interest to continue this practice until official relations with Israel were established. This was particularly emphasized given the current state of Iran's relations with Arab countries, and it was deemed inappropriate for government officials to engage with Israeli authorities regarding scholarship opportunities under any other guise. In addition to this, a wide variety of training courses were offered to government employees, including those from the Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Interior, municipalities, and some military personnel. These training programs were conducted in Israel, and employees from various ministries were sent to Israel to participate in these courses. Furthermore, in the realm of cultural relations,

Israeli films were showcased in film festivals, such as the Children and Youth Film Festival held in Tehran in 1966. There were also cultural exchanges involving artistic groups, with occasional visits of artistic groups to Israel for performances. Additionally, efforts were made to establish an Iranian Studies program at Tel Aviv University, and the compilation of an Arabic-Persian dictionary, both of which were completed in 1966. These initiatives reflect cultural and artistic interactions between Iran and Israel during that period. In the realm of sports relations, it should be noted that numerous competitions took place between sports teams from universities of both countries. However, the Pahlavi government declared that Iran did not interfere in sports policies and had no objections to continuing sports relations with Israel, reflecting this stance in public discourse. It is worth mentioning that during periods of political and social unrest in Iran, publications and newspapers were prohibited from accurately reflecting news, events, and incidents. Only fabricated information dictated by SAVAK was allowed in publications. For example, when Ayatollah Boroujerdi passed away in early 1961, SAVAK imposed severe news censorship on the press. Writers, publishers, and journalists were prohibited from writing articles about his scientific, political, and social persona. Several publications which had published articles about him faced SAVAK's prosecution. Similarly, during the years 1962 and 1963 and at the beginning of Ayatollah Khomeini's uprising, the press and newspapers were directly monitored by SAVAK, and they were only allowed to publish materials provided by SAVAK regarding this uprising. Regarding the confrontations between security and intelligence forces with opponents, reports were not reflected in the media. Incidents related to Ayatollah Khomeini's opposition to the bill on Islamic associations and the conduct of a referendum, the massacre at Feizieh School in April 1963, and ultimately the uprising on June 5, 1963, were never reflected in the Iranian press. This trend continued in the years following 1964, especially after the approval of the bill of capitulation and the exile of Ayatollah Khomeini. SAVAK imposed severe news censorship on newspapers and journals, particularly when it came to coverage of political trials. Newspapers were rarely allowed to reflect any details of court proceedings, and when necessary, only dictated points from SAVAK were permitted for publication. With the beginning of the 1970s and the increase in oil prices in the global market, Mohammad Reza Shah increasingly turned to despotism, and SAVAK agents, with the cooperation of the Ministry of Information and Tourism, tightened control over media owners and journalists, were not relenting in their efforts. During that period, even publications loyal unconditionally to the despotic government were not immune from the pressures of SAVAK agents and media censors. Under the leadership of Nasser, who headed SAVAK, media censorship expanded, and media owners constantly felt the heavy shadow of SAVAK agents over their activities. What was reflected in the publications was primarily an unreal, admiring, and

exaggerated portrayal of the Shah and his royal court. It was even suggested that the country, under the leadership of the Shah, was rapidly progressing towards development and excellence, and that opponents of the government had no intention of preventing this movement, thus destined for failure. In other words, the press only reflected what was favorable to SAVAK, The Shah, and the ruling establishment. The most significant event in the realm of the press in 1974 was the closure of approximately 63 newspapers, magazines, and periodicals. The reasons for these closures were never clearly and transparently announced to the public. However, after the closure of some publications, the remaining ones, which did not exceed ten, provided the groundwork for the establishment of the Rastakhiz single-party in March 1975. Humorous and satirical newspapers were also not immune from censorship, and several humorous publications were confiscated due to publishing satirical and critical content about some social shortcomings by SAVAK. This trend continued to evolve throughout the late 1970s, with SAVAK agents actively involved in editorial boards and the management of notable publications. Consequently, SAVAK was accepted as an indispensable part of the press. During this decade, it was said that the U.S. government was implementing programs to utilize its allies in Third World countries like Iran, requiring the newspapers and media in these countries to be at the disposal of their puppet regimes for development and progress. In such conditions, the press was solely focused on reflecting one-sided news and information dictated by the government, engaging in extensive propaganda for the benefit of the government. Chief editors and managers of newspapers and publications maintained almost constant communication with SAVAK and other government agencies, and negotiations, often accompanied by threats and insults, determined the policies and approaches of these publications. Among the actions taken by SAVAK and the Ministry of Information and Tourism in response to the Shah's dissatisfaction with the content of certain widely circulated publications was the imposition of appointed editors-in-chief. Among these appointed editors were Parviz Loshani and Ali Shabani, who each held this important position for a period in the renowned magazine named "Khandaniha". During this period, SAVAK maintained a lengthy list of writers, intellectuals, and thinkers, whom they banned from writing and ordered various newspapers and magazines not to publish any material from them. Publications were also prohibited from publishing critical content, and writings from political critics and opponents of the government were never allowed to be published. Offenders were pursued by SAVAK, and in many cases, publications were pressured by SAVAK for publishing mildly critical letters, leading to efforts to identify and pursue writers. Additionally, publications and newspapers were banned from printing and publishing images and photographs of opponents, and the names of individuals like Ayatollah Khomeini and Mossadegh were prohibited from being mentioned in these publications. Additionally, SAVAK prevented the

publication of articles and photos of athletes and artists that were believed to enhance their social popularity. One of the most important figures affected, was the wrestling champion Gholamreza Takhti, whose support for the National Front, SAVAK made sensitive to any publications about him. When Takhti suspiciously passed away, publications were prohibited from publishing any material about him, and some sport magazines that had published articles about Takhti's human qualities and sporting successes came under SAVAK pressure. The respective writers were also pursued, and in some cases, SAVAK would fabricate false stories to defame political opponents. SAVAK would review the content of publications before printing and would decide to delete or add sentences and words according to their judgment. In various publications, SAVAK was instilling the notion that the Pahlavi regime was the sole fulfiller of national and religious aspirations and was leading the country toward development and prosperity. Furthermore, SAVAK censored news related to anti-Pahlavi government activities, preventing publications from writing about such matters. For example, when the Pahlavi regime sought to recognize Bahrain's independence and agree to its separation from Iran, SAVAK cautioned the media against publishing any news, reports, or articles that could conflict with this government policy. Similarly, during Iran's involvement in the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman, where hundreds of Iranian troops were killed or wounded, SAVAK imposed strict news censorship on the media. Additionally, when criticisms arose during the celebration of the 2,500-year anniversary of the Pahlavi government by international media and foreign newspapers, domestic publications were unable to publish any articles criticizing this grand event. Instead, SAVAK facilitated extensive advertising in affiliated newspapers and magazines to promote the necessity of holding these celebrations in a more magnificent and splendid manner. Among the groups of media owners, writers, and editorial boards who had connections and coordination with that organization, SAVAK had greater control over them. Directors, editors-in-chief, and other members of editorial boards of such publications showed more willingness to execute SAVAK's requests and institutionalized policies toward the media. Independent journalists and writers critical of the government were under surveillance but continued their activities despite coercion. However, writers of regime-affiliated publications received support, and SAVAK used these affiliated publications to publish desired content about government opponents, portraying them in an unfavorable light. One of SAVAK's monitoring activities involved inserting articles in affiliated publications about the role of the Pahlavi regime in supporting religious beliefs, loyalty to the Shah and the monarchy, and safeguarding religious values of Shia Islam. These measures were taken to prevent the spread of political and religious dissent by scholars and clergy. Owners of affiliated publications sometimes turned their publications into tools to exert pressure on personal opponents and create an atmosphere of intimidation. Among these, the

newspapers and journalists affiliated with the government received support for their cooperation with SAVAK and other government agencies, with the most significant support being financial assistance, acceptance of commercial advertisements, and other reports from government departments, ministries, and official authorities. Additionally, some managers, editors, and writers of these publications received monthly payments as government employees or from affiliated companies. SAVAK instructed its representatives and branches in various cities to provide facilities to increase affiliated publications, including covert purchases of large numbers of copies from various government offices, universities, and educational centers. Another reason that facilitated greater mutual dependence and collaboration between media owners, many writers, and editorial boards of newspapers and publications with SAVAK was the widespread financial corruption, ethical lapses, and similar issues among the first group, which were often complicit with and facilitated by SAVAK agents. The prevalence of corruption among the managers of government-affiliated publications typically occurred with SAVAK's knowledge, leading many owners, managers, and writers of these publications to amass significant wealth through economic and financial misconduct, among other means, with the support of powerful. Among the rewards that SAVAK and the Shah's regime allocated to managers of affiliated newspapers was the provision of luxury and expensive cars. Based on these mutual commitments, managers of government-affiliated newspapers during the revolutionary events did not hesitate to support the government and criticize and attack opponents of the Shah's regime. While many writers, journalists, and reporters who were coerced by SAVAK's pressure into misleading activities in the media openly criticized SAVAK's repressive policies in the media arena with the onset of revolutionary movements. They demanded an end to censorship nationwide. In March 1978, around 90 members of the press wrote an open letter addressed to Prime Minister Jamshid Amuzegar expressing their objection and criticism of extensive censorship in newspapers across the country. They demanded an end to SAVAK's supervision and control over the press. Furthermore, in May 1978 another letter was sent to the Prime Minister at the time, urging the swift and complete removal of press censorship. One of the actions taken by a group of media professionals and writers under SAVAK's pressure at that time was the formation of a writers' and journalists' syndicate with professional objectives. However, SAVAK operatives gradually infiltrated this syndicate, and the responsible managers of prominent newspapers and magazines in the capital, such as "Ettela'at," "Kayhan," and "Ayandegan," which had close ties with SAVAK, exerted control over this syndicate. Moreover, the SAVAK organization directly monitored the printing, publication, and distribution of books. Typically, a manuscript of a book would be submitted to SAVAK before printing and distribution, after reviewing the content, SAVAK experts would decide whether to approve its publication or seize it. SAVAK's oversight wasn't

limited solely to the content of the work but also extended to evaluating the political, social, and background history of the authors and creators of the books. If authors had a political background, their books often faced obstacles in getting published. Despite all precautions taken until the final days of the government's existence, some printing presses secretly printed materials opposing the regime. Although SAVAK often succeeded in discovering these printing operations and apprehending those involved, instilling fear among other printing press owners, but never completely halted the clandestine printing and distribution of various political, intellectual, and religious works. One notable phenomenon during the 1970s and also in the mid-1960s was the widespread printing of famous works in white covers, known as "**jeld-e safid**." These books lacked reliable covers and bindings, featuring only the original content in delicate white paper and small formats, usually without titles and produced without association to any specific printing press. These types of books were widely circulated, particularly during the 1970s, making them a significant aspect of book publishing during the second Pahlavi era. They played a notable role in disseminating political, social, and ideological writings among the people. SAVAK, in addition to censoring critical books against the government, also banned works and writings that contained critical content about foreign countries allied with the Pahlavi regime, notably including Israel. Any book criticizing Israel was prohibited, and SAVAK was taken action against offenders. For example, when Mr. Hashemi Rafsanjani translated the Arabic book named "The Palestinian Case" by Zaatir, historian and researcher from Jordan into Persian as "The Fate of Palestine" and published it far away from SAVAK 's eyes, SAVAK reacted strongly and made significant efforts to collect and confiscate copies circulated in the country, but contrary to their expectations, this book was repeatedly printed clandestinely, and SAVAK's threats and warnings were less effective. SAVAK was vigilant to prevent banned domestic books from falling into the hands of political opponents of the government abroad. It also ensured that foreign books deemed harmful were not imported into the country. Many political, social, historical, philosophical, and even fictional books during the second Pahlavi era were considered smuggled goods, and their owners were categorized as suspects and essentially political criminals. If discovered by SAVAK agents, the owners of such books faced numerous problems. In addition to censoring books, SAVAK engaged in negotiations with certain artistic and media groups, filmmakers, and documentary makers from Europe and America to produce promotional films about the Pahlavi regime and its role in Iran's development and progress, presenting a "rosy" image of Iran. This was done in collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the Court, and these groups were invited to Iran at great expense to produce promotional films favorable to the government and showcase them in foreign media. One of the most significant organizations where SAVAK played a pivotal role in setting policy

and guidance was the Iran Tourist Organization, due to its unique position in organizing foreign tourist traffic to Iran. SAVAK had a significant presence within this organization, overseeing the cultural and promotional aspects for foreign tourists. Another action taken by SAVAK was controlling the dissemination of controlled news and information about various countries worldwide in public media (radio and television). This had a direct impact on the reflection of news and issues related to those countries, with overall direction determined by SAVAK. SAVAK pursued stringent policies towards countries that did not have good relations with the Pahlavi regime, including communist countries, the Eastern Bloc and former Soviet Union, Iraq, and Egypt. These countries were among the most important ones where SAVAK closely monitored cultural, news-related, and similar matters with heightened sensitivity. Documents and evidence indicate that from its inception, SAVAK monitored cinema halls, films, and institutions related to film display and similar matters. Starting from the tenure of Teymour Bakhtiari, a commission for film display was established with active SAVAK representatives. Regulations and guidelines were developed regarding the manner and quality of displaying domestic and foreign films in cinema halls. Specific regulations were also established for foreign theatrical performances and plays, with significant importance placed on security and informational matters related to cinema display operations. SAVAK was vigilant to ensure that domestic and foreign filmmakers, cinematographers, and documentarians did not produce films depicting unpleasant and affecting scenes of the country. They also prevented the creation of films that could potentially show derogatory aspects of the life of the Shah and the royal family. However, occasionally, documentary-style films depicting distressing and harsh scenes from Iranian life were made and showcased in foreign media. SAVAK sought to prevent the creation and display of films opposing the government by exerting influence over various film studios, exhibition halls, and cinemas where filmmakers worked. Many managers and operatives at the forefront of film studios and exhibition halls were selected from trusted individuals aligned with the government. The creation and screening of any film that in any way indirectly criticized political, social, cultural, or economic conditions were prohibited, and creators of such films rarely escaped SAVAK's wrath. Meanwhile, the market for dubbing and displaying European and especially American films in Iran was very active and popular. However, from the late 1960s onward, among hundreds of films shown annually in the country, the cultural degradation and allure of scenes contrary to public morality took precedence. SAVAK initially concealed its censorship and scrutiny of films under the pretense of supporting art, morality, and national unity. They applied government standards to censor various films produced by filmmakers and creators of the Seventh Art over many years. This trend intensified throughout the 1960s and 1970s, leading to the suppression of films with social, political, and critical themes. As time passed, the production and

screening of films with substantive content were forgotten, and attention shifted toward producing empty films devoid of meaningful content. The most important official media of the country, including radio and television, were under the control and supervision of the censors during the entire reign of Pahlavi II. Many sensitive and influential positions in radio and television were held by those who collaborated with the regime. Television, due to its increasing influence on its viewers, played a greater role than radio in government propaganda objectives. Many of the censorship agents were engaged in various departments of radio and television, producing specific government programs. The regime utilized SAVAK more than television for criticizing, condemning, and isolating political opponents. Many television interviews were conducted with SAVAK's approval and coordination. SAVAK had complete control over other radio and television programs, whereby all films, series, and television shows were controlled by SAVAK agents before being broadcast. Additionally, in the 1970s, SAVAK took extensive actions regarding correspondence and communication control. Controlling people's letters, especially those of political opponents, was one of SAVAK's measures. For this purpose, SAVAK designed specific forms to obtain information from opponents' letters, and censors would control the desired letters based on defined criteria. The documents indicate that SAVAK agents controlled all correspondence and private letters of well-known clerics opposing the government, as well as those associated with them. In addition to domestic postal censors, SAVAK operatives stationed in all its foreign offices were tasked with identifying and controlling communications of political opponents and anti-government students. Letters and communications sent from inside and other parts of the world to political opponents and anti-government students in various countries were typically reviewed by SAVAK representatives and agents before reaching their destination, with their contents then sent to SAVAK centers in Iran. Furthermore, SAVAK controlled the correspondence and letters of prisoners before forwarding them to their intended recipients. Censorship of letters was not limited solely to political opponents of the government; rather, SAVAK censored the correspondence of many citizens of the country. Another action of SAVAK included telephone tapping, microphone surveillance, and utilizing receivers and transmitters to monitor conversations, discussions, opinions, and views of the people regarding the government. This surveillance was not limited to political opponents of the government but extended to the homes and workplaces of many officials and government agents. SAVAK even placed microphones and controlled the phones at the workplace and home of Amir Abbas Hoveida, the then Prime Minister under the Shah.

During the reign of Pahlavi II, with a dedication to the importance of the educational institution as a tool for legitimacy, several measures were taken to reclaim Pahlavi's power. Education was so crucial in Mohammad Reza Shah

Pahlavi's policies that he emphasized changes in culture and the educational system more than the modernization of factories and western-style street paving that the country needed (2010 Tamer). second Pahlavi's efforts to reform the country's educational structure were interrupted periodically due to the country's turbulent conditions, including the revolution of the king and the people known as the White Revolution. Mohammad Reza Shah consistently stressed that educational centers in Iran at all levels should elucidate the ideology of monarchy based on expert reviews, with full consideration of Iranian history, culture, and thought through textbooks, teacher explanations, conferences, and academic lectures for students and scholars. This led to the remarkable expansion and advancement of Iran's educational system (Pahlavi, 2010). In the early 1970s, Iran's political, economic, social, and cultural conditions were dominated by the power of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi and ultimately by Western influence. Social conditions were largely stifled, with little room for intellectual freedom, particularly in major cities where forces like SAVAK exerted tight control. However, opposition groups against the Shah's regime were engaged in underground political activities. During this decade, intellectuals were considered among the most significant opponents of the Shah's regime from SAVAK's perspective. These intellectuals were prominent and trustworthy figures within society, including university professors, writers, researchers, poets, clergy, and leading scholars, whose political and intellectual views played an influential role in shaping various forms of resistance against the Shah's government. This period witnessed the emergence of small but highly influential intellectual circles among the people, often referred to as religious intellectuals. Among them were notable figures such as Ayatollah Morteza Motahhari, Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Ja'fari, Dr. Ali Shariati, and Engineer Bazargan, who were at the forefront of religious intellectual gatherings during that time. Their roles were significant in shaping and expanding the socio-political-religious movements against the Pahlavi regime. This group of intellectuals from Iranian society during the Pahlavi regime era lived under constant pressure from SAVAK throughout the regime's existence. None of their articles, writings, speeches, or works could be published or distributed without the supervision and approval of SAVAK. Typically, agents from SAVAK monitored their collections of articles, activities, and political and cultural behaviors, often subjecting many of these individuals to summonses, interrogations, and imprisonment during the 1960s and 1970s. Many were repeatedly summoned, interrogated, and subjected to physical abuse by unidentified individuals organized by SAVAK. Their speaking engagements were also frequently disrupted by SAVAK forces, and some of their close relatives, associates, or family members were detained, interrogated, and tortured by SAVAK to put further pressure on them. Consequently, these intellectuals and thinkers saw their activities heavily restricted by censorship from the beginning, intensifying over time under the enforcement of SAVAK

and other government authorities. However, during this decade, another group of intellectuals and thinkers (especially supporters of the monarchy but opposed to the Shah) were recruited by SAVAK and the government. With the resources at their disposal, they engaged in activities aligned with the goals and desires of the government. However, a small but committed group of intellectuals throughout the 1960s and 1970s resisted coordinated efforts by SAVAK and the royal court to establish multiple dependent assemblies and groups within the court, facing some shortcomings. They bore part of the burden of the political, cultural, and intellectual struggle against the second Pahlavi regime. Consequently, SAVAK was unable throughout that period to effectively use appeasement policies with protesting and committed intellectuals, and many of these intellectuals and thinkers lost their positions in various governmental and academic sectors. Among them, Ayatollah Morteza Motahhari was prohibited from teaching at the Faculty of Theology due to his opposition to the government. SAVAK resorted to nightly and sudden attacks at the homes of these intellectuals and writers to pressure them, seizing their writings, books, and notes, and arresting them. In this regard, some intellectuals were sentenced to death in administrative courts on charges of supporting and guiding various political and leftist groups, facilitated and prepared by SAVAK. They lost their lives, and in numerous cases, individuals were pursued and imprisoned simply for possessing books and writings from these opposing groups of intellectuals and thinkers. One of the writers whose works and writings were repeatedly censored and confiscated by SAVAK was Jalal Al-e Ahmad. His works found a significant audience among political groups, activist students, and anti-regime academics. His works were classified among the prohibited books, leading to their continual smuggling and sale. Additionally, he himself was constantly under SAVAK surveillance. During this time, publications and journals that dared to publish writings from intellectuals without coordinating with SAVAK were seized. However, these actions by SAVAK rarely managed to subdue the cultural society into silence and turmoil, especially at the peak of SAVAK's violence in the years 1975 and 1976. During these years, intellectuals and writers openly addressed letters, statements, and writings to the Shah of Iran and prominent figures, protesting against the severe censorship that prevailed in society, which curtailed personal, social, and political freedoms and rights. Among these protesters, religious intellectuals felt more pressure than others, particularly because SAVAK correctly recognized the significant support for political Islam among the people, a trend that was growing over time. Consequently, figures like Dr. Ali Shariati and Professor Morteza Motahhari were continuously under SAVAK's surveillance, leading to the covert publication of their works mainly for audiences inside and outside the country. SAVAK repeatedly attempted to associate the political and ideological ideas of certain Muslim intellectuals with Marxist and communist thinking in order to portray them negatively to the people. For example, when Dr. Ali Shariati

suddenly passed away abroad, SAVAK endeavored to depict the public's perception of his views and ideas negatively by disseminating fabricated statements and letters, attempting to label him as an advocate and promoter of communist and Marxist thought.

With the initiation of popular movements during the Islamic Revolution, intellectuals endeavored in various ways to expose to their audience the hidden corners of the injustices, deficiencies, and despotic actions of the Shah's regime and SAVAK through declarations, writings, and speeches. Moreover, scholars and clergy, considered the most significant and influential political opponents of the government from the early 1960s through the 1970s, were constantly under SAVAK's surveillance, especially following the uprising of June 5, 1963, and Ayatollah Khomeini's exile to Iraq in 1965, during which SAVAK implemented plans to weaken the oppositional position of the clergy. On the other hand, SAVAK sought to prevent the growth of political Islam and Islamic cultural and political movements by strengthening clergy and religious entities affiliated with the regime and religious movements sympathetic to the government. In this context, SAVAK endeavored to minimize religious education in educational environments (schools, high schools, and universities) and redirected government resources towards supporting non-political Islam. SAVAK sought to undermine the intellectual and cultural activities of clergy opposed to the Shah's regime, imposing news and media bans on them and preventing the dissemination of any content or reports that could familiarize the public with their ideas. Another action by SAVAK was to control educational matters within the Qom seminary and restrict the scope of its activities to steer students in favor of the government's desires and prevent the growth of opposing ideologies. To achieve this, after the June 5, 1963 uprising in the 1960s, plans were devised to simultaneously change the curriculum and educational content of seminaries in the following years, alongside implementing programs to reduce the dissenting religious influence of clergy among the public. Additionally, SAVAK censored books by clergy critical of the government, preventing their publication and circulation. During this period, SAVAK also prohibited the purchase, sale, study, and possession of a substantial list of books and works by dissenting clergy, including Ayatollah Khomeini's *Resaleh Elmiyyeh* and other important works. Despite this, Ayatollah Khomeini's works were secretly printed and widely circulated among opponents, along with his speeches, declarations, and viewpoints distributed in pamphlets to his followers and enthusiasts in a clandestine manner.

SAVAK had complete surveillance over a range of activities, assemblies, centers, clubs, intellectual and cultural organizations, as well as Islamic and religious educational institutions. Despite all of SAVAK's actions, the opposition's resilience gradually deprived SAVAK of its initiative, forcing the organization into a defensive posture. By the mid-1978, some publications that had been shut down in 1974 under false pretenses, gradually resumed their

activities. Meanwhile, criticism of SAVAK expanded due to continued censorship of publications, newspapers, and other intellectual, cultural, political, and religious works. Many writers and editorial boards of newspapers and magazines protested against ongoing censorship by publishing statements of objection addressed to government officials. By mid-1978, protesters demanded the complete abolition of censorship in the realm of media, intellectual production, culture, and politics. Opposition to censorship in the media and the dissemination of intellectual, cultural, and political works intensified and extended to the 24th National Consultative Assembly. Some members of the assembly called for the elimination of censorship, although significant relaxation of censorship only occurred during the premiership of Jamshid Amouzegar in the spring and summer of 1978 under mounting pressure from opposition forces. Ultimately, only during the premiership of Sharif Emami that the government was compelled by the climax of popular movements to promise the abolition of press censorship. Finally, in October 1978, the government declared its commitment to safeguarding the freedom and activity of the media in accordance with the constitution. During the initial few months of Prime Minister Sharif-Emami's tenure and according to the government's statements about lifting censorship, SAVAK was still actively involved in controlling and censoring the press and other intellectual and cultural productions. However, after the fall of Sharif-Emami's government and during Azhari's premiership, SAVAK continued its efforts to censor the press and prevent the publication and dissemination of cultural and political works. Additionally, Bakhtiar during his short tenure as prime minister, also promised to lift censorship, although it had long been evident that the culture of censorship and censorship policies of SAVAK and the government were bound to face inevitable defeat in the face of the people's growing movement. It's worth mentioning that in the summer of 1977, Iran continued to experience student protests and unrest. During the same year, Mohammad Reza Shah declared his alignment with human rights policies advocated by U.S. President Carter, announcing that he would create political openness in the country. Consequently, in August 1977, he dismissed Amir Abbas Hoveyda from the premiership and appointed Jamshid Amozegar as prime minister. Following this, he declared that the law allowing the speedy trial of opponents in military tribunals would be abolished. Additionally, he acknowledged widespread corruption within government institutions by forming a commission to combat corruption within the Shah's regime. In November 1977, Ayatollah Seyyed Mostafa Khomeini, the elder son of Ayatollah Khomeini who was in exile and played a significant role in guiding and coordinating the struggle against the Iranian regime, suspiciously passed away. The political Islamic ideology that took shape during the years leading up to the Islamic Revolution played a significant role in delegitimizing the Pahlavi regime. This ideology possessed two fundamental characteristics: firstly, it identified colonial policies and foreign economic, political, and cultural

interventions as the cause of Iran's misfortunes and dark days. Secondly, it advocated a return to one's own roots, both in terms of belief and culture, namely a return to Islam, as the primary solution to societal problems. Therefore, by drawing from Islamic teachings and designing a revolutionary ideology, efforts were made to address the core issues and aspirations of society, namely the pursuit of freedom, independence, and social justice (Karimian: 2002). Essentially, the high-risk gamble taken by the Shah in promoting ideologies through cultural institutions was to eliminate or forget Islam. The Shah's assumption was that by removing Islamic spiritual foundations from people's minds, no consolidated resistance force would emerge, and there would be no Islamic movement to contend with. Despite opposition to the Shah's regime, Ayatollah Khomeini, as the leader of the Islamic ideology, broke the longstanding alliance between the clergy and the Shah's court and explicitly opposed the regime's policies. Following the emergence of the White Revolution principles, Ayatollah Khomeini denounced them and, in a speech on June 5, 1963 (15 Khordad 1342 Iranian Calendar) compared the Shah to Yazid, urging people to rise against him and expel him from the country, in the subsequent years, the clergy reacted to the approval of the Capitulation Act, the coronation celebrations, and the 2,500-years celebration. Ayatollah Khomeini explicitly condemned these actions as contradictory to the country's interests, benefits, and independence, stating, "Islamic principles are opposed to monarchy; demolish the palaces of the despotic Shah." Monarchy is one of the most shameful and ugliest relics (Madani: 1999).

Social and political crisis in the royal regime of second Pahlavi

In January 1978, President Carter of the United States visited Tehran. The Shah's enthusiasm with Carter's praise and the support of America and Western countries for his government led to an order from the Shah after Carter's trip to have a strongly worded article written against Ayatollah Khomeini. One week after Carter's visit to Iran, the famous article titled "Iran and Red and Black Colonization" was published in a newspaper called "Ettela'at" in January 1978. The publication of this insulting article in Ettela'at newspaper faced immediate reactions from religious scholars, clergy, and the people of Qom. The protests on January 9th of that year escalated into a military attack on the people, resulting in deaths and injuries among civilians, as well as arrests and exile of many religious scholars. The scope of protests expanded, leading to further military interventions on February 18, 1979 when the army of the Shah's regime intervened during the Arba'een ceremonies held in Tabriz city for the martyrs of Qom city. The army of the royal regime entered the scene and shot the people and martial law was declared in Yazd, Isfahan and Shahreza cities. Following these tragedies, including the cinema Rex fire in Abadan city, Jamshid Amozegar the Prime Minister at the time was forced to resign, and Sharif Emami was appointed as Prime Minister, purportedly advocating for national reconciliation. However, he also failed to prevent the expansion of public protests by proposing changes to the Shah's regime policies. Extensive demonstrations by the people of Tehran, held after the Eid al-Fitr prayers on September 4, 1978, further heightened the fear of the Shah, his government, and America. Three days later, around five hundred thousand people in Tehran marched with slogans such as "Death to the Shah," "America, go to home," "Hussein is our leader, Khomeini is our leader," and also chanting "Independence, Freedom, Islamic Republic." It was decided that the following day's demonstrations would be held in a square called Jaleh (now is known as Martyrs' Square) in Tehran, but that night, while the people were asleep in Tehran and eleven other cities in Iran, martial law was declared. On the morning of 8th September of 1978, people took to the streets in Tehran, thousands of people gathered in Jaleh Square (now known as martyrs Square). The military and commandos of the army were unable to disperse the crowd, so they resorted to shooting at the people with machine guns from tanks and also used helicopters to scatter the crowds using tear gas and other riot control methods. Following the brutal massacre of Iranian civilians, Carter supported the Shah of Iran and his actions to restore order. However, within the White House, there were serious disagreements on how to deal with the Iranian Islamic Revolution, and these disagreements led to confusion for Carter and the

Shah in suppressing the people and the Islamic Revolution. With increasing public demonstrations in Iran at the same year, the Iraqi government, following a secret agreement and coordination with America, expelled Ayatollah Khomeini from Iraq. Ayatollah Khomeini went to Kuwait on October 5, 1978, but Kuwait did not allow his entry. Meanwhile, Iraq also denied entry of Ayatollah Khomeini. As a result, Ayatollah Khomeini and his companions went to France on October 7, 1978. However, as soon as the French President was informed of Ayatollah Khomeini's unexpected arrival, the Shah's opinion on this matter was sought, and subsequently, Ayatollah Khomeini was allowed to stay. The Shah and America's assumption was that Ayatollah Khomeini's departure from Iran would lead to his disconnection from the revolutionary movement. However, with better communication conditions for student activists in France under the leadership of the revolution, contacts became easier, and messages increased thereafter. On November 4, 1978, a large group of students and protesters at Tehran University were martyred by military and Police forces. Scenes from this incident broadcasted on Iranian television stirred public emotions. Concurrently, alongside student protests in Tehran and other Iranian cities, Iranian students residing in European and American countries, as well as Iranian Islamic students in Pune, India, organized extensive demonstrations outside the Iranian consulate in Mumbai. Many Iranian students in India, along with members of the Islamic Association in Pune city, participated in these protests against the policies and actions of the government and the Shah. Following the student protests in Tehran and other cities in Iran, and the activities of student associations abroad, Sharif-Emami was dismissed from the premiership, and General Azhari was appointed in his place. However, on the same day, more intense demonstrations took place in Tehran, during which part of the British embassy was set on fire. Then, on November 6th of that year, Mohammad Reza Shah admitted in a speech that he had heard the message of the Iranian revolution and pledged that the mistakes, corruption, and oppression against the Iranian people would not be repeated. As a part of the initial efforts to reduce dissatisfaction and restore calm, Azhari's government arrested several prominent figures, including former Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hoveida and General Nasiri, head of SAVAK (the Shah's intelligence agency). However, Ayatollah Khomeini warned the people that these were superficial and deceitful actions. Another important and decisive crisis of the Iranian Islamic Revolution was the historic demonstrations and processions of the people on Ashura in the year 1978. Ayatollah Khomeini called upon the people to participate in this grand day of procession, and on the first night of Muharram, people came out to the streets. However, the Shah's regime responded by violently suppressing the mourners, leading to ruthless massacres of people in southern Tehran and other cities across the country, creating the grounds for the massive Ashura procession. A remarkably organized and disciplined crowd moved towards Azadi Square (Freedom Square), with an estimated 4 to 5 million people in

Tehran alone, and over 16 million people throughout the country participating in the demonstrations that day. It's worth mentioning that the total population of Iran at that time was announced to be around 36 million people. The magnitude and scale of these demonstrations on that day, along with their discipline and unity, increased the fear of the Shah and the United States government. The statement for this Ashura procession was read by Ayatollah Beheshti, reaffirming the overthrow of the monarchy, the return of Ayatollah Khomeini to the country, the formation of the Islamic Republic government, and calling upon the Iranian military to join the people. Under these circumstances, General Azhari resigned from the prime premiership, and Shapour Bakhtiar, a member of the National Front, was appointed as the new prime minister.

During this time, disagreements among American policymakers made the situation even more critical for Carter and the Shah of Iran. The National Security Council of the United States was seeking a coup and instigating bloodshed in Iran, with the US State Department and the CIA considering deceiving the Iranian people by replacing Bakhtiar with the Shah and riding the wave of the revolution. With the closure of all the ways and handcuffs to keep the Shah in the country, the American effort was directed towards preserving the structure of the Iranian military. For this purpose, General Huyser, Deputy Commander of US forces in Europe, was dispatched to Iran in January 1979. General Huyser's task was to coordinate with the military leaders to support the Bakhtiar government and, if necessary, carry out a military coup against the revolution and preserve strategic interests as perceived by the United States. During this time, American officials' efforts to overcome popular protests and create divisions among revolutionary forces did not succeed, as the people continued to demand the overthrow of the Shah's monarchy and the establishment of an Islamic republic. On January 16, 1979, Mohammad Reza Shah and his wife Farah Pahlavi fled Iran after the formation of the Provisional Government. Although the Shah was supposed to go initially to the United States, Carter deceitfully sent him to Egypt instead. Upon the announcement of the Shah's escape through radio and television, celebrations erupted across the country. Following the Shah's departure from Iran, protests continued in various cities, with regime elements in some cities resorting to firing upon civilians. During this time, Ayatollah Khomeini, from France, issued a statement urging military personnel to leave their barracks and service in the army. Following that announcement, the escape of officers and soldiers from the barracks accelerated, and on January 19, 1979, coinciding with the Arbaeen Sayyid shahada (fortieth day after the martyrdom), the Iranian people once again expressed their hatred and disgust towards the Pahlavi government and reiterated their demand for independence, freedom, and an Islamic republic. At this time, Ayatollah Khomeini announced that he would soon return to Iran. Amid these events, with the resignation of Seyed Jalal al-Din Tehrani as the head of the Monarchy Council, the council effectively disintegrated. Despite

the possibility of an assassination attempt on the life of Ayatollah Khomeini, on February 1, 1979, amidst one of the greatest historical Welcome he returned to Iran. Ayatollah Khomeini, in his speech at Behesht-e Zahra cemetery in Tehran on the same day, while offering condolences to the families of the martyrs, criticized the illegitimacy of the Pahlavi regime. Following the Revolution Council's recommendation, Mehdi Bazargan was chosen as the interim Prime Minister, which was officially announced to the public on February 6, 1979. Following this news, Bakhtiar, the last prime minister of the Shah's regime, on the same day, in a treacherous act, canceled the contract to deliver military equipment to the Iranian army, which had been purchased from the United States for seven billion dollars. Considering that the payment for this contract had already been made to the United States, all of this amount went into the pockets of the American government. With the fall of the Pahlavi regime, Shapour Bakhtiar, after a period of hiding in Tehran, fled with mysterious support abroad and settled in Paris. During this time in Tehran, clashes began among the army forces, and many soldiers who were forced to shoot at the people either surrendered their weapons to their commanders or fled the scene. Ayatollah Khomeini declared on that day, the military governor's announcement was illegitimate and that the people should not pay any attention to it. Consequently, with the issuance of a new declaration, Ayatollah Khomeini on February 10, 1979, rallied the people to support the air force, which the Imperial Guard had attacked, and within a short period, with extensive participation across the country, military and urban centers fell into the hands of the people one after another, leading to the collapse of the regime's bases. It's important to note that the officers of the Tehran Air Force, who were opposed to the Shah's regime, succeeded in a fierce battle against the Imperial Guard forces in Jaleh Square of Tehran, sacrificing their lives, and simultaneously, Islamic student associations abroad undertook similar actions to occupy embassies or consulates outside the country. In Iran, upon witnessing the collapse of critical centers, the Council of Army Commanders declared their neutrality through a statement, and ultimately, on February 11, 1979 (22 Bahman 1357, Iranian Calendar), the Shah's regime completely collapsed. Upon hearing the revolution broadcasted on the radio, people celebrated with unparalleled joy and happiness, marking the end of the Pahlavi monarchy and the eve of the Islamic Revolution. Engineer Mehdi Bazargan, appointed as the interim Prime Minister by Ayatollah Khomeini on February, 1979. He commenced his work upon establishing his office at the Prime Minister's headquarters. Ayatollah Khomeini assigned four tasks to the interim government through a decree, which included:

- 1- Administration of the country, 2- Conducting a referendum to determine the country's political system 3- Establishing an Assembly of Experts to draft and approve a new constitution 4 - Organizing elections for the previous National

Assembly under the new constitution. On February 14, 1979, Engineer Bazargan introduced his cabinet, which consisted almost entirely of members and supporters of the Freedom Movement and the National Front.

The second part - cultural and social developments after the Islamic revolution

Chapter Two

A sociological look at the 1980s (1360s Iranian calendar)

An Iranian sociologist believes that with the expansion of social networks and alongside historical documentaries on satellite channels, the collective memory has gradually shifted attention from the 1980s to the 1970s eras (1360s to 1350s Iranian calendar). According to ISNA, Fardin Alikhah stated that personalities, faces, films, and objects from the 1970s are gradually becoming more prominent in the media. On social networks, contemporary Iranian history is divided into pre- and post-1970s eras, while the 1980s are fading into the background. He continued: It is important not to forget that in the initial narrative of the 1980s, there is no political presence, and it seems that the collective memory has no interest in addressing politics in the 1980s. Collective memory is only interested in discussing things like egg shampoo, sandwich bread, and the way news was delivered by a deceased television presenter. However, in the collective memory's portrayal of the 1970s, discussions about everything including politics, culture, economics, and society are emerging, and moreover, without any critical scrutiny, a sort of nostalgia is forming around all these areas. This sociologist stated that the 1980s hold a distinct place in the collective memory of Iranians, with decades before and after it always in the background. He continued: Collective memory is one of the areas studied in social sciences, dealing with ideas, judgments, memories, and narratives we have about a period, an event, a place, or a historical figure. For example, what do we remember about them and what feelings do we have towards them? What aspects do we emphasize, what aspects do we trivialize, and what aspects do we overlook? Collective memory can be understood based on various sources including people's conversations in streets and alleys, films, images, and writings available in the media. The sociologist emphasized the importance of the term "memory" in "collective memory," adding: Memory has characteristics. For example, memory can be strong or weak. Memory can suffer from forgetfulness, or it can remember things again upon seeing certain things. In this regard, collective memory in some societies is strong, while in others it is weak. Some societies have forgetful collective memories, while others meticulously record events in their memory. Alikhah continued: Researchers in this field believe that when mass media, alongside other institutions like schools, were under government control, managing and

directing collective memory was easier, and governments could present their preferred narrative and interpretation of history to society through their media. With the emergence of competing media, this has become more difficult because rival narratives of historical events are presented to society, affecting the portrayal of collective memory. He stated that the 1980s are accompanied by a deep nostalgia for Iranian society, primarily understood through media works and common objects of that decade. Some of these signs have been depicted in Iranian films like "Amber Nahang (Amber whale), "Nafas" (Breath), and the TV series "Vaziate Sefid" (White Status). The sociologist added: In this narrative of the 1980s, there is no mention of ideological values or the revolutionary ideals of the Islamic Republic. Similarly, politics is absent from this narrative, essentially presenting a depoliticized view of the 1980s. In some cases, politics is reduced to a mere inquiry about the relationship between a couple inside a car. Alikhah published this article titled "When the 1970s Gradually competed with the 1980s" on his personal page in the virtual space, stating: With the emergence of satellite networks, opposition groups to the Islamic Republic have gradually presented different narratives of the 1980s. As mentioned in the previous narrative, the political atmosphere of the 1980s was predominant. In the new narrative, political aspects become more pronounced compared to its media and social aspects. However, despite all these efforts, the new narrative of the 1980s has not been able to overshadow the original nostalgic narrative. The 1980s still retain their nostalgia. shaped gown, scarves, cassette tapes, and video device are still the dominant imagery of the of the 1980s. Looking down at the 1980s, we see a turbulent decade, but in collective memory, it is a decade of passing joys. This sociologist said: Undoubtedly, paying attention to the 1970s has multiple sociological reasons which can be reviewed in a separate article. The journal "Khorasan" wrote: The generations of the 1980s and 1990s in Iran, known worldwide as Y Generation, are apparently the first generation that teaching their parents. This generation has grown up in a world of computers, the internet, and rapid advancements in information and communication technology, each having a relative affinity with these spaces. They have sought refuge in the virtual space, which is evident from their daily observations and activities in virtual environments. What is it that makes generations have different behaviors, and why are younger individuals so immersed in virtual networks? Why have personal photo albums been replaced by Instagram in today's world? The answer to this last question is not particularly difficult. Perhaps Instagram offers a thousand things that albums couldn't. A sociologist and university professor who has studied and researched generations in Iran believes that, the inefficiency of the meaning-making apparatus has had a significant impact on the formation of young people's mentalities. Life in the older virtual spaces, meaning the time of our parents and grandparents, was a kind of real existence, perhaps one might say a defined life. In today's world, young people referred to as the 1980s and 1990s

generations and even the youngest, the 2000s generation experience separate lives, which is life in the virtual space. Why is the virtual space so important? Or why is it that we cannot separate life in the virtual space from daily life? Each generation that has encountered the internet had a unique relationship with this subject. The internet was a phenomenon for the generation of the 1980s but a part of daily life for the 1990s and 2000s generations, and for someone born in the 1980s, computers and the internet were a discovery in their time, a fresh perspective of the world. However, for the 1990s generation in Iran, computers and the internet have been around as long as they can remember, just as bowls, cups, and household items are now commonplace. For this generation and for the 2000s generations, Instagram, Facebook, Twitter, and all these networks are routine. Many young people we refer to as belonging to the 1990s or 2000s seem to live days and nights in virtual networks. They see the world in terms of **likes and followers**, and this world is actually their value space, where they take life seriously. When young people don't see much in the real world, they seek refuge in an inner and spiritual world filled with meanings. What's wrong with this retreat? Problems start right here. The malign form of retreating inward leads to addiction. Sometimes it's addiction to drugs, sometimes to social media, and sometimes to risky friendship groups. It's not bad to have parties, but when we limit their world, they invariably move towards their own world. There's risk in everything they do, which makes the situation dangerous. Imagine if we redirected their life energy towards creation, art, culture, science, and social activities. Fears and anxieties, whether due to social or global issues, influence their behavior, lifestyle, and perception of their own future. Children of the computer era, with PCs, the internet, satellite TVs, the emergence of the World Wide Web, blogs, wikis, and encyclopedias written by people, teach their parents how to use computers, and the shape of the family has changed. For a better understanding, I'll talk about two generations: the 1980s and 1990s. Those born in the 1980s till 1990s are the generation who have experienced war, costs, epics, and hardships. Later on, they witnessed coupon economics and post-coupon economics. They experienced ideologies and pragmatism. Leisure time became important to them, they initiated the lifestyle movement to express their existence. Love was an important subject for them, and they fell in love and faced heartbreak. The generation of the 1980s has relatively extensive political experience and many memories, but the experiences of the 1980s and 1990s are different. Many things that were phenomena and memories for the 1980s generation are ordinary topics for the 1990s generation. Politics is more of a narrative for this generation, entertainment and pleasure are important to them. This generation has less political experience but a lot of communicative experience. They experience the world through the internet. They see the world before us and become informed earlier than everything else. They have a feeling that, due to a sense of void, they want to jump from here to there frequently. The post-revolution generation refers to those who born in the 21st century.

This generation has witnessed phenomena like ISIS, and platforms like microblogs, Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram are considered outdated for them. Their generation is the generation of digital children, very pluralistic and unpredictable. What is the best societal approach to these changes? In my opinion, creating third spaces could have a positive impact. Adolescents and young adults are either at home or attending school and university, facing various challenges at home while finding the educational environment at school and university inadequate. They do not have a clear vision. In such circumstances, what they need is a third space. The educational system is alien to real needs. Garrison and ideological training patterns clash with real-life situations, suppressing children whose self-esteem is diminished by reducing everything to scores in boring and repetitive lessons. This is where the importance of a third space lies a place to create fresh meanings.

Music and social life of Iran in the 1980s era

The main goal is to investigate the role of cassette tapes in the cultural audio landscape of the 1980s in Iran. Music was one of the most important domains that needed to be purified according to the Cultural Revolution from what existed during the Pahlavi era. In the years following the revolution, the general culture, through the reproduction and distribution of cassette tapes, preserved its attachment to pre-revolutionary music, which gave rise to a black market for these tapes. Thus, after the Islamic Revolution in Iran, cassette tapes took on a new role in shaping unauthorized auditory culture. To investigate this issue, a theoretical framework was used, which goes away from the historical duality of subject and object, and goes to the concept of agency in order to be able to discuss the power of agency of objects, in the same proportion as humans have the power of agency. Based on the findings, cassette tapes, which recorded unauthorized music from pre-revolutionary Iran or from Los Angeles, on the body of homogenizing Iranian culture of the 1980s, they created situations like grooves in which an underground listening style was created, and this was a challenge for the homogenizing cultural engineering of the Islamic Republic in the 1980s. The Islamic Revolution in Iran not only brought about transformations in political dimensions but also led to profound changes in other areas. One of these main areas was culture. The Islamic Revolution achieved significant cultural accomplishments for the people of Iran over forty years, achievements that can be examined internally and externally.

Cultural achievements of the Islamic Revolution in the domestic dimension

Simultaneously with the establishment of the Pahlavi regime, Reza Shah sought to combat religious and Islamic culture by reviving antiquarianism. In this project, Reza Shah aimed to marginalize Islam as a superior culture. He endeavored to promote nationalism. The victory of the Islamic Revolution and the introduction of Islam as a school of struggle and, in the view of religious scholars, the only path to human happiness, not only invalidated the strategy of the Pahlavi regime but also demonstrated that nationalism not only does not conflict with Islam but these two can be introduced as the identity of every Iranian without extremism and sacrifice. Attention to the cultural sphere and efforts towards its growth were among the first duties of the Islamic government, which were explicitly emphasized in the constitution. Therefore, positive changes and progress in cultural matters were placed on the agenda of officials after the victory of the Islamic Revolution. The Cultural Revolution was one of the most significant cultural initiatives following the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, which took place in the field of education. The first effective action in this regard was Ayatollah Khomeini's Nowruz message in March 21, 1980, emphasizing the necessity of creating a "fundamental cultural revolution in universities nationwide," "purging professors associated with the East and West," and "transforming the university into an environment for the compile Islamic higher sciences " to emphasize cultural independence. Following this, Ayatollah Khomeini issued the order to establish the Cultural Revolution Headquarters on June 13, 1980. Therefore, the Cultural Revolution Headquarters, with an emphasis on changing values, settling accounts, and purifying the academic and university environment, invited experts from various fields to introduce new programs. Its initial goals included determining the cultural policy of the Islamic society, developing the educational system in Iran, integrating and dissolving some existing higher education institutions, establishing new universities, reviewing and determining the content of school and university textbooks and curricula, reviewing the academic staff, and selecting professors, among other tasks. The Cultural Revolution Headquarters structured itself with a coordination office and three sections: pre-university education, higher education, and academic jihad. The Higher Education section included various components such as "educational planning," "translation, authoring, and correction of university textbooks," "refinement," "management and organization of universities," and "university educational structure." After two and a half years of effort, the Cultural Revolution Headquarters reopened universities, transforming the academic and student environment of the country.

However, the importance of preserving and safeguarding Iran's cultural independence and the extension of the cultural revolution into the societal framework and all educational mechanisms and strategic planning in this regard led the Cultural Revolution Headquarters to pass its responsibilities to a higher institution named the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution. Thus, Ayatollah Khomeini, in a message on December 10, 1984, emphasized the widespread implementation of the cultural revolution in all aspects of Iran, leading to the formation of the "Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution." In a part of this message, Ayatollah Khomeini stated: "The departure from the corrupt Western culture and the replacement of it with the instructive, Islamic, national, and cultural revolution in all fields across the country (Iran) requires such effort and endeavor that it will take many years of hard work and deep-rooted struggle against the entrenched influence of the West. I deem it necessary to strengthen this institution to further the revolution across the country, with gratitude for the efforts of the Cultural Revolution Headquarters to enrich the revolution. "The formation of the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution was one of the important and fundamental steps in eradicating Western culture in the country, which was able to achieve its most important Islamic objectives.

The establishment of academic jihad

The academic Jihad was actually the first institution established from the Cultural Revolution Headquarters, formed in August 1980 with the aim of identifying and utilizing the liberated resources of universities, including human resources, technical equipment, laboratories, medical facilities, and other areas, to develop a program for utilizing these resources, supervising university activities in accordance with the new system, preventing deviations, providing research and executive personnel for constructive jihad and other revolutionary and popular institutions, and Islamizing the university based on Islamic criteria. It achieved significant accomplishments in pursuit of its goals.

Press and books

The assessment of the diversity and volume of publications in various subjects, the development and expansion of television and radio networks of the Islamic Republic of Iran within the country and beyond its borders, the construction and development of cultural and artistic centers, the organization of dozens, and even hundreds, of domestic and international book exhibitions, the increase in reading rates among the people, the quantitative and qualitative increase in audiovisual works, especially in the film sector, and achieving global successes in this field, and most importantly, the enhancement of public awareness and social insights at the societal level, are among the most significant cultural steps

of the Islamic Republic of Iran. During the second Pahlavi era, only 86 journals and an average of 2,000 book titles were published annually, which according to cultural officials, most of them did not have suitable scientific content, and many were published on trivial subjects. Today, in the Islamic Republic of Iran, more than 3,400 journals are published with various tastes and perspectives, and about 2,500 journals are in the process of obtaining licenses, with approximately 53,000 book titles being published annually. The number of registered book titles in the National Library from 1937 to 1978 was a total of 11,000 titles, averaging 275 book titles annually, which after the victory of the Islamic Revolution, from 1979 to 2017, it reached an average of 32,049 book titles annually and a total of 1,281,996 book titles.

Radio and TV

Mass media like radio and television are powerful tools for conveying cultural concepts and values in any society. The efforts of IRIB (Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting) to elevate public culture after the victory of the Islamic Revolution led to structural transformations within the organization and the establishment of groups such as Islamic education, Youth, Culture and Arts, Film, and Cinema in radio and television networks. The initiative to launch specialized radio and television networks like Radio Farhang, Radio Maarif, Radio Javan, and others reflects a profound transformation. Today, more than 130 provincial, national, regional, and international radio and television networks cover their own programs. Among these, over 35 radio and television networks broadcast programs to audiences worldwide.

Art

The mission of "art" as a cultural agent and messenger contributes to the elevation and advancement of society's culture. After the victory of the revolution, serious attention was given to cultural and artistic centers. In the field of art, particularly theater, officials emphasized a deep focus on traditional forms of theater such as Taa'zieh (religious emotion play), Puppetry, street theater, and also modern forms like tele-theater, which led to increased public interest in this art. Key cultural activities that took place after the victory of the Islamic Revolution include the Fajr International Film Festival, the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance Film Festival, the Growth Educational Film, The Fajr National Theater Festival, provincial theater festivals, Fajr National Song Festival, international competitions for the memorization and recitation of the Holy Quran, book reading competitions, essay writing competitions, ethnography and traditional arts exhibitions, Quran exhibitions, cultural heritage exhibitions, and international book exhibitions are among the most important

cultural activities that have taken place after the victory of the Islamic Revolution.

Attention to religious culture in Iran

Attention to Iran's religious culture at the level of the general population has been another achievement of the Islamic Republic's cultural efforts. Although precise statistics cannot be presented on this matter, one can easily perceive this shift in people's culture towards religious culture through direct observation and fieldwork. For example, in the 1980s, we witnessed the emergence of thousands of religious gatherings and widespread participation of people, especially the youth, in religious activities such as seclusion (Etikaf), pilgrimages to holy sites like Mecca, the holy shrines in Iraq and Syria, Mashhad, and other pilgrimage destinations, showing an unparalleled growth compared to the past. The Islamic Republic system, born out of this revolution, endeavored to create a conducive environment for the inclination towards values and religiosity by promoting Islamic teachings through various means and diverse methods, including national media, education, higher education, alongside mosque activities, cultural centers, and reinforcing religious beliefs among the people, especially the younger generation. Mosques, due to their important role in raising awareness among the people, regained their prominent position during the Islamic Revolution period and significantly expanded their activities and roles. This transformation began during the peak months of struggle and revolution, the final months of the Pahlavi regime, and reached its peak in the early years of the revolution.

Cultural achievements of the revolution in the foreign dimension

The Islamic Revolution of Iran, in addition to its domestic cultural impacts, also had notable cultural influences beyond the country's borders. Some of these influences include: The spread of revolutionary ideology- Supporting the rights of oppressed nations- Active presence in regional and international affairs- Supporting the rights of Muslims around the world- Promoting Islamic literature and art- Support for national and anticolonial campaigns. We can also mention the following:

Realization of revolutionary slogans outside the borders of the country

The Islamic Revolution of Iran introduced new cultural values into the political struggle of Islamic movements. One of these values was a commitment to jihad. After the Islamic Revolution, Islamic movements embraced jihad, martyrdom, and sacrifice as fundamental principles. Peoplehood, which was one of the characteristics of Iran's Islamic revolution in the 1980s, found its way into

Islamic political movements. Emulating slogans from the Iranian Revolution became another form of influence from the Iranian Islamic Revolution. For example, the Egyptian people's slogan "La Sharqiya va La Gharbiya" (No East and No West), the Kashmiri people's chants of "Allahu Akbar" and "Khomeini is the Leader," and the Palestinian people's chants of "La Elaha Ella Allah" (There is no god but Allah) and "Allahu Akbar" (Allah is the Greatest) exemplify this influence. Another aspect of the Iranian Islamic Revolution that is seen among contemporary Islamic political movements is the emphasis on hijab (Islamic scarf). With the victory of the Islamic Revolution, the inclination towards wearing hijab increased in various parts of the world. Additionally, conducting various protests in the region similar to those in Iran against oppression and tyranny represents another cultural impact of the Iranian Islamic Revolution on contemporary Islamic and political movements.

Revival of Islamic values and traditions

Given the prevailing atmosphere before the victory of the Islamic Revolution, Muslims in many countries, especially in Western societies, were under the dominance and influence of Western thoughts and culture. They refrained from displaying their religiosity and religious customs and traditions, and Islamic values and traditions were neglected or overlooked. One of the cultural impacts of the Islamic Revolution was that it gave Muslims the spirit and courage to demonstrate their commitment to their religious beliefs and values proudly, highlighting their dignity and honor not only in their own societies but also on the global stage, including within cultural centers in Europe. Therefore, these achievements have expanded not only in Iran over the past 40 years but also on a global scale.

Ten years passed like a century

In the 1980s in Iran, every day felt like a hard and perilous event. It was so sensitive and dangerous that it seemed like not just 10 years had passed, but a whole century. The 1980s were a decade of stabilization and survival of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Therefore, enemies emerged from every corner to ensure that the revolution would not endure.

According to the Fars Plus magazine, the 1980s in Iran represent a particular quality of life that is not much more than a decade, yet it has become so memorable for Iranians that it feels like they are talking about a longer period of time. This decade is mostly associated with nostalgic memories. The political and economic events of those days are usually discussed and analyzed in specialized and historical-political articles, which may have a special audience and less general attention. Nevertheless, this decade is a combination of all

these elements; its sweetness, bitterness, and enduring memories. The 1980s were a decade of stabilizing the revolution, a decade of war and resistance, of simple living and deep joys. It involved Heartbreak and terror; Seditions and military riots of the hypocrites, Death of the founder of the Islamic Revolution, and the entrustment of leadership to Ayatollah Khamenei. Of course, one should not overlook the sweet memory of liberating Khorramshahr and the return of the first group of Iraqi-imposed war prisoners to their homeland in 1990. The 1980s, in a sensitive sense, represent the most critical period of the Iranian Islamic Revolution. It was a decade full of ups and downs, and perhaps it's best to start recalling its bitter aspects by remembering its sweet memories to endure its painful reminiscences. Only those who truly understood it can speak of what happened during the days of people's resistance and the enemy's calamities. Some believe that the 2010s era share similarities with the 1980s in some respects, but it seems that nothing can examine this view as thoroughly as a detailed review of the 1980s.



For many peoples, the 1980s era are remembered through symbols like yellow telephone booths, lines at milk stores, and black-and-white television channels. The years that, when the only way to find out about family members who were late was to come and ask them. and there was no news of mobile phones. Paper maps replaced GPS, and there was no concept of uploading or downloading. If someone wanted to listen to their favorite music, they patiently waited for it to play on the radio again and then recorded it. Public baths, red plastic shopping baskets, returning of soft drink and milk bottles to the neighborhood grocery store, and Ferris wheel that played the role of a mobile amusement park for

children are just a few of the many nostalgic memories. However, the 1980s were more than just these elements. From the perspective of children of that decade, it was an exciting period, as described by the children of yesterday. The poems, songs, and even television programs tailored for children in that era were vastly different from those generation before and after. The generation that was born in the arms of war and grew up as a child, even until the mid-1990s the bitter taste of war was still under their teeth. Most of the dynamic characters of that period evoked the atmosphere for these children as if losing and being away from loved ones was an undeniable reality. Poems with single bit or words like "Once again, the morning bird..." or "Last night, I dreamed of my dad again" etched deeply into the minds of children of the 1980s. Revolutionary themes were prominent, to the extent that anthems like this one, sung solo: "Who was it, who asked, what do you have on your lips?" And the choir members, without delay and melodiously, responded: "Blossoms of outcry, the slogan of war and jihad." This chant echoed from school corridors to homes for many students of the 1980s era.



The days when the anniversary of the Holy Defense Week coincided with the reopening of schools marked a strange period for its students. Empty classroom desks. The seats of classmates who became martyrs on the war front lines or under missile attacks were seemingly filled by a bunch of flowers bearing the inscription, "Greetings to heavenly classmates!" What made the 1980s a turning point and enduring decade was not just its sweet memories. This decade, without pretense, was one of the most eventful, not only in the history of the Islamic Revolution but also in the history of Iran. The events that unfolded

during this decade were so profound that the esteemed Leader of the Revolution referred to this period as "An oppressed decade" and announced the enemy's failed attempts to seek revenge through the method of "replacing the place of executioner with the martyr." The events of the 1980s are bitter incidents in the history of life of those who remember those days. For a generation that was young at the time or had not yet been born, the images, statistics, films, newspapers, and available articles provide a great opportunity to understand the hardships of those days. It is advisable for young and sensitive individuals with heartache to refrain from viewing them. The visual evidence of the crimes committed by the terrorist groups of the Mujahideen-e Khalq and Monafeghin (hypocrites) is so vivid, painful, and explicit that it unapologetically reveals the ideological brutality of the Monafeghin. These groups emerged with theories and books but ultimately they resorted to military training and rigid individualism. They taught their followers, "Whoever inflicts more torture is victorious." With the animosity that people harbored towards the Monafeghin (hypocrites) and the vigilance of the Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guards), many hideouts of Monafeghin teams were exposed. Therefore, the second phase of the Monafeghin's military operations took shape, the "lonely suppressor assassination" or simply "pointing the finger at the regime." This phase was supposed to involve armed confrontations, injuring and killing, as well as public property destruction aimed at creating terror and fear. Their targets included the forces of the Pasdaran army, Basij, and Hezbollah. An analysis of the statistics of assassinations in the second half of the year 1981 or the second military phase indicates that approximately 75% of these assassinations targeted merchants, workers from various professions, and ordinary people, while 25% targeted Pasdaran forces. The justifications and confessions of the Monafeghin regarding their military actions are thought-provoking and painful narratives. The burning alive of a 3-year-old child while she slept, the abduction, severe torture, and killing of a shoemaker on the pretext that his wife was a member of Hezbollah, or the torture leading to the martyrdom of an innocent teacher, and similar incidents are the face of this group with 17,000 assassination victims, a strong testament to their hostility and anger is available. Documents of their ruthless actions, those who called themselves "Mujahideen Khalq" (People's Mujahedin) and claimed to be creating agony for the people, are accessible in the virtual space. Watching the confessions of Mehran Sedgi, a member of the terrorist of Monafeghin group, in the case involving the engineered operation resulting in the martyrdom of 3 Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guards), reveals that the tortures were so severe that no healthy, blood-free part remained on the tortured person's body. During the peak of torture, another torturer would arrive and would blame his friends, saying, that "You don't know how to handle this. Hit them so hard that they fear you." The torturers featured in the recorded video report, which depicted a bathing area turned into a soundproof torture chamber for the martyrdom of 3 Pasdaran, indicating the terror of the

Monafeghin towards individuals being tortured, as they used these fabrics to conceal their faces during these tortures. Seyyed Mohammad Beheshti, a continuous member of the Academy of Arts, has interesting interpretations about the 1980s in an article published in the spring of 2016 in Kargadan Weekly. In his opinion, Iranian society experienced a dramatic aspect during this period: "It is not wrong to say that the war made society feel the proximity of death, while happiness also became much deeper." In this writing, Beheshti describes the 1980s and the war from a new perspective: "Civil life in Iran, which had collapsed due to mismanagement in the 1960s, was like a scattered 'population' of individuals." He attributes a magnetic quality to the war: "The war had become like a magnet that brought scattered iron shavings around itself and gave it temporary coherence and order. In fact, it transformed 'population' into 'society.'" Among Beheshti's statements in this publication, another thought-provoking point is made about the economy of the 1980s: "In the atmosphere of the 1980s, society was structured in such a way that the gap between poverty and wealth was not as apparent as it is today, or better to say, it was not highlighted." Beheshti summarizes the most distinguishing feature of the 1980s from other eras in one word: "Thirst," and says: "In the 1980s, Iranian society was thirsty for conquering new realms in all areas; therefore, it was active and industrious."

Chapter three

The cultural and social situation of the 1990s era (seventies Iranian calendar)

According to the book and literature reporter of Fars News Agency, alongside libraries which serve as cultural centers, the Center for Intellectual Development of Children and Young Adults has a production unit that includes publishing, cinema, theater, and music departments. These units send their productions to the cultural centers, which are essentially libraries, or showcase them there. In the 1990s, the press and publications sector experienced a significant boom, and the publishing department of the Center was not unaware of this growth. Alongside other publications, the Center's publications entered the publishing market extensively. Fars News Agency has attempted to narrate "The Center After the Islamic Revolution" from various perspectives during the 18-year management period of Mr. Chiniforushan. Hamid Grogan, the author of works such as "Quran's Report on Enemies" and "Memory of Friends and Places," who managed the publishing department of the Center during two different periods in the 1990s, discussed this in an interview.

The chaotic situation of the cultural center in 1991

What were the problems of the center for raising children and teenagers and how did the center's publications interact with writers and other agents during your management in the 1990s era?

in years 1991-1992, when I took over the management of publications, the Center was in disarray. Three or four decision-making authorities, each with their own approach, were responsible for reviewing and approving works. This led to significant friction among these individuals and authorities. A massive volume of unedited works had piled up. There were about 150 edited works that had been approved, but months had passed without them entering the production cycle. Only partial advances had been paid, and the owners of these works kept coming back, constantly inquiring over the phone. On the other hand, we dealt with several printing houses and lithography workshops that had annual demands and regularly visited, sometimes resorting to disputes, which, of course, they were entitled to. Among these, four or five monthly magazines that had been produced at the Center for several years were experiencing delays in printing due to various reasons. Some had even turned into bimonthly

publications, and subscriber complaints were common. Another problem was the high circulation of these publications, which caused many of the previous issues to end up in the warehouse, and it was not clear why they had such a large circulation. In summary, the path ahead was challenging, and the publication engine was running slowly. In such a situation, with the dedication of my colleagues in the publications department, I tried initially to remove obstacles. It took about a year and a half to review the files. Many demands were met, responses were given to the received and old works, and gradually, order was restored to the operations. In short, the separation of the library from the center was the biggest damage to the body of the center.

In your opinion, what are the strengths and weaknesses of cultural center's productions during the management of Mohsen Chiniforushan?

The production sections of the Center for intellectual development of Children and Young Adults include publishing, graphics, cinema, theater, creative entertainment, tape and music unit, and also a significant section that serves the audience, which are the Center's libraries located in various parts of the country. Here I must say that, in my opinion, this section is the most substantial, important, and productive part of all the areas managed by the cultural center. If we were to separate the libraries from the body of the cultural center, it would be like disconnecting the hands from its body. It is regrettable that we have been hearing discussions and decisions about separating of these libraries and merging them with other cultural centers, which, if implemented, would cause the greatest harm to the essence of the intellectual Center. Another issue was the lack of oversight on the print run and book prices on one hand, and the lack of control over inventory and book sales on the other. I remember books and magazines being printed with large print runs and ending up gathering dust in the warehouse, while low-print-run items were not restocked. There were also books that were in demand, and it was unclear why they were not being reprinted.

What measures did you take to promote cultural center's publications in those years?

Interacting with writers and poets who, for any reason, did not have a relationship with the intellectual Center was another policy area in publishing during the 1990s. Prior to this, the rule was that anyone who had a manuscript for publication or a design proposal would be referred to a specialist. However, it was not the case that the Center actively sought out projects and invited well-known writers and poets to collaborate and manage projects themselves. Instead, after a few years, readers of the center's books were faced with a variety of perspectives, and book publishing at the Center for the Intellectual

Development of Children and Young Adults moved away from a uniform approach.

Narrative of social harms in Iranian cinema of the 1990s

The present study explores the narrative of Iranian cinema regarding social issues in the 1990s through the analysis of the films named "Two Women" and "Under the Skin of the City." The research method used is qualitative and falls under descriptive-exploratory research, aiming to provide a thick description of the phenomenon under study. To analyze the data, we utilized discourse analysis methods, specifically applying the "Ruth Wodak" discourse analysis approach to categorize films into genres or linguistic functions. Within each linguistic function, we used the "Paul Gee" discourse analysis method to address seven key questions. We then presented a table of social issues depicted in each film. In the conclusion section, we provided a narrative of social issues in the films named "Two Women" and "Under the Skin of the City" based on the context and conditions of Iranian society in the 1990s. The most significant finding of the research is that the films of the 1990s (by studying movies through "Two Women" and "Under the Skin of the City") represented social issues involving the clash between traditionalism and modernity discourses, resistance of patriarchal/masculine discourse against enlightened feminist discourse advocating social freedoms, the sense of class divide between affluent and poor segments of society, and the portrayal of limited social mobility, among other themes.

The role of newspapers in the cultural invasion of the 1990s

According to the Seda magazine during Mohammad Khatami's tenure at the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, a situation emerged where, in 1991, when Mohammad Taqi Banky published the first issue of "Negah-e Nov" (New look magazine) magazine, he wrote in its editorial: "Today, the writings of journalists are like water that has accumulated behind a tall dam and suddenly, like a flood released onto a dry riverbed, we stand on the threshold of vast freedom!" This statement surprised the anti-revolutionary magazine "Jang" in Los Angeles, which remarked: "In Iran, highly substantive magazines are being published that engage in cultural struggle and resistance. They write things that we in this side of the ocean do not dare."

In the field of domestic press under the management of Mohsen Aminzadeh, while the number of official Iranian publications with government licenses did not exceed 50 to 60 titles until 1987, from the beginning of 1989 until July 1992

(Khatami's resignation), a total of 345 publication licenses were issued, representing an increase of it more than six-fold. However, the year 1991, was the birth year of 7 intellectual-oriented publications, in addition to the two magazines named as "Kian" and "Women," two newspapers, as "Salam" (under the editorship of Abbas Abdi) and "Jahan-e Eslam" (under the responsibility of Hojjat al-Islam Seyyed Hadi Khamenei), began publication from June 1991. These two newspapers ostensibly belonged to two prominent members of the Combatant Clerics Assembly, but the content, they published did not align with the stated goals of the assembly. In July 1991, two more intellectual-oriented magazines were published: named as "Jame'e Salem," (Healthy Society) which some considered it the Persian translation of "Jerusalem," under the responsibility of Dr. Siavash Gooran, and "Safheh Avval," (Front Page) under the responsibility of Mahmoud Askariah. Although operating in relatively distinct areas, they shared a common function. "Jame'e Salem" was managed by intellectuals whose distinctive feature was opposition to the religious government. This magazine later openly defended the Zionist regime and questioned the positions of the Islamic system. "Safheh Avval" was translation of foreign articles about Iran; this magazine published articles from European and American journals that were obviously critical of the Islamic Republic without any explanation. "Negah-e Nov" was another magazine that joined the Press Association in 1991. It was published from October of that year by Dr. Mohammad Taqi Banky (Minister of Energy in the Mousavi government) and Khashayar Dayhimi (one of the press figures who had previously written for the magazines of "Donyay-e Sokhan" and "Adineh"). Media researcher Yaser Jabraili writes in his book: "A simple estimate says: In these years, more than 20 pro-monarchist associations have been openly active in Iran and under the cover of titles such as "Association of Kermani's Residing in Tehran", "Association of Toyserkani's Residing in Tehran", "Saadi Golestan Literary Association", "Khayyam Literary Association" they gathered every week to analyze the situation in Iran. This group even published a magazine called "Farhangnameh" with the permission of the Ministry of Culture and Guidance." He then writes: "Based on the results of a research, during Khatami's tenure at the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, a joint domestic and foreign effort was observed to eradicate the religious trend in Iran. He claims that organizations and institutions affiliated with or associated with both the Iranian government (such as Kiyan) and the United States (such as the US-based Sierra Foundation led by Hooshang Amirahmadi) engaged in significant activities to influence culture and politics in Iran. During this period, the movement of Iranian figures associated with the American government, such as Ehsan Naraghi and Houshang Amirahmadi, to Tehran and their presence in government institutions occurred easily. It was said that the movement of Iranian elements to the West was even easier. He also provides examples and instances regarding the situation of books and cinema during the Khatami era,

stating: "The conditions of other areas under the supervision of the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, namely cinema and books, were not better than this. Khatami, in addition to being a fixed pillar of his intellectual-organizational activities, was also tasked with defending the policies and actions of the forces under his management in the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance against external criticisms." With the rise of cultural liberalism, a committed writer of that era, in an article published in Keyhan newspaper, described the publishing situation of Khatami's period in a lamentable manner, criticizing Khatami as follows: "In the book publishing market, the presence of westernized and secular cultural currents is easy to understand. A quick look at some bookstores in front of the University of Tehran, we will be faced with a lot of books, which shows intellectual vulgarity, purification of the West, promotion of sexual promiscuity and distortion of history in their contents. "In the Fajr Film Festival of 1990, films with vulgar themes and scenes were screened, and even to a Turkish actress who was awarded the Crystal Simorgh in Turkey, ultimately the clergy's protest ensued. Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati opened the door to criticism of Khatami in one of his Friday prayer sermons in Qom in march 1991, saying: 'A despicable movement called art has begun to emerge in some vulgar festivals and magazines by isolated tyrannical individuals, and those who were active in the previous regime are now entering the current scene. ' This movement, by mocking and belittling the families of martyrs, Hezbollah, Basij, the Revolutionary Guards, and revolutionary values, intends to strike a blow at the revolution, and committed artists must confront it. Mohammad Khatami, who does not protest against these attacks and plays the role of an observer and supporter, stands firm against cultural assaults and disregards the warnings of the leadership about cultural invasion. However, he becomes agitated and takes a stance against a moral movement. Martyr Seyyed Morteza Avini published a photo on the cover of Soreh magazine of a Bosnian youth with a forehead band reading "Allahu Akbar," mimicking Iranian Basijis. This photo illustrated the popularity of Basij and the Islamic Revolution in the world. However, Khatami rebuked Seyyed Morteza Avini, citing that the photo contradicted Islamic principles. Martyr Avini commented on this photo, saying: "This is the jihad of Allahu Akbar, our cultural invasion against the West." This statement by Avini agitated Khatami because it was a strong response against the Western cultural assault.

Chapter Four

Social and cultural situation in the 2000s era (1380s Iranian calendar)

In year 2009, Ahmadinejad won the presidential election for the second term. However, Ahmadinejad, through deceitful tricks and empty promises to the Iranian people, regained power for his second term. At this time, reformist candidates like Engineer Mousavi and Ayatollah Karroubi rose in opposition to these elections. The domestic situation in the country became tumultuous for several days, with some young individuals and supporters of the reformists pouring into the streets to protest against the vote-counting process. They sparked riots, leading to confrontation and suppression by anti-riot forces. Consequently, some were killed or imprisoned, and a considerable number of reformist journalists and reporters were also arrested and imprisoned. Some of these detainees at Kahrizak Detention Center were subjected to assault and moral corruption by some of the guards. One significant event that occurred in 2009 was the killing of a person named Palizdar in Kahrizak Detention Center by the authorities, which happened under the order of the then Attorney General, Saeed Mortazavi. After the complaint from Palizdar's family, his case remained pending in the Tehran court. Following this incident, Mortazavi was dismissed from his previous position and appointed as the head of the Social Security Fund by the president. During the 2009 unrest, even Engineer Mousavi and Ayatollah Karroubi, who were part of the reformist group, were confined to their homes and denied permission to engage in political activities. The tenth government, through various lies propagated via state media, began presenting false social and economic statistics and news to the Iranian people.

Cultural dimensions and the intellectual status of the elites in 2000s era

Investigating the intellectual status and position of the elites in Iranian society in the 2000s era and talking with Dr. Khoshchehreh.

In a conversation with Dr. Khoshchehreh about the situation of elites in Iran in the 2000s era, he pointed out that while the mistakes of elites may lead some government policies astray, this cannot be a valid reason for their complete rejection by the decision-making bodies. He emphasizes that, in addition to the mistakes of elites, the character and personality of managers are also factors in ignoring the elites in advisory and decision-making positions. In other words,

some senior managers in the past twenty years have sometimes preferred their personal interests over collective wisdom and the opinions of elites. This indicates that, not only the mistakes of elites, but also the disregard for their opinions by managers, can lead to neglect of elites in decision-making processes. The following text is the result of the discussion of Andisheh Khabar online group with Dr. Khoshchehreh about the situation of Iran's elites in the 2000s era.

What is your assessment of the status of elites in the 2000s era?

To answer this question, we need a proper conceptual definition of the term "elite." What is commonly referred to as "elite" today is not entirely consensual and acceptable. However, in this discussion, we assume that elites refer to political, social, and economic intellectuals. This interpretation helps us provide a clearer answer to the question. Although nowadays the scientific elite has a clearer definition compared to political, social, and economic elites, since the term "elite" itself is not very clear, its definition can also be subjective. Expressing opinions in a subjective space may not be a suitable basis for judgment unless we can base our answers on common ground. Nevertheless, the atmosphere of the 2000s era in Iran was distinct for both scientific and political and social elites, especially for social elites, characterized by ups and downs. For example, the level of participation of economic elites in national, regional, and even urban projects and decision-making in the 2000s era was not particularly high. In the early 2000s, the atmosphere was more conducive in this regard. However, from the mid-2000s onwards, the atmosphere gradually became more closed. Even in some periods, instead of being viewed as a scientific gift and a guide for achieving national interests, scholarly warnings of the elite were viewed from political and factional perspectives, and sometimes restrictions were imposed on elites who issued such warnings. Elite warnings were generally perceived by ruling factions as harsh criticisms and even opposition. When specialized and scholarly opinions are perceived as opposition and we exaggerate the extremism of some domestic factions in this matter, we find out why the atmosphere has become such that elite participation in the design and decision-making stages in various fields has faded.

In what cases has the disregard for the elites had a special effect?

Many Important plans, such as Subsidy targeting plan, were formulated and pursued without considering the opinions of economic elites, both in the legislative and implementation stages. Even the opinions expressed recently regarding the evaluation and assessment of the implementation of these plans, by economic elites have been met with indifference. Therefore, the economic environment in recent years has not been conducive to economic elites.

Although the leadership of the system is striving to utilize the expertise of elites, and explicit emphasis has been placed on this issue in the design of the Iranian-Islamic progress model, we are still far from reaching this ideal point, and we must strive to achieve this goal. The prerequisite for this is trust in the elites and a positive view of their critical opinions and warnings. Overall, in the field of economics, which is my specialized area, the space for expressing the opinions of elites has not only been limited and not transparent but has also been shrinking day by day.

Isn't this elitism caused by the populist approach of the policymakers of the executive branch?

The reasons for this can vary. Deviations of this kind are primarily due to a negative attitude towards expert opinions. This negative outlook may be somewhat understandable because global centers want to impose predetermined opinions on third-world countries. This is a fact that is empirically provable, but adopting a black-and-white view of this situation is incorrect.

Can you give examples that prove this fact?

Such tendencies can be fueled by discussions surrounding absolute liberalizations, the implementation of open economic policies, globalization and integration into the global economic system in its absolute sense, or the uncontrolled expansion of free trade zones in Iran, which have arisen from non-committal expert opinions imposed on our decision-making system. Iran currently holds the record for the highest number of economic free zones in the world. Even a country like China does not have more than three economic free zones, while we have more than thirty. These zones serve not only as export hubs but also as entry points for goods. They have also entangled all our governments. For example, just a few days ago, the costly and inefficient Qeshm Free Trade Zone connectivity bridge project, which costs half a billion dollars, was put on the government's agenda. The funds for this project could have been better allocated to address issues related to national gross production and supply chains. I was a member of the World Free Zones Union a decade ago and have been involved in its decision-making processes. Therefore, I can boldly state that the phenomenon of free trade zones in Iran has been a deviant one. This phenomenon usually appears to facilitate exports, belonging to countries that have enhanced their production capabilities and have surplus production capacity, hence their initiative to establish free trade zones. Before the establishment of these zones, priority should have been given to industrial towns, workshops, and factories. In summary, the performance of free trade zones, which has been on the agenda of all governments after the war, has

primarily had an import-oriented aspect, and extensive smuggling of goods has even occurred in these zones.

In this way, staying away from the elite is also justified in your opinion.

No, although such projects may indicate that sometimes opinions expressed by elites are imposed on our decision-making system, which later results in negative consequences, it does not mean that we should completely disregard intellectuals and opinion leaders. However, this negative view towards elites, stemming from deviations arising from the opinions of elites, is one of the factors leading to the neglect of intellectuals. The second factor relates to the mindset and upbringing of certain individuals, especially at decision-making levels, and particularly within the executive branch. For example, if the head of the executive branch bases decision-making on personal beliefs and preferences without them being based on expert knowledge and without considering opposing opinions, this naturally leads to the exclusion of intellectuals. Unfortunately, we have witnessed this phenomenon after the end of the war and in recent years. That is, decision-making has become more personal rather than being collective, and it is based on personal beliefs and preferences.

Chapter five

Social situation and health status in 2010s era (1390s Iranian calendar)

The state of insurance services in Iran over the past decades, especially in the early 2010s, and the situation of health and treatment are under consideration. The history of health and medical insurance in Iran dates back to before the Islamic Revolution, when one of the significant actions taken by Mohammad Reza Shah in the field of health and treatment development and the insurance of government employees, armed forces, and factory workers began in 1955. Before the Islamic Revolution, there were only three types of medical insurance in Iran:

1-Social Security Insurance 2-Armed Forces Insurance 3- Oil Company Employees Insurance. These three types of insurance schemes covered three specific segments of society:

1. Employees and workers of factories and production companies
2. Human resources employed in all armed forces
3. Employees and workers employed in oil companies

The other segments of society, including rural and urban residents with self-employment, did not benefit from these insurance services. This system of medical insurance continued through the 1980s. After the Islamic Revolution, the Imam Relief Committee was established, which provided limited medical insurance to the needy and poor segments of society. But in the 1990s, in addition to these three state-run insurance services providing medical insurance to their respective covered individuals, private insurance companies also emerged. Notable among them were Dana Insurance, Iran Insurance, Atieh Sazan Hafez, Mellet Insurance, Razi Insurance, Moallem Insurance, and insurance services provided by most private banks in Iran. These private insurers not only offered car insurance services (such as third-party insurance and body insurance) but also took on supplementary health insurance for employees and workers of private companies. Furthermore, most of banks in Iran also took responsibility for the medical insurance services of their employees. This diversification of insurance providers and the inclusion of supplementary health insurance by private companies marked a significant shift in the insurance landscape, offering broader coverage and addressing gaps that existed in the previous decades. In the 2000s, era the establishment of private

banks increased, and these banks, apart from banking affairs, turned to corporate affairs and especially insurance affairs. By the early 2010s, with specific deposit conditions, these private banks provided health insurance services to their customers based on 80% of the bank deposit amount. Notable private banks offering such services included Pasargad Bank, Parsian Bank, Egtesad Novin Bank and Day Bank, and other private banks. During the 1980s to 2010s, other insurance companies such as Alborz Insurance, Asia Insurance, Moallem Insurance, and Mellet Insurance primarily focused on car insurance, building insurance, fire insurance, earthquake insurance, engineering insurance, liability insurance, and land and marine transportation insurance. These companies have continued to provide these services and have had a lesser role in offering health insurance services.

In the summer of 2014, the Minister of Health and Medical Education implemented the Iranian Health Insurance system with the approval of the Cabinet. This system had been initially established during the tenth government under the name "Iranian Health Insurance," with a state insurer named "Health Services" responsible for providing health insurance coverage to all Iranian citizens. This type of insurance was voluntary, while the social security insurance, armed forces insurance, oil company insurance, and bank insurance for employees and retirees were mandatory. The "Health Services" insurer committed to covering only 30% of medical expenses, providing coverage to rural patients, including farmers and urban residents, with the remaining costs to be borne by the individual. Additionally, state insurers covered 30% of paraclinical costs, with patients responsible for the remaining treatment expenses. Most private and public companies were compelled to secure supplementary health insurance for their employees through private insurers (such as Dana, Iran, Alborz, Moallem, and Atiyeh Sazan Hafez). These contracts, known as supplementary insurance, were designed with specific conditions and contract limits beneficial to both the insurer and the employees' health coverage. This supplementary health insurance system continues to this day, with annual renewals featuring varying premium limits and conditions. Typically, these policies cover 60% -70% of the employees' medical expenses, with the remaining 30% to 40% paid by the insured. This percent amount of monthly insurance premium is paid by the employees, while the remaining percentage is covered by their employer or affiliated company. During that time, most of government hospitals and medical centers faced budget shortages and were unable to adequately cover the costs of public health services. This situation also continues to the present day, with the management of these centers encountering numerous challenges. Additionally, many essential imported medications were scarce, a problem that persists. Due to financial sanctions and the monopolistic practices of drug importers, the cost of imported medications has been rising. Acquiring most medications for patients with

special conditions, which are primarily produced by European pharmaceutical companies, was particularly challenging due to banking sanctions that hindered international financial transactions necessary for importing these drugs. As a result, these imported medications have remained scarce in the country. Currently, the shortage of drugs for patients with special conditions continues. Only a few pharmacies in Tehran, such as 13th Aban Pharmacy, Helal Ahmar Pharmacy (affiliated with the government), Shafa, and Khas (affiliated with charitable organizations), as well as the 29th Farvardin pharmacy (affiliated with military and armed forces organizations), are authorized to sell and supply these rare and imported medications. Patients can obtain these medications based on prescriptions from specific medical records, which must be endorsed by transplant associations, centers for patients with special conditions under the Ministry of Health, or the Drug and Food Administration. In other cities, only branches of the Helal Ahmar (Red Crescent) pharmacies are responsible for procuring and distributing medications for patients with special conditions. Additionally, all medications produced in Western countries fall outside the coverage agreements of government insurance providers (such as Health Services Insurance, Social Security Insurance, and Imam Khomeini Relief Foundation). As a result, some patients with special conditions who are not covered by government insurance are forced to purchase these medications at free market prices, often at several times the cost, from government pharmacies. It is noteworthy that during the 1990s and 2000s eras, due to the shortage of foreign medications, many imported drugs from foreign companies were smuggled into the country. Several drug dealers in Tehran would sell these medications at exorbitant prices, significantly higher than their original costs, to patients with special conditions and others in need. These transactions often took place in areas around Naser Khosrow and Imam Square in Tehran.

In Iran, most of medical specialist have insisted, and still insist, that patients use foreign medications regardless of the conditions set by insurance providers. It should be noted that some domestically produced medications are less effective compared to their foreign counterparts. During the eleventh government, from the autumn of 2013, measures were taken to combat the smuggling of imported drugs and drug dealers with the help of police forces. In the summer of 2014, the Minister of Health and Medical Education converted the Iranian Insurance into Health Insurance to ensure the provision and guarantee of insurance for the general public. This change made the annual insurance costs free for patients with special conditions and the general public who were not covered by any insurance company. However, the costs of medication and treatment in the same year remained such that patients bore seventy percent of the costs while Health Insurance covered thirty percent. During the years 2017-2018, the cost of paying for medicine became very expensive, with patients bearing one hundred percent of the costs. Consequently, the costs of procuring medications,

hospitalization, and para-clinical services remained very high. The primary factor behind these escalating prices continues to be annual economic inflation. In the autumn of 2014, due to the rising prices of expensive medications for patients with special conditions, the subsidy for domestic pharmaceutical production, which had seen a price increase for most drugs, was adjusted. The percentage of the cost coverage for these medications by the government was reduced from 10% to 6%, while the prices of such drugs increased by approximately 50%. Despite diabetes disease, classified by the Ministry of Health as a special condition disease and according to the reported statistics, there were about 5 million type 1 and type 2 diabetic patients in Iran in the same year, and now it has become more. For Type 1 and Type 2 insulin-dependent diabetic patients, the Ministry of Health provided certain benefits for obtaining insulin pens through Social Security Insurance, with a 10% deductible. However, these benefits were only available to diabetic patients who had registered with the Medical Documentation Center with their doctor's approval and personal documentation. Otherwise, the cost of insulin in some pharmacies was calculated at market rates, or patients with government insurance had to pay at least 30% of the cost. Additionally, while 70% of laboratory tests and other paraclinical expenses were covered by government insurers, the costs of regular medical check-ups, disposable syringes, and blood glucose testing devices were not covered by insurance. Another significant issue is the hardships and problems faced by dialysis patients, as emphasized by a nephrology specialist. This specialist highlights the overcrowding of dialysis units in the country, noting that dialysis machines should ideally be used in two shifts, but some centers in Tehran and other cities operate four shifts due to patient volume. This deviation from standard practice is attributed to a shortage of dialysis beds. Dialysis centers should ideally be close to patients' residences, but due to the saturation of nearby facilities, patients often have to travel long distances. According to the nephrology specialist, increasing age is a major factor in kidney disease, and as Iran's elderly population grows, the number of dialysis patients will also rise. This shortage is expected to worsen in the next two years, especially given the lack of trained personnel and nurses for dialysis patients, making the establishment of new centers currently unfeasible in Iran. This situation poses a serious risk of an increase in dialysis patients. The Director General of the Clinical Services and Hospital Management Office at the Ministry of Health also considers this a serious threat. In Iran, as of year 2018, fifty thousand people were suffering from kidney diseases, with an annual increase of 8% and by 2021, the number of these patients was expected to reach 90,000. Predictions indicate that if the number of kidney patients continues to rise at this rate, within five years the number of dialysis patients will increase by approximately 25,000 to 30,000, given that about 5,000 to 6,000 new dialysis patients are added each year. According to the Director General of the Clinical Services and Hospital Management Office at the Ministry of Health and

Medical Education, even under ideal conditions, performing 4,000 kidney transplants annually would not be sufficient to cover all dialysis patients. Consequently, over the next five years, 5,000 new dialysis machines will be needed, with plans to procure 2,000 machines in the current year (2018). Of these, 800 will replace outdated machines. The alarm has sounded for the increasing number of dialysis patients, with the Ministry of Health and Medical Education reporting that the percentage of dialysis patients in urgent need of a kidney transplant has risen from 18% to 45%. The government, with only 250 nephrology specialists, is unable to adequately care for this growing number of patients. government officials emphasize the importance of education, prevention, and the need for assistance from charitable organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to support dialysis patients. They promise the addition of more dialysis beds in the future, but it remains uncertain when this issue will be resolved and the hopes of dialysis patients will be fulfilled. Despite these efforts, from early autumn 2014, measures were taken to regulate and combat corruption in the medical field, specifically addressing the phenomenon of receiving cost under the table by some specialist surgeons in their office for the additional costs from the patients. By penalizing such unethical practices and imposing heavy fines on offending specialist surgeons, some financial burdens were alleviated for patients. With the implementation of the third phase of the healthcare program and the Ministry of Health covering the costs for special patients, only expensive and imported drugs for special patients became free. However, other paraclinical expenses continued to be the patients' responsibility according to set tariffs. In December 2014, the Minister of Health announced that certain drugs for special patients were subject to sanctions by western pharmaceutical companies, which prevented the payment for some imported drugs due to banking sanctions. Nevertheless, the Minister of Health declared that, with an allocated budget of Two thousand billion tomans, the issue of providing some scarce drugs in Iran had been resolved, reducing the number of scarce drugs from 3,000 to 30. He also stated that all Iranians were now covered under the "Health Insurance" program, with approximately 2.7 million people insured through this scheme.

Another significant health and social issue currently affecting Iranian society is the alarming statistics on HIV/AIDS. According to data from the Ministry of Health and Medical Education, by the end of summer 2014, there were 28,600 reported cases of HIV/AIDS in Iran. However, the actual number of people living with HIV/AIDS is estimated to be three times higher, approximately 90,000. In this regard, it should be kept in mind that the change in the pattern of AIDS transmission in Iran during the 2010 era, when the main victim of this disease was introduced, and according to Iran newspaper, injecting drug addiction and unprotected sexual relations in the 2000s era were the two main causes of the spread of AIDS, which was introduced in Iran. of course initially,

the epidemic was primarily driven by intravenous drug use, especially among young people. Over time, with public awareness campaigns and actions taken by government officials, the transmission of HIV through intravenous drug use has been somewhat controlled. Despite these efforts, unprotected sexual activities continue to be a significant factor in the transmission of HIV/AIDS. This ongoing issue underscores the need for continuous public health education and prevention programs to address both the existing and emerging challenges associated with HIV/AIDS in Iran.

A report on the dispersion of "HIV" control institutions.

In the summer of 2016, it was reported that among all the women diagnosed with HIV, 70 percent were completely unaware of risky sexual behaviors. Interestingly, these women were committed and faithful to their marital lives and had contracted the virus from their husbands. In response to this, the Ministry of Health and Medical Education had planned to implement a project aimed at prioritizing the prevention and control of HIV/AIDS in Iran by the year 2020. This project included reducing the risks associated with the disease, increasing the identification of infected individuals, raising the treatment coverage to 90 percent, enhancing the effectiveness of treatment, and reducing transmission to healthy members of the community. The goal was to identify and treat 70 percent of the undiagnosed cases within the next four years. It is estimated that about 80,000 Iranians are infected with HIV/AIDS, but only 23,000 have been registered and identified. Of those identified, only about 6,000 are currently receiving treatment. These care, treatment, and medication services are provided by the Ministry of Health under conditions where the HIV/AIDS budget is approximately 8 billion tomans (unofficial Iranian currency) annually. This budget is distributed across 116 behavioral disease counseling centers, 279 counseling bases, 76 harm reduction outreach centers, 34 health promotion centers for vulnerable women, and 25 positive clubs. This means that 8 billion tomans were allocated for 530 HIV prevention and control centers, or in other words, 8 billion tomans for the treatment of 23,000 people, which amounts to 347,000 tomans per patient annually. A quick calculation shows that each control and prevention center receives approximately 1.6 billion tomans (unofficial Iranian currency) in funding annually. However, this figure is distributed among the centers and patients under the care of each center based on the type of activity and the patients covered by the center across different provinces. Despite this, cost estimates for a women's health promotion center show that these centers spend around 4 to 5 billion tomans annually on the diagnosis, care, and treatment of HIV/AIDS patients. Keep in mind that with this budget, the Ministry of Health covers only 30 percent of people living with HIV and AIDS, while around 70 percent of the infected individuals remain undiagnosed. According to the fourth national strategic plan for AIDS, the

Ministry of Health, in collaboration with key ministries such as the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Social Welfare, Ministry of Education, and Ministry of Science, as well as the Welfare Organization, the Prisons Organization, and related agencies, aims to reduce new HIV infections and AIDS-related deaths to zero. Furthermore, they intend to ensure fair and equal access to prevention, care, and treatment services for all. This goal can only be achieved if individuals are aware of their infection status, are willing to receive care and treatment, have access to free services, and consistently receive these services. The Head of the AIDS Control Department at the Ministry of Health has stated that the funding for HIV is used to support these various facilities and services to improve the care and management of individuals living with HIV/AIDS.

Environmental, cultural and social damages in the 2010 era

Factors of environmental damage

One of the social harm factors known as " parasite " (interference signals) is believed to lead to cancer, which has recently become widespread in the country, especially in Tehran. In this regard, in December 2014, the Minister of Communications announced that if the level of parasite exceeds a certain limit, it could have harmful effects. The issue of parasite became contentious when environmental officials warned that the waves of interference signals sent to satellite antennas were extremely harmful to health and could even lead to cancer in some cases. It should be noted that in late autumn 2014, several Tehran citizens succumbed to cancer after undergoing chemotherapy, including the young pop singer Morteza Pashaei and the former national football team player Gholam hossein Mazloumi. Although cancer has various causes, parasite and the consumption of fast food are among the factors contributing to its spread. Additionally, due to economic sanctions imposed by the West, it was impossible to import certain medications for specific patients, including anti-cancer drugs.

Another environmental issue in the early 2010s was the drying up of Oromo Lake and the Zayandeh Rood River. In the past decade, due to neglect of the environment, the depletion of groundwater, and excessive use of agricultural water, Oromo Lake in Oromia city and the Zayandeh Rood River in Isfahan had dried up. However, in the autumn of 2014, with the implementation of water consumption control for agriculture and the government's plans and programs, along with increased recent rainfall, the Zayandeh Rood River and then Oromo Lake began to recover slightly.

Air pollution

Another environmental and social issue is the air pollution in Tehran and other major cities. Over the past decade, due to increased urban traffic, rising urban traffic problems, and neglect of air pollution issues in major cities, especially in Tehran and Ahvaz, the excessive use of gasoline produced by petrochemical companies has intensified air pollution in these cities. However, in 2014, with the control and cessation of petrochemical gasoline consumption and the import of a certain amount of European standard gasoline called Euro 4, and distributed in major cities by the eleventh government, air pollution levels in these cities have somewhat decreased. It is worth noting that during the tenth government, several petrochemical companies were licensed to produce gasoline and began production and distribution to the public for about four years, so that in early 2014, multiple tests conducted by European standard oil laboratories revealed that the levels of toxic substances in the gasoline produced by petrochemical companies were excessively high and non-standard, significantly contributing to the air pollution in Tehran and other cities. Therefore, in December 2014, officials from the Ministry of Oil, unveiling a new fuel policy of the eleventh government, announced that the supply of regular gasoline would be halted. According to the "Mehr" news agency, there are currently three types of gasoline available nationwide: regular gasoline with an octane rating of 87, super gasoline with an octane rating of 95, and Euro-4 standard gasoline with an octane rating above 91. At that time, based on a government resolution, a three-phase plan was initiated. Initially, Euro-4 standard gasoline would be introduced in the eight major cities, followed by provincial capitals, and finally, all cities and high-traffic routes across the country, gradually phasing out regular gasoline. Simultaneously, the implementation of the plan to increase the production of Euro 4 standard gasoline of the European Union in Isfahan, Abadan and Bandar Abbas oil refineries, as well as the Persian Gulf gas refinery, is in operation. Therefore, a 36-month plan has been defined by the Ministry of Petroleum, which was in accordance with the eleventh government's resolution. Another significant cause of air pollution in Tehran and western provinces in Iran is the phenomenon of dust and fine particles, which has been increasingly affecting these regions, especially during the summer months, originating from Ahvaz and spreading towards Tehran and other western provinces. This issue has remained uncontrolled by authorities so far. In recent years, acidic rain in Ahvaz has caused respiratory issues, resulting in around two thousand residents being hospitalized due to breathing difficulties and they went to the hospitals. Moreover, for several years (about ten years), Ahvaz weather has always been polluted with dust and debris, so the authorities have not been able to do anything to eliminate this permanent air pollution in Ahvaz. and daily, several individuals are admitted to Ahvaz hospitals due to these conditions. In the winter of 2018, air pollution levels in Ahvaz were

significantly high. Interestingly, the budget for combating dust storms in Khuzestan province was eliminated during this period. According to a report by the deputy of the Environmental Protection Organization in the Islamic Consultative Assembly, the proposed budget bill for the parliament initially included \$150 million to address dust storms in southern Iran, including Khuzestan. Unfortunately, this allocation was removed by the parliamentary reconciliation commission. During this time, the number of respiratory patients in Khuzestan province due to dust storms increased to 694 people in winter of 2018. The deputy head of the treatment department at Ahvaz University of Medical Sciences informed the IRNA news agency that, following the dust storm in Khuzestan in early February 2018, 694 individuals had visited the 38 medical centers under this university in the province due to respiratory issues. Of these, 88 individuals were admitted to the general wards, 16 individuals were admitted to the intensive care units, 473 individuals were treated as outpatients, and 117 individuals were treated in emergency departments.

The table below shows the amount of air pollution in Ahvaz in winter 2018

Air pollution in Ahvaz in the winter 2018



chapter six

Social and environmental events of the 2010s era

The tragedy of the death of Seyed Emami, an environmental activist, in prison

One of the journalists wrote in February 2018: On Sunday, February 11, 2018, at 3 AM, I saw a headline in the news that struck like lightning. My heart sank. It was hard to believe: "Professor Kavous Seyed-Emami, a political science professor, has passed away." Undoubtedly, he was one of the great professors of political science and a methodology expert in political science and sociology. Immediately, I asked in the Telegram group for the sociology of religion: "Is this news true?" The responses at that time of night hit my mind like multiple blows. "Yes, unfortunately, he has also committed suicide in prison." I thought this statement was a bitter joke and asked again: "Dr. Seyed-Emami, a member of the sociology of religion group? Was he in prison? Why? For what reason? Why was there no news of his imprisonment anywhere? Even in the sociology of religion group, they answered: "He was a member of an environmental NGO that was arrested a few days ago for espionage." I was astonished and wrote again: "I am distressed. This is unbelievable. What espionage? He had no governmental position and no access to information to spy. What was the name of the NGO?" But there was no choice but to painfully believe this news. A piece of news that, in any advanced country, would bring down a government. I have no knowledge of the case, but I believe that worse than his death is the accusation of espionage. It was unbelievable. I consider confessions made without the presence of a lawyer in detention centers, which hold no good memories for me, to be worthless. The chain of deaths in prison also makes it hard to believe any news. For years, we were both members of the Board of Directors of the Religion Group in the Iranian Sociological Association. He was a dignified man, a scholar, and an academic, not a politician. That is why he wasn't involved in political parties; instead, alongside teaching at the university, he collaborated with the Iranian Sociological Association and an environmental NGO. What information did he possess that would lead to the accusation of "espionage under the guise of executing scientific and environmental projects"? Even those with access to government documents cannot easily be accused of such a crime; otherwise, all government officials would be at risk of accusation and insecurity, let alone a university professor. The civil society and scientific community of the country must pursue this issue until all aspects of the case,

from the espionage accusation to the death in prison, are clarified. The relevant authorities are also obliged to satisfy public opinion. News of deaths in prison has always been painful, and this one is even more so. When I heard this news, I felt guilty because I restrained myself from exposing the mistreatment I endured during my detention to prevent enemies of Iran and national interests from exploiting it. If we all had spoken out, it would have been clear why such tragedies occur in prisons. The coinciding of the sorrowful death of an innocent, wise person in prison with the day of the Islamic Revolution's victory and the start of its 40th anniversary is a symbolic and meaningful event.

Narratives from the case of environmental activists

The body of Kavous Seyed-Emami, a sociology professor who was reported to have committed suicide in Evin prison after 15 days of detention, was buried at noon on February 12, 2018, in the village of Emameh, Tehran. Over the past three days, reactions to the death of this professor from Imam Sadeq University indicated widespread disbelief regarding the news of his suicide. However, statements from Seyed-Emami's family lawyer and a member of parliament confirmed the reality of his manner of death. Naqavi-Hosseini, the spokesperson for the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission of the Parliament, provided details about Seyed-Emami's death, stating: "It is entirely clear to us that Seyed-Emami committed suicide." According to IRNA, Naqavi-Hosseini explained, "The prison surveillance video of Seyed-Emami was reviewed by a parliamentary delegation and the deputy speaker of parliament. This video clearly shows that he himself took steps to prepare for suicide." Naqavi-Hosseini further elaborated: "Because Seyed-Emami was a distinguished academic and a university professor, he was given a special room. He arranged the area where he rested in such a way that anyone looking through the window would think he was sleeping, placing the pillow and blanket to create that impression, essentially he creates a scene completely." The representative from Varamin city in the parliament continued: "Seyed-Emami takes off his shirt, ties it, and prepares for the act. At one point, he attempts to break the room's light bulb, presumably to use it to cut his veins, but he does not succeed. In the video, he is seen throwing various objects at the bulb to break it but ultimately fails. He then takes off his shirt and prepares it." Naqavi-Hosseini emphasized that "Seyed-Emami's family has also seen the video, and all members of the delegation unanimously agreed that the suicide occurred." He added: "His brother also confirmed that the body showed no signs of harm other than the marks from hanging. Because they saw the video, the family did not request an autopsy." These statements from the spokesperson of the National Security Commission come as Seyed-Emami's family lawyer, in an interview with Ilena, news Agency reported that Kavous Seyed-Emami's body had indeed been autopsied. The lawyer stated, "In all cases of suspicious death, an autopsy is

performed, and this case was no exception. The body was handed over to the family after the autopsy." Payam Derafshan the lawyer further explained, "We watched the cell surveillance footage along with his family and other lawyers. However, because the camera did not have a clear view of the cell's restroom, the act of his suicide is not visible. It is clear from the video that he entered the restroom wearing a shirt." Derafshan mentioned that a few hours later, a prison guard, noticing that Seyed-Emami had not picked up his breakfast, entered the cell and was shocked to find his body in the restroom. "Since the guards were unaware of the exact time of his death, they perform cardiac resuscitation upon finding him." Derafshan rejected theories suggesting that Seyed-Emami was murdered in prison, stating, "It is crucial to understand why he was compelled to commit suicide, and this reason must be clarified. The Criminal Affairs Prosecutor's Office is also investigating this matter." He criticized Article 48 of the Criminal Procedure Code, highlighting its implications in security-related cases like Seyed-Emami's, where it restricts the right to legal representation. "In such cases, where lawyers are not allowed to be present, the situation becomes very difficult for the accused. When a person is denied legal counsel and is under pressure during investigations, they may resort to drastic measures. It is the lawyer who can provide the necessary calm and explain the situation to the accused in the first 48 hours, and depriving them of this right can lead to such tragic incidents."

Parliament's follow-up until complete clarification

Mohammad Ali Vakili, a member of the Presidium of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, also recounted the evidence related to Seyed-Emami's death in Evin prison. Referring to a meeting between several members of parliament and the Intelligence Organization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to investigate the cause of Dr. Kavous Seyed-Emami's death, he said, "From the part of the film that we saw, it appeared that Mr. Seyed-Emami had returned from a meeting. He was distressed and tried to break the ceiling lamp. After breaking the lamp, he took off his shirt and tied it around his neck." According to Asr Iran news agency, Vakili added, "Since there was a camera in the cell area, it was visible what he was doing, but when he left the cell area and went to the restroom, there was no camera." He further stated, "The interpretation of the IRGC intelligence colleagues was that by breaking the lamp, he intended to cut his veins, and by tying his shirt around his neck, he wanted to commit suicide. We saw up to this part of the film, and it continued, but the plenary session began. It was agreed that we would watch the rest of the film in another session and examine various aspects of the issue." Vakili emphasized, "The parliament will pursue the matter until complete clarification is achieved and the results of the investigations are announced. This issue needs to be thoroughly examined, but in any case, the prosecution is responsible for the lives of those held in

prisons, and the fact that a prisoner commits suicide does not absolve the relevant authorities of their responsibility to protect the lives of individuals."

Canada demands an investigation into Seyyed Emami's death

Despite the emphasis by Seyed-Emami's family lawyer and the parliament members who reviewed the CCTV footage of his cell, affirming that his death was due to suicide, Seyed-Emami's dual Iranian-Canadian citizenship led the Canadian government to raise concerns about his death. Canada expressed suspicions about the circumstances of his death in prison and called on Iran to conduct a transparent and fair investigation on behalf of the Canadian government. The Deputy Parliamentary Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada claimed that Seyed-Emami's family did not accept the Iranian officials' statements regarding his suicide. He stated that Canada seeks to conduct investigations through diplomatic channels.

At the same time, according to Ilena's report, Mustafa Turk Hamdani, one of the lawyers, also said regarding the case of the arrest of some environmental activists in which Dr. Kavous Seyed Emami was arrested: "Seven people also have been arrested so far in this case, now I am in charge of representing 5 of these people." Turk Hamdani added: "According to the announcement of the prison supervisor, these people were in contact with their families at least once and informed them about their condition."

Iran is the main affected in the water crisis

The water crisis can be reliable for Iran in various fields and endanger this land. For example, in the northwest, the death process of Oromo Lake, when it leads to the creation of huge salt winds, can convert the majority of the area of East and West Azerbaijan provinces and large parts of Zanjan provinces, Kurdistan of Iran, and Kurdistan of Iraq and part of Turkey into a "death zone". So that an area will be very similar to an atomic bomb explosion area. Either in the east and southeast, where water depends on runoff originating in neighboring countries, the continued and expanding encroachment by Afghanistan on Iran's share is pushing things to a breaking point. The average rainfall in Iran is one-third of the global average, and the average water evaporation rate is three times the global average. Rainfall in recent years has been lower, worse, and in locations that deviate from the long-term average pattern. The rampant increase in the volume of gases produced by fossil fuels is a well-known example of this misconduct. In this field, we are also affected by the misconduct of other countries. We ourselves are also an environmental

troublemaker and a carefree polluter among nations. Water consumption must also be managed in a way that minimizes encroachment on nature's share of water. Nature's share of water is not just important for preserving plant and animal life. The issue is the survival of nature's water cycle. Iran holds the number one spot in the world for exceeding its sustainable freshwater potential. We can't exactly pick up Iran and move it next to Sweden or Scotland to fix its dryness problem. We, firstly, need to reduce our water consumption and increase efficiency. Secondly, we must correct our behavior with the environment." Thirdly, we need to activate water diplomacy with our neighbors regarding shared water resources. In the water sector, the Ministry of Energy has always been part of the problem, not the solution. For example, water Department of Kerman Province, which ran well with around 20 people in the 1970s era, now has thousands of employees. The main concern for the minister is securing salaries for this vast number of employees. A huge army has turned Iran's water sector into a source of income for themselves. Who defines all of these useless water dams? Who has controlled the incoming waters of Oromo Lake to the point of death? Who has sold so many well licenses that exceed the capacity of watering the plains? Whose work is this two-billion-dollar masterpiece of the Gotvand salt water dam, which is salting the best lands of Khuzestan? Who has been delaying the legal task of hundred thousand of unauthorized wells for 30 years? See the performance of parliamentarians in the water scene as well, they were applicants for the dam building movement even if the dam is without water. There are many harmful or useless water projects that are full of empty promises. They haven't been beneficial for anything other than election campaigning and political maneuvering. Can you believe that in the early years of the revolution, hundreds of well permits were issued in the restricted plain of Rafsanjan city by the religious authority? These permits were later even legalized by parliament. For two decades, the government viewed water distribution as a tool for wealth distribution. The worst way to solve a problem is to hand it over to the very entity that created the problem. As long as we pin our hopes on the Ministry of Energy to fix the problem, the situation will only worsen day by day. Without proper research, they changed the location of the Gotvand Dam and placed it on top of the biggest salt structure in the region, resulting in producing salty water. Even after the issue was discovered, they continued construction for years. Then they filled it with water and insisted on using the dam. Even after the issue with the Gotvand Dam was discovered, they continued construction for years. Then they filled it with water and insisted on using the dam. we should create a "water market" and let the market itself direct water towards uses that generate the most added value. Right now, in the city of Baradsir, water is used to grow grains that don't even create 150 tomans (Iranian currency) of added value per cubic meter. 200 kilometers away, in the same basin, water officials are bringing desalinated water from the Persian Gulf at 10,000 tomans per cubic meter! Gravity-fed water transfer over this distance

costs about 300 tomans per cubic meter. Let people freely buy and sell this [water] so it's not wasted. When you deny people's right to manage their own water and hand given ownership to the government, it becomes the place of unaccountable fate and sometimes corruption. The government and its parts, from ministers and representatives to religious authorities and water department heads, all start interfering with this limited and valuable resource. They do this with intentions of poverty alleviation, winning hearts, or personal financial gain. Now the well has run dry! There's no water left to squander. Every cubic meter of water has several annoying owners. The water table in the plains is approaching bedrock. The lifespans of wells have shortened, runoff water has vanished, and social tensions around water are on the rise. If the government told many of its water sector personnel to go home, collect their salaries, and sit there, there would be more hope for improvement. therefore, saving Iran from drought doesn't even require stopping agriculture entirely. It's enough to follow the development model of countries like the Netherlands. Today, Iran, which is drowning in political and factional disagreements, is deeply neglecting the real danger that threatens its very existence and essence more than any internal challenge or even the threat of foreign military attack. Iran today should prioritize the slogan "Big drought is coming" above all its other slogans and focus all the country's resources with a future-oriented perspective on the great enemy of drought, which has crossed its borders and is mercilessly ravaging its cities one after another. (Iranian Meteorological Organization).

The red siren from head of the Environmental Protection Organization in 2018

Water, soil, and air are facing contamination. - Soil erosion is 12 tons per hectare annually. - The enemy of the country is actions without expertise. - We are in a water crisis, don't make it a security issue. - To solve the problem, we need to give all information to the people. - We need to reduce water consumption by 40 to 50 billion cubic meters. - 80% of gas and oil industries should be shut down due to pollution. The head of the Department of Environmental Protection said: If we want to follow the Supreme Leader's environmental orders, we need to tear the Sixth Development Plan that was just approved by the Iranian parliament today. Undoubtedly, if we want to follow the law, more than 80% of industries, including gas and oil industries, need to be shut down. However, the legislator has emphasized that polluting industries should be fined only 1%. Can this fine be a proper solution or treatment for this issue?

According to ISNA (Iranian Students' News Agency), Issa Kalantari, the head of Iran's Department of Environmental Protection, spoke at the eighth General Assembly of the Supreme Council of Provinces. He said: "I recently traveled to Assaluyeh (major industrial zone) . It's no exaggeration to say that you can't live

there for more than 48 hours. Even by current environmental laws, the Asaluyeh industrial zone should be shut down right now. And if we want to act according to international standards, the car manufacturing industry would also be closed. Additionally, many power plants, refineries, food producers, and livestock farms would need to be shut down as well." He continued, stating that air, soil, water, vegetation, and genetic resources are all facing serious problems today. "The environment is a trust for future generations," he said, "we have been the worst trustees, leaving almost nothing behind." He pointed out that according to reports, we are witnessing 12 tons of soil erosion per hectare annually. "Misguided policies of the past four decades have caused such a trend in the country, leading to 12 tons of soil erosion per hectare every year," he said. "Unfortunately, without considering the consequences of our actions and without listening to the advice of experts, we have caused the country's environment to face more serious problems than ever before. Emotional, unstable, and short-term policies have put the environmental situation of Iran in such a state that today it's much worse than what the members of the Supreme Council of Provinces think." Kalantari added: "Unfortunately, we are giving the people wrong information. 50 years ago, the amount of groundwater resources was about 132 billion cubic meters. The process of using these resources began and we reached a point where, by the time of Mr. Chitchian's ministry in the Ministry of Energy, this figure fell below 90 billion cubic meters." He continued: "When people know that we are truly facing a water shortage problem, they will definitely conserve water. Unfortunately, we are hiding these issues, and if this trend continues, we will have a much worse situation in the water sector in 50 years. We need to reduce water consumption by 40 to 50 billion cubic meters, and if this doesn't happen, we will face a serious problem. We need to tell the people the facts and discuss all the problems with them." He added: "We are in a water crisis, but we shouldn't make it a security issue. To solve the problem, we need to give all information to the people so that citizens become more informed about the environment. In such conditions, their actions will be a hundred times more effective than the government's." Pointing out that 120 billion dollars have been invested in Asaluyeh area, Kalantari said: This investment was made in this area, while only 1 billion dollars was needed to relocate the refineries. But due to shortcomings, today the people of Asaluyeh either have to die in bad environmental conditions or relocate." He emphasized: "The gas and petrochemical industries pay 450 billion tomans (Iranian unofficial currency) in fines annually to the provincial governorate, but instead of allocating this amount to Asaluyeh, it is paid to nearby cities like Bushehr and others. Today, to protect the environment, we may have to shut down the country's economy. On the same path, agriculture would need to be shut down, but on the other hand, doing this would cripple the country's economy." He continued: "Unfortunately, pollution has become a source of pride for councils and municipalities. They fire a factory manager because they are not polluting,

as their source of income has been cut off. In reality, they see their own benefit in pollution." The water quota has currently fallen below 1000 cubic meters per year, and on the other hand, we take pride in agricultural production so that, the water scarcity and the increase in agricultural production and our economy are not compatible with each other. Kalantari continued: "In July 2018, the ozone level in the air was over 150 parts per million. This means people were breathing pure poison, but because nobody sees it, the city wasn't closed. In contrast, during the winter of the same year, there was more focus on particulate matter less than 2.5 microns because it's visible. Undoubtedly, the Ministry of Oil cannot improve the current fuel situation unless the price of fuel goes up." He added: "According to studies, 18% of Oromo Lake dried up due to climate conditions, and 82% due to poor human management. We haven't even defined environmental water rights for Khuzestan province. Now, if the Karun River has 100 cubic meters less water, the place stinks because 20 cubic meters of sewage enter it. Unfortunately, the country's implementation plans are short-term, and the environment is the victim of this approach. If environmental laws are enforced, 80% of current managers would end up in jail."

The Death of 15 thousand birds in the Miankaleh wetland of Mazandaran in 2020

On 27th January, 2020, the news of thousands of Flamingos deaths in the Miankaleh Wetland shocked many people. This news was published while the sight of a massive amount of bird carcasses on the shore of the wetland painted a grim picture. Two weeks later, after tests by the national Veterinary Organization, the reason for the death of 15,000 migratory birds was identified. The lack of water flowing from upstream into the Miankaleh Wetland was determined to be the cause of the bird deaths. The latest official report from the Veterinary Organization, which is responsible for investigating wildlife diseases, acknowledged that botulism caused the death of the birds. Botulism is a very dangerous toxin, and each nanogram of it can kill five people. In other words, two kilograms of it could destroy all humans on Earth. The lack of water entering the Miankaleh Wetland caused anaerobic conditions and the production of this toxin, because dams and pumps prevent water from entering the wetland.



Oromo lake drying up and environmental pollution

Oromo Lake is the name of a lake in the northwest of Iran. According to the country divisions of Iran, this lake is located between the two provinces of West Azerbaijan and East Azerbaijan in Iran. The area of this lake in the summer of 2015 was about six thousand square kilometers. Oromo Lake is the largest internal lake in Iran, the largest saltwater lake in the Middle East, and the sixth largest saltwater lake in the world. The water of this lake is very salty and it is mostly fed by the Zarina River, Simina River, Talkhe River, Gader, Barandoz, Shahr chai, Nazlo and Zola rivers. This lake has many islands in it, which Kabudan, Ashk Daghi, Arzoo and Spire are among the most important islands of this lake. The catchment area of this lake is equivalent to three percent of the area of Iran. This basin is fed by 21 permanent or seasonal rivers and 31 periodical rivers. Oromo Lake's ecosystem has been registered as a protected area by UNESCO. This lake is also a stopping place for many migratory birds. Unfortunately, with its gradual drying, the entire ecosystem of this area, which is also registered as a national park, has suffered severe environmental damage.

History of Oromo Lake

Lake Oromo is the largest lake within Iran, located between the East Azerbaijan and West Azerbaijan provinces in northeastern Iran. It forms one of Iran's most valuable ecosystems. Following the dead sea which bordered by Jordan East, it is the second-largest saltwater lake in the world .Before the catastrophe of the drying of Lake Oromo, in 1998, this lake ranked twenty-fifth among the world's largest lakes with an area of approximately six thousand square kilometers. Millions of years ago, this lake was part of the Paratethys Sea. One of the earliest references to Lake Oromo can be found in a tablet from the 9th century BC during the reign of Shalmaneser III (ruled 858–824 BC), which mentions it by two names in the area: Parsuah (meaning Iranians or Persians) and Matiane (or Medes). It is still unclear exactly whether these names refer to a region, a tribe, or a connection that existed between a group of people's names and the kings. This lake was the center of the Mannaeans kingdom. The probable place of residence of the Mannaeans was the Hasanlu Hill in the southern part of the lake. The Iranians, known as the Mannaeans people, were dominated by a group called the Matienians. These Iranian people were of various origins, including the Sakas, Sarmatians, and Kimmerians. It is unclear whether the people took their name from the lake or if the lake was named after the surrounding people.

However, the ancient country was called Matiene, from which the Latin name for the lake was derived. In the last five hundred years, the regions surrounding the lake have been inhabited by various Iranian peoples, including Azerbaijanis and Kurds.

The state of Lake Oromo in 1991



Causes of dryness of Lake Oromo

One of the most exciting and fascinating tourist attractions in Iran and one of the saltiest lakes in the world has dried up. It is a strange news that cannot be easily overlooked. Lake Oromo, which was one of Iran's most important lakes, has completely dried up, causing the loss of one of Iran's main blessings and assets. Various reasons have been put forward for the drying up of this lake, and in this article, we intend to examine some of the most important ones in order to further explore the dimensions of this environmental disaster. Many reasons have been proposed for the drying up of the largest permanent water reservoir in West Asia, and we will examine some of them below. Reasons related to both global warming and lack of attention and irreparable human errors. According to experts, about 40% is related to natural factors and 60% is related to human factors. The results obtained from researchers in North America show that a factor such as drought is only five percent effective in drying up Lake Oromo, and 95% of the reasons for drying up are related to human factors, including the creation of a passage that passes through the lake.

1- Passage road, the main cause of drying up of Lake Oromo

Perhaps the main and one of the most important factors aggravating the dryness of Lake Oromo is the construction of the road crossing Lake

Oromo. This bypass road has caused Lake Oromo to be divided into two halves. According to many experts, this issue has caused the natural process of the lake to be disrupted and this has resulted in the drying up of Lake Oromo. Another problem caused by the construction of the crossing bridge is that the presence of the bridge and the lack of water circulation increase the volume of sediments and decrease the depth of the water, and this causes an increase in water evaporation. Also, another problem caused by the construction of this passage is the entry of a large amount of construction materials into the lake.

2- dam construction

The construction of dams, which prevented water from entering Lake Oromo, was the next factor in increasing the drying rate of Lake Oromo. In West Azerbaijan province and Orumi city, 22 dams have been built along the rivers that lead to Lake Oromo, which 8 of them have been put into operation so far. 4 dams have been built in Kurdistan province and 36 dams have been built in East Azerbaijan province, of which 22 dams have been put into operation. A total of 62 dams, of which 34 have been put into operation. The presence of these dams, a total of 44 of which were built in the previous three decades, has caused the amount of water entering the lake to be as low as possible, and this has increased the speed of drought.

3- Drilling unauthorized wells

About 50,000 unauthorized wells have been dug in the area of Lake Oromo for agricultural purposes and other uses during the past years, which has caused the level of underground water to decrease even more and increase the drying speed of the lake. The use of underground water by drilling unauthorized wells has caused 680 thousand hectares of cultivated land to be created in this region. At the same time, the presence of this water has caused a large part of the cultivated area to change its use from agricultural to garden, and this issue has also had a greater impact on water wastage.

4- Increase in air temperature

Global warming and climate change is another factor and reason that contributed to the dryness of Lake Oromo. Although this factor is fainter than other factors, its presence cannot be underestimated. According to statistics, the air temperature has increased by more than 2 degrees in the last two decades.

This lake started to dry up in the mid-2000s era and today it is in danger of drying up completely. The analysis of satellite images shows that in 2015, this lake lost 88% of its area (previous reports only mentioned the loss of 25-50% of the lake's area). A new study by several researchers in North America shows that the drought has only caused a 5% decrease in precipitation in the lake's catchment area, and that human factors include ambitious water-economic development projects along with the construction of a 15-kilometer highway on the lake with a small 2.1-kilometer valve. The situation of the lake has led to a crisis. Until 2012, more than two hundred dams on the rivers of Lake Oromo's catchment area were ready for operation or at the end of the design stages. Based on surveys in November 2015, the water level of Oromo Lake was 1270.04 meters, which showed a decrease of 40 centimeters compared to the same time of the previous year. an editorial newspaper of Egtesad Puya blames the drying up of Lake Oromo on the people and representatives who have repeatedly demanded to transfer the water of the rivers that flow into Lake Oromo to other places in order to meet the agricultural and domestic needs of East and West Azerbaijan and requested the government to use the water of these rivers to meet the needs of the gardens in Maragheh city and other cities of the two mentioned provinces, or they implemented the Lake Oromo bypass project with great pressure on the authorities. According to this theory, in order to save Oromo Lake, instead of drying up the Aras River and destroying fertile lands in other places, water consumption should be reduced and Ministry of Energy should be allowed to release the water of the rivers that flow naturally into this lake again.

Dangers of drying up the Lake Oromo

Experts have expressed concern that if the Lake Oromo dries up completely (recent reports indicate that it may already be Completely dried in this period), the region's temperate climate will transform into a tropical weather with salty winds, fundamentally altering the local environment. Beyond the issue of salt, many pollutants have infiltrated the lake's surface and groundwater, including heavy metals used in industry and toxic agricultural chemicals and if the lake dries up, it will create a lot of aerobic toxic substances and risks of respiratory diseases for the ecosystem and the people of the region. Despite the looming environmental catastrophe, no serious action has yet been taken to save the lake. Experts and environmental activists believe the threat of complete desiccation extends far beyond the lake itself, potentially impacting a 500-kilometer radius.

In the past, Oromo Lake has been a suitable place for the migration of birds such as flamingos, chickens and ducks. One of the most important invertebrates in this lake is a species of saltwater shrimp called *Artemia*. This type of shrimp is the most important food source for many water birds such as flamingos. In the current situation, due to the regression of the lake water and the occurrence of numerous droughts and of course the reduction of its water volume, it has created very difficult conditions for the continuation of the life of the plant and animal species of this lake, among them, we can mention the stoppage of *Artemia* life due to the high salinity of the lake water. The main water suppliers of the lake include permanent rivers of Zarina River, Talkheh river (Aji Chai), Shahr chai, Zola chai, Simina River, Lilan chai, Nazlo chai, Baranduz chai, Sufi chai, Ghalea chai, Almalo chai and Osko chai, which are from the mountains surrounding the lake (including Sabalan, Sahand, border mountains of Iran and Turkey). The ecosystem of this lake is a typical example of a closed catchment basin into which all the flowing water in the rivers of the basin is discharged. The springs at the bottom of the lake also supply a part of the lake's water. In order to facilitate transportation and commercial exchanges in the region, considering the location of the lake, which is located between West and East Azerbaijan provinces, the Shahid Kalantari highway was proposed in the 1980s, and this highway was completed in the middle of the lake in year 1990. Oromo Lake, as a place to discharge all the flowing runoff of the rivers and its ecosystem characteristics, during the last four decades, following numerous activities in various fields of agriculture, has largely been deprived of its natural water resources, and today it is facing a drying crisis. The average amount of annual precipitation in the catchment area along with the decrease in the lake's water level indicates that the lake's water rights have not been reached during this period of time.



Investigating the drying up the Lake Oromo and environmental pollution and its effects on the economy

The gradual death of Lake Oromo, the largest wetland in the country, the second saline lake in the world, it is not just the drying up of a salty lake, the death of Lake Oromo means the destruction of the ecosystem and the loss of large agricultural and economic resources, which means the loss of one of the great habitats of the biosphere. it means the loss of a heritage of several thousand years and destruction of one of the unique tourist attractions of Iran and the world. Also, the drying up of Lake Oromo has caused the loss of thousands of hectares of agricultural land in the area of this lake, the least consequence of which is unemployment and migration of nearly 3 million people in East and West Azerbaijan provinces, and irreparable effects. It will leave a mark in all fields including economic, industrial, social and cultural.



Effects of the drying up of Lake Oromo on the health of the people in the region

The results of Iranian researchers' studies on the effects of the drying up of Lake Oromo on people's health show an increase in blood pressure and asthma.

According to ISNA news report, Dr. Behdad Chehrehnegar, the head of the Strategic Studies Unit of Oromo Lake Restoration Headquarters, in the series of research meetings on the protection and restoration programs of Iran's lakes and wetlands, which was held as a webinar at the Academy of Sciences, the first international studies of dust centers in the Middle East. considered to be related to 2012, when Oromo Lake was introduced as one of the centers of dust in these studies. He stated that in Iran, this area has become a center of dust, which gradually became prominent, and stated: One of the concerns about this area was the effect of the salt dust of Lake Oromo on the health of people, livestock and animals. It was implemented by Tabriz University of Medical Sciences. Chehrehnegar added: The results obtained from these studies from 2005 to 2015

showed an increase in the geographical distribution of blood pressure, while the geographical transmittal of asthma was also observed. According to him, the increase in the birth rate of infants with a weight of less than 2,500 grams and the spread of the death rate were other results of this survey. The head of the Strategic Studies Unit of Oromo Lake Restoration Headquarters, referring to the studies conducted in this headquarters from 2014 to 2018, said: Among the most important studies, of the following can be mentioned:

- The study of fine dust in the catchment area of Lake Oromo using remote sensing technology.
- Focusing and monitoring of fine dust in West and East Azerbaijan provinces using frequency of occurrence index.
- Statistical and locative assessment of the relationship between meteorological parameters.
- Identifying and prioritizing the centers of dust generation in the bed and privacy of the lake Oromo.
- Feasibility of estimating the threshold limit of soil moisture and wind speed for the occurrence of dust.
- Estimation of agricultural uses in the catchment area of Lake Oromo and investigation of potential changes in dust production in the conditions of changes in the level of Lake Oromo. using remote sensing.



Perhaps the main problem and destructive effect of the drying up of Lake Oromo is the transformation of the region's climate into tropical conditions and the creation of salty winds. In addition to the issue of spreading salt and creating salt marshes, the possibility of aeration of toxic substances in the river that have entered the lake water for various reasons will cause various risks such as respiratory diseases.

Social event of acid attack in Isfahan

Another social harm that has appeared in recent years and is also regrettable is the issue of throwing acid on women in the cities of Tehran and Isfahan, so that in the last decade acid spraying was caused by enmity and it is used to be a personal grudge, but recently it was observed in Isfahan that three young women from Isfahan were sprayed with acid by motorcyclists with the aim of creating insecurity in cities and it has been done without previous recognition and relationship which it had the aspect of extremism of the political faction. During a few days in winter 2014 in Tehran, the director of Ziaian Hospital was the target of an acid attack by two unidentified motorcycle riders. It is interesting that the perpetrators of throwing acid on women and the manager of Ziaian Hospital, which was carried out with personal enmity, was soon taken by the police force. the arrestee has been put on trial, but the perpetrators of the acid attack in Isfahan are still being prosecuted, but the injured patients have been treated at the expense of the Ministry of Health and Medicine. In this regard, on behalf of the President of the Republic and members of the parliament and other national authorities this case has been condemned and it has been decided that, the case of acid spraying will be investigated by the judicial branch with the help of police personnel and the Ministry of Information. Of course, from the point of view of sociology, acid spraying is the root of an anti-social personality and comes with pressures that have an internal origin and are imposed on the targeted person by the social environment and society. There are anti-social traditions in all societies, and the basis of all social and cultural disorders is one of the factors that help to spread this behavioral curve, and in fact, antisocial personality is an unwanted reflection of behavioral patterns in our society.

Cultural events

1- Closing the cinema house

From the cultural aspect, the cultural situation in the last decade with the closure of the cinema house during the 10th government and applying some cultural restrictions such as not having cinema and television programs and also not paying attention to the screening of some domestically produced films in the last decade has caused some disturbances in the Iran's society. Considering the severe limitation of using satellite antennas and the encounter of special forces with the people in this field in the 10th government had caused internal pressures at the society. By reducing and stopping such restrictions by the 11th government, relatively freedom to use the Satellite antenna of TV has returned to the society to some extent, as well as the reopening of the cinema house in this government and he renewed activity of cinema and theater artists in 2014, revelations of the High Council of Cinema and holding fruitful meetings to decide on the major issues and problems of the country's cinema is one of the cultural actions of 11th government. In the same year, plans and programs have been developed in order to expand theater spaces, establish unemployment insurance for cinema artists and the results of the meetings of councils, committees and resolutions of the High Council of Cinema have been compiled, which have an executive guarantee. The main purpose of holding this council is to raise the issues and problems of the country's cinema in its cultural field, which is a reliable achievement. It should be mentioned that in the fall of 2014, due to the extreme factional and political performance and the lack of publication of some media news about the actions of the 11th government, managing director of Radio and Television was dismissed by the president and Mr. Sarafaraz the head of cross-border programs of Radio and Television was appointed to the executive management.

2- Books and book reading

Regarding books and book reading, despite the large number of publications, it has not yet been fully cultured. Of course, book fairs are held in Tehran every year, but the printing and distribution of academic, scientific,

technical, and medical textbooks is done by various and numerous publications. It is seen more than the printing and publishing of books in other fields, including historical and fiction books, novels and religious books. Since the number of publishing companies is more than the distributors of all kinds of books in Iran, which has caused some problems in this field, and also because of the high price of all kinds of non-curricular and academic books, as well as the limitations of some libraries in the field of librarianship and Reading facilities have reduced the interest of young people. One of the problems that has arisen in the field of book publishing is the use, copying and profit seeking of university books by some unauthorized people, and also the phenomenon of buying and selling university theses, which is often done by most of translation, printing and reproduction institutions. By imposing exorbitant costs, they prepare and sell dissertations in all academic fields. Of course, since the fall of 2014, this problem of buying and selling theses has been raised in the Ministry of Science and Research, which has decided to deal with students and such institutions legally, but effective action has not been taken so far.

Moral and cultural corruption

The issue that happened in April 2015 and could be criticized is the issue of cultural corruption and contrary to custom related to the rape of two Saudi airport policemen on two Iranian Umrah Hajj pilgrims that happened at the Saudi airport (of course, the two policemen at the Saudi airport had committed this act as a body search in a private room during departure from Saudi Arabia) ,So this news was first spread on social networks like Facebook and then to all media was pulled and this act against the Islamic law of the two police officers of the Saudi airport caused the protest of a number of Iranian families in front of the Saudi embassy in Tehran, which they demanded severe punishment for two aggressive Saudi policemen and also, the judiciary reacted and strongly criticized this issue. Also, a number of members of the parliament asked the Speaker of the Parliament to cancel the Hajj Umrah trip by the government and the Parliament. Until the government also criticized this issue from the government of Saudi Arabia and demanded severe punishment for the two Saudi airport policemen, until at the end of April 2014, the government officially announced the cancellation of the Hajj Umrah trip, and thus the Saudi government was deprived of the profit from the Hajj trip. The Iranian remained unprofitable,

as statistics show that Saudi Arabia benefited from the significant reward of the Iranian Hajj Umrah, about one billion dollars annually, from the arrival of Iranian pilgrims to Saudi Arabia.

Another issue that happened in Makkah during the Hajj pilgrimage in 2015 is that one of the princes of the Saudi king was moving in the opposite direction of the Hajj pilgrims on the way to the Kaaba to perform the Hajj ceremony, and the Saudi police, by order of their superiors, closes the path of pilgrims for greater security and as a result, thousands of pilgrims who intended to pass are forced to move back, this compression and overcrowding of thousands of people causes thousands of Iranian pilgrims to fall on top of each other, and those who were below definitely lost their lives, and according to Iranian statistics, about 500 Iranians were killed in the incident, also before this incident, during the Umrah Hajj ceremony in Saudi Arabia, a construction crane fell on some pilgrims and several people were killed, but fortunately, Iranians were not among the victims of this incident. After these events, the King of Saudi Arabia ordered the execution of Ayatollah Nimer, the only Shia Ayatollah who opposed the Al-Saudi regime, and as a result, he was executed and because of this matter, all European countries and even the head of the United Nations criticized Saudi regime, but in Iran, in addition to the official criticism of the country, some people called Basiji students organized at night to set fire to the Saudi embassy in Tehran and the Saudi consulate in Mashhad, and this incident made the king of Saudi Arabia uncomfortable and ordered the official termination of political and economic relations with Iran.


The tragedy of youth unemployment has occurred

Another social problem and damage, that has afflicted to educated youth in the 2010s is the issue of unemployment. In this regard, a report published by the Statistics Center is noteworthy. The disaster of unemployment as stated by the head of the Statistics Center of Iran was one million university graduates which are unemployed. On April 7, 2016, the head of the Statistics Center of Iran announced the unemployment rate of university graduates to be 18.5% and stated that about one million people with an associate degree or higher are unemployed. In a television interview, the head of the Statistics Center of Iran mentioned that the center had announced an unemployment rate of 11% for the years (2015-2016). He added that about 882,000 people were added to the

economically active population, of which 688,000 became employed and 214,000 were added to the unemployed population. This increase caused the unemployment rate to rise from approximately 10.6% in (2014-2015) to 11% in (2015-2016). Adel Azar the head of the Statistics Center of Iran emphasized that the center adheres to international standards in presenting statistics. He stated that the basis for presenting the unemployment rate is either one hour of work or eight hours of work, and the current unemployment rate has been announced based on both measures. He further asserted that the 11% unemployment rate is accurate, as it is based on scientific methods without any bias, and has been compiled by professional agents. Adel Azar noted that this statistic includes the unemployment rate for individuals aged 15 to 64, but he acknowledged that people pay more attention to the unemployment of young people. He continued: "The unemployment rate for young people aged 15 to 24 is 26.1%, and for young people aged 15 to 29, it is 23.3%." The head of the Statistics Center of Iran noted that the basis for the statistics is self-reporting, adding that this might sometimes lead to the presence of hidden unemployment. One of the social affairs officials emphasized: "According to the law of the Fifth Development Plan and the recent resolution of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, from now on, the Statistics Center of Iran is the official authority for preparing, producing, announcing, and publishing official national statistics such as unemployment rates, inflation, and economic growth."

The following graph shows the statistics of university unemployed people in Iranian society in the 2010s

82



The infographic shows the unemployment rates in different provinces of Iran for the fall of 2017 (1396 in the Iranian calendar). Eight provinces have single-digit unemployment rates. Here are the details:

Hormozgan: 7.5%

Semnan: 8.3%

Markazi: 8.5%

North Khorasan: 8.7%

Razavi Khorasan: 8.8%

Ardabil: 9.2%

Ilam: 9.6%

Zanjan: 9.6%

The source of this data is the Statistical Center of Iran.

Calculating the unemployment rate and suggesting some modifications in the definitions

The study of economics department of Razi University shows the following:

According to the calculations and definitions of the unemployment rate by the Statistics Center of Iran, an individual is considered unemployed if they are of working age, have actively sought work during the reference week, and have not found a job. Individuals who have been engaged at least one hour of work are not considered as unemployed. This definition has resulted in an official national unemployment rate of about 12% in the country, and with the unemployment rate ranging between 18% to 24% in Kermanshah province. Many people believe that the actual unemployment rate should be higher and feel that the reported rate underestimates the true extent of unemployment. The question arises: where is the problem? to calculate the unemployment rate, the Statistics Center of Iran defines the active population as those who are of working age (10 years and older), willing to work, and able to work.

The first point: The working age in countries around the world is determined based on several factors. First, the law. Labor laws recognize individuals over the age of 18 as eligible for insurance and legal regulations, having a bank account, etc. Now that labor laws, civil laws, mandatory military service laws, and so on have set the working age at 18, why does the Statistical Center of Iran still consider the working age to be 10 years and older, following the 1956 census?

The second point is physical capability and capacity. Individuals between the ages of 10 and before 18 are still in their growth phase physically, and today, even in the most remote areas, an average family does not allow child labor. Although the issue of child labor and individuals working under the age of 18 is a reality, it falls outside the scope of an average family. Therefore, it is an exception and should not lead the Statistical Center of Iran to assume the working age as 10 years and older. This approach makes child labor appear normal.

The third point is the law on compulsory education, which mandates secondary education until the age of 18. Even parents who, out of necessity, prevent their

children from studying are considered violators under the law. The next issue is the upper age limit for working. Perhaps in the years 1956 and 1966, social security laws and pension funds were not widely implemented, and a large portion of people worked until any age. However, today, it is necessary to consider a working age limit of 65 years, taking into account the existing laws of these funds, as well as other norms and regulations. Therefore, it seems that one of the main problems of unemployment rate calculations, which is seen as unrealistic, is the choice of working age. Based on international evidence and comparing the country with current cultural and legal conditions, it seems the best working age to be considered in censuses and labor market statistics is from the completion of 18 years to the completion of 65 years.

The second issue in determining employment is the number of working hours. It is not appropriate to consider working just one hour, even without pay, as a criterion for determining employment. To establish a reference for weekly working hours, several main issues need to be considered. In 2017 the hourly wage rate in Iran was around 4300 tomans. If we multiply this rate by 26 working days in a month, it wouldn't be enough to even feed an individual, let alone support the dependency rate in Iran, which is approximately 3.5. This means that each employed person needs to support about 3.5 people. To determine adequate working hours, the following factors should be taken into account:

Living Wage Calculation: The wage should be sufficient to cover basic living expenses for the individual and their dependents.

Dependency Rate: The average number of dependents per employed person should be factored in to ensure the wage is realistic and adequate.

Minimum Working Hours: Establishing a minimum number of working hours per week that ensures an adequate income to support the individual and their dependents. by considering these factors, a more accurate and realistic measure of employment can be established, reflecting the actual economic conditions and living standards in the country. Meanwhile, the International Labor Organization (ILO) considers 15 hours of work per week as the standard for employment. Customary practices, law, minimum wage, and other standards also recognize 15 hours of work per week as the criterion. Therefore, to accurately calculate the unemployment rate and labor market statistics in the country, two essential criteria need to be revised:

Adjust the working age to 18 - 65 years.

Set the minimum working hours per week to 15 hours.

Regarding job creation, the Vice President of the Iranian Chamber of Commerce, Industries, Mines, and Agriculture stated in July 2017: "The Social Security Organization breaches agreements and harasses the production sector." By adopting these two criteria, the measurement of unemployment rates and

labor market statistics would more accurately reflect the actual employment situation.

What is the philosophy of the growth of institutions, organizations and government agencies that are under the control and subject to the will of the government?

The worst and most unacceptable response regarding this issue is one, that suggests these institutions, organizations, and government agencies are established merely to create jobs for some people and provide positions of authority for others. The most acceptable response is that, the philosophy behind the growth of any institution or agency should be aimed at meeting the needs of citizens and various groups. this philosophy is especially relevant for institutions whose resources are provided by specific groups, and the government having a minimal role in funding them. The Social Security Organization in Iran is one such institution. From its inception to the present day, its financial resources have been provided and continue to be provided by employers. the experience of recent decades has shown that even though the financial resources of this organization are supplied by tens thousands of small and large Iranian employers, the government has taken control of it. This massive institution, which has now become a symbol of the efficiency of quasi-governmental bodies, unfortunately, suffers from inefficiency and low productivity. Its management in the last decade has been unable to effectively utilize its resources. The government, instead of fulfilling its legal obligation to provide its share of the funding, has imposed difficult conditions on this institution, making its operations more challenging. Additionally, the macroeconomic conditions in recent years have been such that the organization's managers are unable to distinguish the right path from the wrong one. We acknowledge that the necessary resources for organizations should be collected from eligible employers with precision, speed, and thoroughness according to the law, and employers have agreed to cooperate as required. However, the behavior of this organization is neither in accordance with legal norms nor based on efficiency and productivity. Despite senior officials of the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, who are the upper management of the Social Security Organization, repeatedly promising employers in 2016, that they would correct some behaviors of the middle managers of this organization and making these promises with certainty, in practice, this has not happened. Why do we witness this inconsistency between the promises of senior managers and the actions of middle managers within the Social Security Organization? One possible answer is that senior managers make promises in public forums out of politeness or pressure, without consulting with middle managers and experts

beforehand. As a result, these senior managers, when making promises, are unaware of what awaits these promises at the middle and lower levels. Another possibility is that senior managers of the Social Security Organization and their superiors may not genuinely believe in these goals and might be hoping that these promises will simply fade over time. Another possibility is that the middle managers of the Social Security Organization hold anti-free market views and consider a hostile stance towards capital owners as the basis for their decisions. This possibility should be taken seriously, as the organization's publications, funded by employers' money, promote these ideas. Additionally, it is possible that the organization is burdened with excessive and unusual costs, and there is a lack of motivation for innovation and finding new sources of funding. The politeness or obligation towards the government leaves only one option for managers: increasing pressure on employers. This pressure is applied even though employers submit their financial statements to the organization's experts on time and in accordance with the law. These challenges highlight the need for a more accountable and effective management system within the Social Security Organization. It is essential to ensure that the resources provided by employers are utilized efficiently and that the organization operates transparently and in line with the law. Only through such reforms can the organization meet its intended goals and serve the needs of its stakeholders effectively. This article believes that senior managers of the organization, higher-level managers of this institution, and the ministry never intend to make empty promises or assume the likelihood of corruption. However, the organization's breach of promises and agreements is also unjustifiable. The illegal pressure and calculation of insurance premiums from audits of several years ago, which should be returned to normal and legal procedures according to the law and the promises of senior managers, are contrary to the norms and rules in today's conditions, especially considering that the Supreme Leader has declared the year 2017 as the year of production and employment. Breach of promises only leads to distrust.

Smoking among academics in the 2010s era

Another problem that exists among academics is smoking, which has attracted the attention of university officials. As they have thought of implementing the "smoke-free university" comprehensive plan, pay attention to the statistics provided by the Anti-Narcotics Headquarters of the Ministry of Science and the Ministry of Health and Medical Education: About 90% of medical students and 75% of non-medical students have experienced smoking, which having started smoking before the age of 20. The rate of cigarette consumption among students is 16%. Additionally, 6.4% of students at medical universities have used narcotics or psychotropic substances. Officials have sounded the alarm on the prevalence of tobacco use among students by presenting these statistics. This issue has now prompted the Ministry of Science to react, indicating that despite having disciplinary regulations related to smoking in universities, new initiatives are still being introduced. The Director General of the Counseling and Health Office of the "Student Affairs Organization" of the Ministry of Science, Research, and Technology has announced the implementation of the "Comprehensive Smoke-Free University Plan" and stated that by 2016, tobacco products, especially cigarettes and hookahs, will be eradicated from the university community. Dr. Hamid Yaqubi emphasizes the need for this initiative, saying that as an institution responsible for training the country's future managers, it is necessary to address this issue. In response to the question of whether there are already disciplinary regulations regarding the use of narcotics in universities, Dr. Yaqubi explains: "The use of tobacco in the university environment is mentioned in various regulations, including employment regulations and disciplinary codes. However, it is essential to develop a specific policy that sets clear guidelines in this area. The existing regulations do not meet the needs of university presidents." He stresses: "The implementation of this plan includes various components, and different measures have been taken to ensure its success." The first step in implementing the aforementioned plan is to establish and clarify the policies and guidelines that universities will follow in dealing with tobacco use on campus. These policies and frameworks will be developed by the Counseling and Health Office of the Ministry of Science, in collaboration with universities and with input from students, including those who use tobacco. Efforts will be made to inform the entire university community, including students, professors, and staff, about the existence of such policies regarding tobacco use on university campuses. Dr. Yaqubi explains: "Some individuals may have been using tobacco before entering the university, but once they receive the necessary education, they may be encouraged to quit smoking. Therefore, providing accessible and free cessation programs to the university community is essential." By taking these comprehensive and inclusive steps, universities can create a healthier

environment that discourages tobacco use and supports the well-being of all community members.

Please bring a hookah with high-speed internet

Now, coffee houses are equipped with football screens and high-speed internet. With the advent of games like Clash of Clans and Soccer Stars (online football), one of the essentials for coffee houses in Iran to attract customers is internet access. Not having internet means a lack of customers and ultimately bankruptcy. According to field reports, 11 million Iranians smoke hookah recreationally, with nearly 3 million being regular users. Girls, with an 18% usage rate, are closing the gap with boys. Dr. Mohammad Reza Masjedi, Secretary-General of the Iranian Anti-Tobacco Society, has stated that hookah use and the resulting diseases will lead to very serious issues such as increased rates of heart and respiratory diseases in the next 10 to 20 years. A recent study in the country found that 43% of girls and 64% of boys have occasionally smoked hookah.

The phenomenon of historical monuments being stolen in Tehran in the 2010s era

Another social and cultural harm that occurred in the mid-2010s era is the theft of historical monuments and inscriptions from old buildings, which is described below.

Most of the thefts in Tehran have occurred in District 12. Many of these tiles, after being stolen, have been found in Tehran's markets, at antique shops on Manouchehri and Saadi streets, and even in antique shops in Kashan and other cities. Tracing these artifacts is not difficult. It seems that there is more sensitivity towards the loss of pottery jars than there is towards these tiles. there is no legal sensitivity for dealing with these tiles, door knockers and clones and action towards these items. The method of some of these thefts indicates that not all of them are random; in some cases, it seems that a gang is involved, which operating at specific times and are familiar with the techniques for removing these items from buildings. Many people, amid all their urban concerns, have become sensitive to this issue but do not know where to report these thefts. here is an eyewitness report: On Imamzadeh Yahya Street, in the Oudlajan locality of Tehran, opposite the Memar Bashi Mosque and School, the theft of these historical artifacts is evident. The absence of historical tiles on the entrance of the building is glaring. according to the head of Memarbashi School, the empty space of the historical tiles above the door of the building, which is now the residence of young religious students, is a bad sight. No one has yet

figured out what happened to the tiles of the mosque, and the two remaining pieces that were removed have been set aside. Tiles have been cut off so hard that certainly cannot be the work of drug addicts or petty thieves, it was done by professionals. The locals speak with great regret about the azure tiles above the door of the school building. We are not allowed enter inside the school; they say it's impossible without prior coordination. However, the courtyard of the mosque and the courtyard of the Memar Bashi School are truly beautiful on a rainy spring day in Tehran. A full pool of water is visible in the circular courtyard. This building is a heritage from the Qajar dynasty. It's not just the tiles of the Memar Bashi School that were targeted for theft in 2016. Several other historic buildings in Tehran were also burgled in the spring of 2015. Inscriptions and tiles above the doors of old houses were removed. Door knockers were taken off, and even the bronze pieces above the National Garden gate have disappeared. The old carvings look as if they've been eaten by termites. Piece by piece, they have disappeared from the National Garden gate, similar to a tree where the fruits on the lower branches are picked first, gradually moving up to the higher branches. The same has happened to the National Garden gate. The bronze adornments have also been removed from the lower part of the gate, gradually working their way up, and no one in the Oudlajan locality has seen exactly what happened. Everyone is astonished by these types of thefts, which usually occur at night when there are no witnesses. They say these tiles have a good market, which is why they are stolen at night. One of the locals, who owns a real estate agency directly opposite the Memar Bashi School, says: "I was very upset when I saw that they had taken the tiles. We called the police and the cultural heritage organization several times. They came and went, but well, you have to forget about stolen goods." A fruit seller who has a small shop nearby says: "They have also stolen the tiles from Imamzadeh Yahya. There is an old house a few alleys up where people still live, but the tiles above the entrance have been stolen." One of the neighbors said that the stolen tiles are sold in the Seyed Esmail market, as he had seen the antiques there himself. Another person mentioned that the tiles are exported and sold at high prices in auctions abroad. A taxi driver working on Imam Khomeini Street said, "You can be sure that the theft from the top of the National Garden gate is the work of addicts; Otherwise, what is the use of broken bronze? What historical value do they have? This area isn't residential, so they can easily come at night. They need to put up guards." The historic Malek House in the Tehran bazaar has also lost its door knockers. Despite having a caretaker, no one knows what happened to the old knockers. The Haj Ghanbar Ali Mosque, the ruins of Isa Mafi's house, and the entrance of the building of Sediq, the third president of the University of Tehran, are other places where entrance tiles have been stolen. Recently, the theft from the top of the Sepahsalar Mosque and School also made news.

The unknown fate of historical monuments in Tehran

What happened to the painting tiles and other stolen artifacts of Tehran's historical buildings? Are they really found in antique shops or different markets in Tehran and outside Iran? At all, who is willing to buy the torn pieces of tiles from a historical building that are clearly stolen? (From the old houses in Tehran city that were destroyed or their owners destroyed them to build new houses in their place. Not all of them are for Tehran, and some were brought from Yazd and Kashan cities. Like this one that was brought from Kashan.) The reference is to an inscription which it has the name of five people. Who are most looking to buy these tiles? - Most of those who are looking for keeping antiques, those who love Iran and Iranian culture, when you walk in Friday market, you will see many of these things, from tiles and door knocker to albums of Qajar families and a collection of old coins. The antique shops of Manouchehri Street are one of the places where many people believe that these historical works can be found.

Protection of historical buildings and education of citizens

A large number of historical buildings of Tehran are located in districts 1, 15, 11, 10, and 12, especially district 20 of Tehran, which has a special ancient and historical context. Should the government employ special guards to protect these buildings? Is the protection unit of the cultural heritage organization not enough to protect these buildings? In principle, is it possible to protect the buildings by the government, or should the citizens be trained in this regard? The secretary of the follow-up committee of Tehran's historical houses says about this: Most of the thefts happened in Tehran. Many of these tiles of region 12 have been found after being stolen in Tehran bazaars, such as Seyed Ismail bazaar, Manouchehri and Saadi street antique shops, and even Kashan antique shops and other cities. Even traces of the sale of some of these works have been seen on foreign websites such as Amazon, which have been sold for up to 300 euros. He believes that tracking these thefts is not a difficult task, many of these works are placed in the luggage of travelers and leave the country easily. The secretary of the committee believes that in order to prevent the sale of stolen tiles, their pictures should be printed and distributed in antique markets. The method of some thefts also shows that not all of them are random thefts and in some Case, it seems that a gang with planning at specific hours which familiar with the methods of separating works from the building does this. Many people have become sensitive to this issue among all their urban concerns these days. But they don't know where to contact and report these thefts. Iskandar Mokhtari, a Tehran expert and researcher of Tehran studies, has a different opinion about the theft of Tehran's historical monuments and says: "I consider this issue to be

a kind of vandalism ". That is, the same people who write on historical works can steal these works. These things are the result of lack of identity. Vandalism is the result of lack of identity. Because anyone who loves his city or country is not ready to hurt it like this. Tehran expert believes that the solution to deal with this phenomenon is not the use of special tools for the protection of cultural heritage, but informing the people.

Chapter seven

Social disasters in the 2010s era

Uncensored reporting of the plasco Building fire

On January 19, 2017, the Plasco building fire incident in Tehran occurred, capturing national attention. In response, the president at the time appointed the head of Tarbiat Modares University to lead a special national committee to investigate the Plasco Building incident. The goal was to take necessary measures to prevent similar incidents and strengthen the country's crisis management capabilities. The President requested that the committee to publish a national report on the incident within two months for the Iranian public's information. The report was released as scheduled and identified several parties as responsible for the incident: during this incident, Foundation of the Oppressed (Bonyad Mostazafan) as the owner of the building, municipality, fire department, Ministry of Roads, Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Welfare were introduced as the culprits of this incident.

Introduction of the seven culprits of the Plasco incident in the parliament report

Eight months after the Plasco Building fire incident and the collapse of this building, the report from the Parliament's Construction Commission was read out in an open session. This report questioned the standard of the building's equipment in seven areas and simultaneously identified seven different culprits of this incident as responsible for the incident. The directive to prepare this report was given by the Speaker of the Parliament to the Construction Commission at the time of the fire and collapse of the Plasco Building. However, after its reading, some parliament members still found faults with its comprehensiveness. The Construction Commission's report primarily attributed the cause of the incident to the "unauthorized use of heating devices and non-standard, unauthorized wiring by workers in the commercial units on the tenth floor." Additionally, it stated that other contributing factors to the fire and building collapse were the "lack of necessary safety standards in the industrial electrical system, lighting, ventilation, heating, protection, warning systems, and fire-fighting equipment in the Plasco Building." The report also explained that written warnings had been issued over the past several years by the Fire Department and the Tehran Municipality to the owner, leaseholders, and the building's board of directors, indicating deficiencies in the building's safety

systems. In this section of the report, several issues are highlighted as contributing factors that exacerbated the extent of the damage in the Plasco Building fire. These factors include: Lack of Natural Gas Supply: The building did not have a natural gas supply, leading to the use of non-standard heating and cooking systems. Deteriorated Electrical Network: The electrical network was outdated and the building had a high electricity consumption due to the production units. Absence of Warning and Fire Suppression Systems: There were no adequate warning systems or fire suppression systems in place. Failure to Implement National Building Regulations: The building did not adhere to the national building regulations regarding proper maintenance and operation. Lack of Safety Equipment: Necessary safety equipment was not provided. Unauthorized and Inappropriate Change of Use: The commercial units were improperly and illegally converted into production workshops, contrary to the provisions of Chapter 22 of the national building regulations. Additionally, non-fire-resistant materials were used for partitioning the units.

Negligence of the building owner, municipality and chamber of guilds

Perhaps the most important part of this report refers to the responsibilities and legal duties of various institutions and entities in causing this incident. The Parliament's Construction Commission firstly points to the responsibility of the building owner and manager, stating that "the role of the building owner in the extent of casualties and financial losses suffered by tenants and shop owners is significant and should be considered by the relevant judicial authorities." Secondly, the report identifies the Chamber of Guilds and individual guild members as the next group responsible for the incident, stating that "in the Plasco Building, many commercial and workshop units were operating without compliance with workshop and safety regulations," which falls under the responsibility of the Chamber of Guilds and individual guild members. The third entity mentioned for its responsibility in this incident is the Municipality of Tehran and the Islamic City Council of Tehran. According to the report, "the Municipality of Tehran failed to obtain a judicial permit to enforce Clause 14 of Article 55 of the Municipal Law, recognizing its authority to take such action. Furthermore, the Islamic City Council of Tehran, beyond its supervisory duty over the Municipality of Tehran, especially in enforcing the above-mentioned legal clause, had a direct responsibility to implement precautionary measures to ensure the city's safety against fire, but no report indicates that this duty was fulfilled.

In addition to the three previously mentioned sections, the Construction Commission's report also introduces four governmental institutions among the institutions that have had responsibilities in this incident. The first of these

institutions are the Tehran Governor's Office and the Tehran County Office. The Construction Commission believes that these two institutions failed in their responsibility to oversee the proper implementation of laws and regulations and to coordinate the implementation of these regulations concerning the Plasco Building. The report states: "The Plasco incident and the extent of its damages are attributed to the failure to enforce laws, lack of inter-agency coordination, absence of necessary preventive measures to eliminate the conditions leading to the incident, and the inefficiency of crisis management. "The report also notes that despite the responsibilities of the Tehran Governor's Office and the Tehran County Office, "no convincing report indicating effective actions in fulfilling the mentioned duties has been received. The report also identifies the Ministry of Cooperatives, Labor, and Social Welfare as another governmental entity bearing responsibility. It states: "The Ministry of Cooperatives, Labor, and Social Welfare has absolved itself of responsibility simply because the Plasco Building was commercial. However, ensuring that illegal production workshops are not established in a commercial building is more important than the failure to comply with safety and protection regulations. Therefore, the Ministry's negligence in failing to report to the judiciary as a judicial authority is clear, evident, and prosecutable by the competent legal authorities." Furthermore, the report criticizes the Organization for Budget and Planning for its "unnecessary interventions, particularly in resource distribution," labeling it a "significant obstacle to the agility and efficiency of the country's crisis management structure." Finally, it highlights the role of the National Disaster Management Organization, stating: "Under the dominance of the Ministry of Interior's governance perspective, the National Disaster Management Organization has lost its professional and specialized nature, becoming an inefficient, political structure with merely supervisory functions."

The problem of rules

In another part, the report of the Parliament's Construction Commission deals with the pathology of the existing laws and points to the "projection of governmental institutions and organizations and public institutions in the submitted reports". It immediately mentions that "examples of this blame-shifting include the report dated on January 31, 2017 from the Tehran Municipality regarding the lack of obligation of the municipality in enforcing Clause 14 of Article 55 of the Municipal Law concerning internal building installations. However, District 12 Municipality had referenced Clause 14 of Article 55 and its related provision in a safety warning numbered 50704/5/12 dated 1 November 2014 regarding the Plasco Building." Additionally, the

report references Article 105 of the Labor Law, highlighting the Ministry of Cooperatives, Labor, and Social Welfare's negligence. The ministry "justifies its responsibilities solely within production and workshop units and considers the inspection of commercial units outside its scope of duties." The report also points out the expiration of the experimental implementation period for the law establishing the National Disaster Management Organization, the lack of enforcement guarantees for existing laws, and the legal gap in the Ministry of Roads and Urban Development's oversight of building maintenance and operations. Finally, in the proposal section, the Parliament's Construction Commission has presented issues such as the amendment of the engineering system law, the municipal law and the labor law.

Earthquake disaster and the roots behind earthquake in 2010s era

The International Institute of Earthquake Engineering and Seismology in Tehran announced that from November 12, 2017 to December 13, 2017, Iran was filled with earthquake news. In a country that typically records about 200 to 250 earthquakes with a magnitude of over 4 on the Richter scale annually, 106 earthquakes with a magnitude of over 4 were recorded in just the 31 days. Most of these were aftershocks of the main earthquakes in the Ezgeleh, and Sar pol-e Zahab regions with a magnitude of 7.3, and three earthquakes on December 1, 12, and 13, 2017 with a magnitude of 6.0 in the east of Hejdak, Kerman. Iran is experiencing a shortening of about 3 centimeters per year, with approximately 10% of this deformation manifesting as earthquakes. As a result, Iran expects to experience two earthquakes with a magnitude of 6 to 7 on the Richter scale annually, and every decade, two earthquakes with a magnitude of over 7. Over the past two decades, from the Ardakul Gaen earthquake on May 10, 1997 to the Ezgeleh Sar pol-e Zahab earthquake on November 12, 2017, no shallow-focus earthquakes with a magnitude of over 7 had occurred in Iran's continental crust. Additionally, in the decade leading up to the November 12, 2017 earthquake, there were only 11 earthquakes with a magnitude between 6 and 7, compared to the approximately 20 events that might have been expected. The shortage of earthquake occurrences over the past two decades is gradually being compensated. Unfortunately, in an earthquake in a sparsely populated border area with a depth of 23 kilometers (Ezgeleh, Sar pol-e Zahab), we still experienced 620 deaths. On December 13, 2017, the 60th anniversary of the 1957 Farsinj earthquake in Kermanshah with a magnitude of 7.2, which resulted in 1,119 deaths, was marked. The question remains: After 60 years, should the deaths of people in Iranian earthquakes still be considered normal? About 70% of the deaths in the Ezgeleh and Sar pol-e Zahab earthquake occurred in buildings constructed in the last decade (poor-quality of Mehr housing and self-built structures). This is a significant tragedy for a country that has had earthquake engineering and seismic codes for more than half a century, starting with the first draft of the earthquake-resistant building code written by Professor Ali Akbar Moeinfar in 1964. Scientific prediction is a valid approach, and every natural phenomenon can be predicted using scientific methods. The only historically accurately predicted earthquake was the February 4, 1975 Haicheng earthquake in China, which was primarily predicted based on foreshocks, leading to the evacuation of the city. However, in the same city on July 26, 1976 (less than 1.5 years later), a 7.8 magnitude earthquake occurred, which the Chinese could not predict, resulting in 280,000 deaths. Additionally, the May 12, 2008 Wenchuan earthquake in China, with a magnitude of 7.9, caused

approximately 70,000 deaths and was also not predicted. Therefore, predicting earthquakes (identifying the time, location, and magnitude of the next significant event with high precision and within a short time frame) is still not possible. The idea that technologies like Harp technology or nuclear explosion could create or trigger such earthquakes like a 7.3 magnitude earthquake at a depth of 23 kilometers or a 6.0 magnitude earthquake at a depth of 10 to 15 kilometers due to the movement of a basement fault is physically implausible. No human technology has ever been able to induce or influence a natural phenomenon at such depths. Any explosion of this magnitude would be detectable and reported worldwide. These earthquakes will continue (and there remains a possibility of aftershocks over 5.0 magnitude or even 6.0 magnitude in the Sar pol-e Zahab area). In Kerman, the occurrence of aftershocks does not mean that no significant earthquake will follow. In fact, in a region that has experienced a 7.3 magnitude earthquake followed by dozens of aftershocks between 2.0 and 4.0 magnitude, enough energy may still be stored along the fault lines to cause another significant aftershock with a magnitude of 6.0.

The "Iran" media report on the shortcomings of the earthquake affected areas

More than one month had passed since the Ezgeleh earthquake in Kermanshah province, but the city was still experiencing stressful days, with the cold winter days approaching. People were still complaining about the lack of heating appliances and temporary shelters, the family's bottled water supply had been cut off, and access to bathrooms and showers was extremely limited. The initial outpouring of support from the public and artists had faded, and there is no news of the fuss of the first days and initial bustle was gone. Now, the people of Kermanshah had to live with their pain under the cold Red Crescent tents. The first destination of the media reporter was the tents set up in Sar pol-e Zahab, the area that suffered the most casualties and financial losses. As far as the eye could see, white tents were erected throughout the city. Although the shops were open and people could buy food, and the merchants had returned to work, the city was still in a painful state (at the time of writing this article by reporter). Some financially well-off families had managed to procure Metal room and were living in it, while others were using donated shelters. Those who couldn't manage were still spending their nights under the cold Red Crescent tents. Tents were visible everywhere, from the middle boulevards to beside the gas stations. The media reporter recounts: "As we approach one of the parks in the city of Sar pol-e Zahab, I am immediately surrounded by old and young people who start speaking to me in Kurdish. The women outnumber the men around me. They loudly say, 'How long do we have to live in this situation?' 'Where did go

all the noise from the first days? Was Kermanshah only important for one week? Who said "Kermanshah is not alone"? 'When can we rebuild our homes?' 'Why doesn't the government provide loans?' 'It's winter and cold; where do we go with small children?' 'Can you last an hour under a tent?' I look at them, and before I can say anything, one person from the crowd says, 'What's the point, madam? You and your colleagues have come here many times, asked us questions, and we've answered, but what has happened? Nothing. After a month, nothing is in place. Everyone comes, takes a few pictures, and leaves, and we are left with all this pain and suffering.' Someone angrily shouts, 'The people did everything they could. If the government had just delivered the public donations to us, many of us would have already started rebuilding our homes. You came here and made an effort. Look at our sanitary conditions.' He points towards the makeshift bathroom and showers: 'We are nearly 500 families here, and we only have one bathroom and one toilet. You should go inside and look at the bathroom to see if you would want to take a shower there,' one person said. "Every day we have to stand in line to use these filthy toilets. All these people and only two toilets?" A commotion started, with people speaking over each other, and were eager to share their grievances with someone. A young woman carrying a child came up to me and took my hands: "Everything ended in Kermanshah. The earthquake was just a one-week issue for the officials. Where did all those nice words go? Has anyone come to check on our suffering? Our misery has only just begun." From the other side, a young man said, "During the day, the sun is scorching, turning the tents into ovens! But at night, the cold breaks our bones. The cold takes our breath away. If there was proper management, we wouldn't still be living in these tents. Everyone said there were Metal rooms, but look around; can you find a single one here?" The young man was right. Field observations by the "Iran" media reporter showed that very few families in Sar pol-e Zahab had received Metal room. When I inquired about the reason, an old man explained: "A few days after the earthquake, a Red Crescent official came and asked if we wanted Metal room. They told us that if we took a Metal room, we wouldn't receive the three million tomans (Iranian traditional Currency) of government aid. So, we preferred to stay in the tents to get that money and we can solve some of our problems. In two months, this place will become hell; it will be impossible to live inside the Metal room! The heat will be unbearable. We are waiting for the government to give us the three million tomans so we can start to build our homes." Moving from the park in the Sar Pol Zahab area towards the Mehr Housing complex, the situation there is also dire. Residents have set up their tents in front of the Mehr Housing and have begun to rebuild their lives amid the ruins. One of the locals, wearing a purple traditional outfit, describes the plight of the people in this area: "Seven people are living in one tent; is this fair? It gets so cold at night that we are too scared to turn on the lights. There is food, but very little. Within minutes, a group of about 15 people gathers around us, all agreeing with him,

speaking loudly. I don't know whom to listen to. An elderly woman stands next to me and angrily shouts: 'They cut off our bottled water supply. They said the drinking water is safe. Even before the earthquake, we didn't give our children this drinking water, and now they tell us to drink it. A week ago, they came and gave us a box of canned beans and tuna, a can of oil, a pack of tea and sugar, a pack of salt, and a 10-kilogram bag of rice, saying this is your month's ration.'" Calculating the situation for a family of seven, it becomes clear that the provided food rations are insufficient. As the person speaking notes, "Are these food rations enough for us?" Others standing nearby nod in agreement. One of the men expresses, "We expect the construction of our homes to start soon. Everyone here speaks about their own pain." One person mentions, "My kidneys have developed problems, and yesterday I had to pay 140,000 tomans for an ultrasound. My medications cost nearly 85,000 tomans. Where are we supposed to get this money? Under these conditions, anyone going to the hospital has to pay a lot for medications." I ask if the doctors are also charging for treatment, and he responds, "The treatment costs are not charged, but we have to pay a lot for medications. He continues, "There are severe sanitation issues in the cities. In the earthquake-stricken areas, people do not have enough bathrooms and toilets and must use the facilities of half-destroyed homes."

Fatal overturning of student's bus of Azad University of Science and Research in 2018

The overturning of a bus carrying students at the Islamic Azad University, Science and Research Branch in Tehran resulted in 10 fatalities and 26 injuries. Seven victims died at the scene, and three others succumbed to their injuries in the hospital. Following this tragic accident, the university announced a two-day closure of the Science and Research campus. according to a report by Fars News Agency, Dr. Saberian, head of the Tehran Emergency Center, provided details about the incident. He stated that around 12 noon on Tuesday, December 25, 2018, the emergency services were informed about the overturning of a bus carrying students on Simon Bolivar Street at the Science and Research Branch of the Islamic Azad University in Tehran. In response, one ambulance bus, seven ambulances, and two motorcycle ambulances were dispatched to the scene. As reported by Aftab News, Agency he added that the accident had resulted in over 30 injuries, and an emergency helicopter was also present at the scene. According to Fars News Agency, Ebrahim Kalantari, Deputy for Cultural and Student Affairs at Islamic Azad University, stated that eyewitnesses reported the bus driver had a stroke, causing him to lose control of the bus, which led to the overturning. A member of the Tehran City Council also expressed concern over the safety of school and student transportation services. Zahra Nejad Bahram, a reporter, mentioned that the death of 8 students and the injury of 27 others in the Science and Research Branch of Islamic Azad University is a tragic event that has caused concern among the representatives of the people. The City Council, worried about the safety of vehicles used for transporting students, has urged the responsible authorities to address this issue seriously. Jalal Maleki, the spokesperson for the fire department, added that the bus involved in the accident was used for transporting students within the university. The bus veered into a green area and overturned. Part of the bus had sunk into the ground, and firefighters had to cut through parts of the bus to extricate it from the earth. There is a possibility that some individuals may have been ejected from the bus, and search operations are ongoing. Additionally, the traffic police are conducting the necessary investigations.

The exhaustion of the university's transportation fleet is the bane of students' lives

Following the overturning of the bus at the Islamic Azad University, Science and Research Branch, several students spoke with ISNA about some issues with the university's public transportation system and its deterioration. One of students who was present at the scene of the accident mentioned that the

Science and Research campus is situated on a slope with the faculties arranged in a tiered manner along the path. Due to the long distance, students are compelled to use the university buses. Previously, it was planned to transport students via cable cars, but with the change in university management, the cable car project was halted, the severe collision with the concrete base was one of the reasons for the severity of the overturning accident of the Azad University bus. the head of Tehran's traffic police provided an update on the bus accident at the Islamic Azad University, Science and Research Branch. He highlighted the severe nature of the accident and the destruction of the bus, noting that parts of the university's roads are located on steep slopes. The bus was traveling from the northern part of the campus to the south when it veered off the path into the green area of the campus. The bus rolled approximately 90 meters in the green area due to the steep slope and then collided with a concrete base of housing water facilities. This collision caused significant destruction to the bus, leaving only the rear part of the bus intact. He added that the severe impact with the concrete base was likely a major factor in the high number of fatalities. The head of the Safety Committee of Tehran City Council has announced the council's involvement in the investigation of the bus overturning incident at the Islamic Azad University, Science and Research Branch. In an interview with ISNA, Shahrbanoo Amani, who visited the site of the accident, emphasized the lack of an ingrained safety culture in the country, which repeatedly leads to tragic events like this one. She noted that agencies end up spending significantly more to address the aftermath. Amani stated that the deaths of young people, especially students and elites, as well as the impact on their families, are irreparable. She mentioned that in this incident, two female students, five male students, and the bus driver lost their lives, highlighting that these students had exams in the following week and did not deserve such a fate. She pointed out the steep slope of the university route and questioned the absence of essential safety measures like guardrails and speed bumps. The head of Tehran's Traffic Police clarified that the bus involved in the accident at the Islamic Azad University, Science and Research Branch, belonged to a contractor company affiliated with the university. He emphasized that, according to the law, the police do not have the authority to operate within university spaces, whether they are private or public universities. Therefore, the responsibility for traffic management in this area lies with the university itself.

Urgent handling of the University of Research Sciences bus overturning incident

The head of the Cultural and Social Commission of the Tehran City Council expressed regret over the tragic bus overturning incident at the Islamic Azad

University, Science and Research Branch. In an interview with ISNA, Mohammad Javad Hagshenas offered condolences to the families of the victims and emphasized the need for immediate action regarding the incident. He questioned whether there could be an acceptable response for the families who lost their loved ones, noting that seven students had died and the condition of the remaining injured individuals was not favorable. He stressed the significant loss and failure to ensure the safety of the citizens. He insisted that the cause of the accident must be determined promptly and it should be clarified which entity was responsible for confirming the physical and mental health of the bus drivers. He emphasized that everyone is responsible for ensuring the safety, both physical and psychological, as well as the environmental safety of the citizens. Additionally, Hojjatoleslam Montazeri, following the accident, instructed the Tehran prosecutor to investigate the incident thoroughly.

The beginning of the preliminary criminal investigation in the Azad University accident

The head of the Capital Prevention Police announced the initiation of a criminal investigation into the bus accident involving students from the Islamic Azad University. Colonel Keyvan Zahiri stated that officers from the Jannat Abad Police Station quickly responded to the incident upon notification. They, along with other forces from the second district headquarters, assisted the emergency services and university officials in helping the injured and maintaining order at the scene. He added that judicial officers from the police station, following instructions and under the supervision of the judicial authorities, have been present at the four medical centers where the injured are being treated, conducting preliminary criminal investigations. The former project control manager of the Science and Research Branch's cable transportation system (cable car) announced that if they had been allowed to complete the cable car project, this accident would not have occurred. Mohammad Ali Karouni stated that the bus overturning incident involving students at the Islamic Azad University, Science and Research Branch, was shocking. He expressed deep sorrow over the tragic death of eight people and the injury of about 30 others, which brought immense grief to the families and the broader academic community in the country. Karouni explained that since 2013, Mohsen Hashemi, the then Deputy of Urban Development at Islamic Azad University, had proposed replacing the bus system with a cable transportation system for students and staff at the Science and Research Branch. According to this plan, the approximately seven-kilometer mountainous and dangerous route of the Science and Research Branch would be reduced to less than a quarter of the distance of 1,800 meters, with the construction of a cable transportation system featuring four stations at student locations. This would have established a fast, safe, environmentally friendly, and modern transportation system for students,

faculty, and staff. Karouni emphasized that the cost analysis of the project showed that considering the expenses of bus transportation, time wastage, fuel consumption, and the potential revenue from the cable car on holidays for hiking and tourism, the return on investment for the cable car system for Islamic Azad University was estimated to be less than three years. He continued: "With the approval of this project by the Islamic Azad University, an international tender was held in 2014. 'Doppel Mayr,' the most reputable cable car manufacturer in the world, and 'TAM Iran Khodro' were selected as the suppliers of the equipment for this system. The implementation of the cable car project began in 2015 to establish a cable car system with 72 modern eight-person cabins, capable of transporting 4,000 people per hour in a round trip within 10 minutes. In the summer of 2016, with all the equipment for the cable transportation system of the Science and Research Branch imported into the country, the system was fully equipped and tested, and the project had progressed to about 80% completion. It could have been operational within three months. However, with the change in management at the Islamic Azad University, the project was halted and has remained suspended for the past 30 months. The modern equipment is now abandoned in the warehouse of the Science and Research branch. If the cable transportation system of the Science and Research Branch of the Islamic Azad University were pursued and put into operation by its managers, it would not change the tragic fate of today's accident victims. However, it would eliminate the risk of similar accidents for the 40,000 students and thousands of staff and visitors at this university. We hope this project will soon be operational so that the outdated bus transportation system at the Science and Research Branch can be replaced."

The Parliament's intervention in the overturning accident of the students of the Azad University of Research & Sciences

The head of the Higher Education Committee of the Education and Research Commission of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Iranian Parliament) commented on the bus overturning incident involving students from the Islamic Azad University, Science and Research Branch. In an interview with ISNA regarding the details of the visit of the Higher Education Committee of the Education and Research Commission of the Islamic Council to the site of the University of Research Sciences bus accident and the victims of the accident, he added: We are asking the relatives, classmates and companions of these loved ones about the details of the incident.

Pictures of the overturning accident of the Azad University of Science and Research bus on December 25, 2018



Protest and gathering of Azad University of Science and Research students

Following the overturning accident of a bus carrying a group of students of the Islamic Azad University, Faculty of Sciences and Research, the killing and wounding of a number of them, on the morning of December 29, 2018, a group of students of this university unit gathered at the site of this university.

According to ISNA, on the morning of December 29, 2018, a group of students from the Science and Research Branch of the Islamic Azad University

spontaneously gathered at the university's bus parking area. They protested against the inadequate transportation conditions and other issues at the university by chanting slogans and holding banners. On that morning, student movement through the main entrance of the Science and Research Branch was closely monitored by the university's security personnel. Upon entering the campus, small memorials for the students who lost their lives in the accident were set up, and the recitation of the Quran could be heard. Additionally, one student was distributing Maryam flowers among the crowd. It was reported that the university's buses had been replaced on the same day, but nearly all of them were running empty between the university's faculties. The students stated that this was a symbolic ceremony, organized spontaneously. Another group of students, who appeared to have a more organized plan for their protest, told an ISNA reporter that they intended to gather at the university's bus parking area on the same morning. Unlike the previous group, they planned to protest without chanting slogans, instead holding banners to express their concerns about the inadequate transportation system and other issues at the university. One of the students present at the ceremony stated, "The students' question is, where does all the tuition money we pay go, and why hasn't there been any thought given to providing safe transportation for students?" Another group of students stopped a bus attempting to exit the parking lot, with one student protesting to the university officials, stating, "We will not overlook the blood of our fellow students." At this moment, the bus had to reverse and stopped near Danesh Square on the university campus. During the gathering, students chanted slogans against Islamic Azad University officials, demanding the resignation of some of them. One student, in response to an ISNA reporter's question about their current demands, said, "There is nothing to say or ask for. The university officials need to be replaced." The protesting students called for the elimination of the bus system and the allowance of private cars and taxis on campus. During the protest, a group of students chanted "La ilaha illallah" and carried a banner saying "Condolences," making their way through some students sitting on the ground. One student emphasized, "We are not here for a show, we want one of the officials to come and talk to us." Another group of students has currently made their way to the accident site to recite Fatiha and pay respects to the deceased students. The mother of one of the students who died in the bus overturning incident was present among the protesting students. She said, "I lost my daughter in this accident. University officials must answer to me, and I will not leave until I get answers and justice for my daughter." She continued, "Our students are insured when they enter the university, and we pay for their insurance. So why was there a bus at the university that had not been insured for seven years? These are 'martyrs of knowledge,' and university officials must be accountable to us grieving mothers."

According to ISNA, during the continued protest, the students presented their demands in a nine-point statement, calling for action against the responsible officials.

The Nine-Point Statement Includes:

1-Demand for Resignations: Request the resignation and formal apology of the head of the Science and Research Branch and the President of Islamic Azad University.

2-Official Apology: Require a formal apology from the head of the branch and the university president through an official platform.

3-Create a Memorial: Construct a memorial to honor the deceased students.

4-Establish Permanent EMS Presence: Ensure that emergency medical services are always available on campus.

5- Upgrade Bus Fleet: Renovating the bus fleet and determining the speed limit and installing the technical inspection sheet on the bus and checking it in a short period of time and hiring qualified drivers.

6- Install Safety Barriers: Build barriers to prevent rockslides and install guardrails along the campus roads.

7- Reduce Taxi Costs: Make taxi services free or reduce their costs until the bus fleet is renovated and road safety is ensured.

8- Improve Cafeteria Hygiene: Conduct regular health inspections of cafeterias and establish a covered cafeteria in the Ibn Sina building.

9- Postpone Exams: Delay exams due to the students' current psychological distress.

ON-CAMPUS PETITION: A PETITION ECHOING THE STUDENTS' DEMANDS WAS AVAILABLE ON CAMPUS FOR SIGNATURES, WHICH STUDENTS WERE ACTIVELY SIGNING.



Chapter Eight

The most important events of year 2019 in Iran

We will start the memories of the year 2019 from the beginning with the sad events of Nowruz 2019, and then we will review the start of epidemic of the deadly corona virus disease in February 2020 and official announcement of the corona disease in March 2020.

Floods in northern, central and southern provinces of Iran in Nowruz 2019


Nowruz of 2019 should never be forgotten! The unprecedented and deadly flood of Nowruz 2019 was one of the most bitter events of that year, which affected different parts of the country from March 21 to 31, 2019.



IRNA - The head of the Forensic Medical Organization of the country announced the death of 42 people due to floods in different provinces in and Nowruz 2019

March 21, 2019: floods in Golestan, Mazandaran and North Khorasan (17 casualties)

Increased rainfall at the late March 2019 led to severe flooding on the first day of the Persian New Year (Nowruz) in 2019 in the northern provinces of Iran. The floods resulted in the deaths of 17 people and were considered one of the most unprecedented floods in these regions in the past 100 years.



Aerial images of flooded areas of Golestan province

March 25, 2019: floods in Fars, Khuzestan and Kermanshah provinces (23 people lost)

Heavy rainfall began at 8 a.m. on Monday, March 25, 2019 led to an unprecedented disaster at the entrance of Shiraz, specifically in the Darvazeh Quran area. The floods on that day claimed the lives of approximately 23 people and caused extensive damage to numerous residential homes. The flooding also affected the provinces of Khuzestan and Kermanshah, resulting in additional casualties and damage.



Overturning of cars after the flood in Shiraz

March 31, 2019: Flood in Lorestan and Hamedan (21 people killed)

Floods in Lorestan Province on the 26th of March 2019 and 1st of April 2019 caused extensive damage to the residents of Khorramabad, Pol-e-Dokhtar, and many other cities. Approximately 21 people lost their lives in Lorestan due to these floods. In Khuzestan Province, the overflow of the Karun and Arvand Rivers and the filling of dams caused damage worth 138 billion tomans to agricultural lands and residential areas.

Lorestan flood in spring 2019



Death of an 8-year-old child at Azadi Stadium in Tehran on 17th September 2019

During a football match between Persepolis and Sanat Neft Abadan at Azadi Stadium, an 8-year-old boy tragically died from electrocution at the stadium's electric gates. Despite the presence of emergency and medical personnel, the boy could not be saved. The boy was running in the entrance area of Azadi Stadium when he became trapped among scaffolding. His face came into contact with a metal pole carrying an electric current, causing severe facial burns and ultimately leading to his death.

The story of the high price of gasoline on November 15, 2019

The increase in gasoline prices to 3000 tomans (30,000 rials) per liter in November 2019 (Aban 1398 Iranian Calendar) was one of the most significant events of the year. This government decision led to unrest and sometimes violent protests in various cities across Iran. During these protests, a substantial amount of public property, including banks, was set on fire, and a number of people lost their lives. Additionally, in response to the situation, the internet was shut down nationwide for several days. According to Shoma News, based on an announcement from the National Iranian Oil Products Distribution Company, as of midnight on November 15, 2019, gasoline rationing began for all gasoline-powered vehicles. Under this new system, the price for rationed gasoline was set at 1500 tomans per liter, while the price for non-rationed (free market) gasoline was set at 3000 tomans.

In the early hours of Friday, November 15, 2019, the twelfth Iranian government unexpectedly announced a significant increase in gasoline prices without prior notice. The price of non-rationed (free market) gasoline was raised to 3000 tomans per liter, effectively tripling the previous price, which was 1000 tomans per liter. Additionally, the price of rationed gasoline was set at 1500 tomans per liter. In response to the sudden increase in gasoline prices, people in various cities across Iran staged protests and as a sign of their dissatisfaction, they stopped their cars in streets and highways, effectively blocking traffic. According to videos posted on social media, these protests began on Friday, November 15, 2019, in cities such as Ahvaz, Sirjan, and Mashhad. Additionally, a notice circulated on Persian-language social media networks, urging people to stop their cars in the streets and highways at 10 a.m. on Saturday, November 16, 2019, which further expanded the protests to multiple cities, including Tehran. Reports indicate that one person was killed and several others were injured during the protests against the gasoline price hike in Sirjan city, Kerman Province. The acting governor of Sirjan explained to ISNA news agency: "we are investigating how these individuals were injured and cannot say with 100% certainty that they were wounded by direct fire from security forces or otherwise. One person has been killed in these incidents, but the exact cause of death is still being determined whether it was due to gunfire or another reason. This is currently under examination by the forensic department in Sirjan." In response to the gasoline price hike, Parvaneh Salahshouri, then representative of the people of Tehran in the Islamic Council (Iranian Parliament), posted a tweet expressing her concerns and the concerns of her constituents. She wrote: "Since the gasoline price increase, people have been repeatedly expressing their worries. Dear compatriots, it has been a long time since the Parliament has not been at the helm of affairs. This matter was decided in the meeting of heads of

the three powers. We had this one pillar of democracy in half-sentence, whose Fatiha was also read, close the next parliament." Additionally, Ayatollah Safi Golpayegani, a prominent Shia cleric, issued a statement calling on the Iranian Parliament to address the matter. Hassan Rouhani, the president at the time, announced about the government's recent move to increase the price of gasoline, which was implemented from the morning of November 15, 2019: "For the past four years, the government had not taken any action to change gasoline prices. The government has long sought ways to support and help the weaker segments of the population, who are under pressure due to economic conditions, but due to a lack of revenue and budget resources, it was unable to implement such measures." The Iranian government announced that the revenue generated from the gasoline price increase would be distributed to 18 million household heads in the form of subsidies. Based on the announcement by the National Iranian Oil Refining and Distribution Company, the price of gasoline increased from Friday, November 15, 2019, and will be rationed. The prices were set as follows:

- Rationed Regular Gasoline: 1500 tomans per liter.
- Non-Rationed Regular Gasoline: 3000 tomans per liter.
- Super Gasoline: 3500 tomans per liter.
- Monthly Quota: Each vehicle receives a quota of 60 liters of gasoline per month.



The protest of the people of different cities in Iran on Friday, November 15, 2019, against the increase in the price of gasoline approved by the heads of the three powers of the country in the twelfth government.

During the protests following the sudden gasoline price increase, there were reports of significant violence and unrest. Rioters engaged in various destructive

actions, including setting fire to banks, stores, and gas stations. Armed attacks occurred against both civilians and security forces, resulting in casualties among the security personnel. Additionally, there were instances where ambulances were prevented from reaching and transporting the injured.



protest of the people in Iran on Friday, November 15, 2019 against the increase
in the price of gasoline

Spread of the corona virus in Iran since the winter of 2020

In mid-November 2019, an epidemic of a novel coronavirus was identified in the city of Wuhan, central China. This epidemic was caused by a previously unknown type of coronavirus, named Coronavirus 2019, commonly referred to as COVID-19. Chinese authorities announced the discovery of this virus on January 7, 2020. On January 30, 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared a "Public Health Emergency of International Concern" due to the spread of the disease.

The spread of the corona virus epidemic in Iran

About a month after the outbreak of the coronavirus in China and neighboring countries, the first case of COVID-19 was eventually detected in Qom city of Iran, on February 19, 2020. In fact, two residents of Qom city with symptoms similar to those of the coronavirus died in hospitals in the Qom city. On February 18, 2020. After one day of investigation, it was confirmed that the coronavirus had entered Iran. By Saturday, March 28, 2020, a total of 35,408 people in Iran had contracted the virus. Out of these cases, 2,517 Iranians had also died due to this disease, while 11,679 patients had recovered.



Between noon on March 28, 2020, and March 29, 2020, based on definitive diagnostic criteria, 2,901 new COVID-19 cases were identified in Iran. This brought the total number of confirmed cases to 38,309. The number of patients who died was 2640 and 12,391 patients had recovered. These statistics were provided by the Iranian Ministry of Health and the World Health Organization (WHO).

Report of the spread of the corona virus in Iran since late January 2020

On March 28, 2020 Ali Akbar Haghdoost, head of the Epidemiology Committee of Iran's National Coronavirus Task Force, stated that contrary to initial reports from Iranian officials, the coronavirus had been circulating in Iran since late January 2020. According to Haghdoost, the virus was quietly and stealthily spreading in several Iranian cities from late January 2020, with the initial cases being asymptomatic or lacking specific symptoms, which is why they were not detected at that time. He mentioned that although the virus was diagnosed late, Iran's subsequent interventions were better than those of many other countries. From the first days of officially confirming the identification of new coronavirus cases in Iran, there has been criticism regarding the government's transparency about the timing of the virus's spread in the country. On Wednesday, February 19, 2020, the Public Relations Office of Iran's Ministry of Health and Medical Education, after weeks of denying reports about the presence of coronavirus in Iran, initially announced the positive test results of two cases in Qom city and confirmed their deaths within a few hours. The official announcement of COVID-19 cases and the confirmation of deaths within hours led to various criticisms. Kianoush Jahanpour, then spokesperson for the Ministry of Health, stated, "I announced the identification and infection news 45 minutes after receiving the test results; this delay was only for preparing the news release." Hassan Rouhani, then President of Iran, emphasized a few days earlier that "we realized on February 19, 2020, that COVID-19 had entered to Iran, and we did not delay its announcement by even a day. We spoke honestly with the people about this." Ahmad Amirabadi Farahani, a representative of Qom at the time in the Islamic Consultative Assembly, claimed that the first death due to COVID-19 occurred on February 13, 2020, six days before the government was willing to confirm the news. He stated that the virus had entered Qom city three weeks before the official announcement and had killed about 50 people within two weeks. However, officials from the Ministry of Health denied this report. In early March 2020, Reza Malekzadeh, Deputy Health Minister of Iran, admitted on a live television program that Iranian authorities had delayed detecting the entry of the new

coronavirus into Iran and that the Ministry of Health's requests to halt flights from China were not heeded. Reza Malekzadeh, the Deputy health Minister, acknowledged that Iranian officials initially mistook COVID-19 cases for influenza, leading to a delayed recognition of the virus. Several members of Parliament also expressed doubts about the officially announced timeline and statistics of COVID-19 infections and deaths. For instance, Mahmoud Sadeghi, a Tehran MP, urged officials to provide clear and documented explanations regarding the timing and location of the virus's entry into Iran, instead of denying and reacting aggressively. He compared the government's concealment of the initial COVID-19 outbreak to the few days of denial concerning Iran's responsibility for the downing of the Ukrainian passenger plane. Despite these criticisms, the Supreme Leader and other government officials in Iran repeatedly emphasized that the dissemination of information about the coronavirus was prompt, accurate, and transparent.

Announcement from the Head of Communicable Diseases Department of Ministry of Health in Iran

On April 2, 2020, the number of confirmed COVID-19 cases worldwide surpassed one million, and the death toll from the virus exceeded 51,000. Dr. Kianoush Jahanpour, the spokesperson for the Iranian Ministry of Health, announced that as of April 3, 2020, based on definitive diagnostic criteria, 2,715 new COVID-19 cases had been identified in Iran, bringing the total number of confirmed cases in the country to 53,183. Fortunately, 17,935 patients have recovered and been discharged so far. Unfortunately, in the past 24 hours, 134 patients with COVID-19 have been died, bringing the total number of deaths from the disease in Iran to 3,294. According to Tehran - IRNA, the Head of the Communicable Diseases Department at the Ministry of Health, Treatment, and Medical Education stated that the first wave of the COVID-19 epidemic, which began in March 2020, would subside by June 2020. However, there would be sporadic cases during the summer, and the second wave of the epidemic is expected to start in the fall.

How dangerous is the corona virus for younger people?

In a report by Rachel Schraer, a health correspondent, dated in March 28, 2020, it was stated: "So far, most recommendations regarding coronavirus have suggested that the older you are, the more dangerous the infection might be for you. However, the World Health Organization has warned that this virus can also be dangerous for young people." Dr. Rosena Allin-Khan, an emergency physician and Representative of the Labor Party in the British Parliament, told the BBC: "This disease is not just confined to the elderly or those with

underlying health conditions." A day after this comment, an 18-year-old young person died in England due to an underlying disease caused by Corona. It is reported that he was the youngest victim of COVID-19 in the UK.



Age and risk of corona virus

It is widely acknowledged that COVID-19 poses a greater risk to older individuals. Research from Imperial College of London established a clear link between age and the likelihood of hospitalization due to coronavirus. Consequently, the probability of requiring intensive care also increases with age. Observations related to the age of patients with coronavirus in England, shows that less than five percent of people under the age of 50 are hospitalized due to this disease, but in the elderly between 70 and 79 years old, this figure reaches 24% and five percent of people under 40 years old have been transferred to the intensive care unit, while this figure was 27% in people 60 to 69 years old and 43% in people 70 to 79 years old. But in two countries, China and Italy, this rate reached to 71% in people over 80 years old. According to research of a charity research institute, in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, the average age of people who had been transferred to the intensive care unit was 63 years. The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention said, preliminary statistics show that 53 percent of those hospitalized were over the age of 55, that means nearly half of them were younger. However, admission to the intensive care unit and death were more common in old age, with about 80 percent of deaths occurring in people over 65 years of age.

According to the reports of the World Health Organization, the world's coronaviruses were 2,250,790 people in the world, of this number, until Saturday morning, April 18, 2020, more than 154,266 people died and 571,144 people recovered. They also found, out of a total of 1,503,633 active or infected cases, but the condition of 56,197 people was declared critical.

The Research Center of the Islamic Council of Iran wrote in a report that we are still far from controlling the wave of the Corona epidemic in Iran.


The Social Studies Office of this center has addressed the "prediction of the second wave of the epidemic and the necessary preparations for it" in part of this study, Referring to the experience of full quarantine in China and extensive screening tests in South Korea, the report states that in Iran, "neither of these two policies has been properly and fully implemented; neither the complete urban quarantine (generally or in outbreak centers) has been seriously pursued, nor the policy of maximum testing and isolation." The Parliamentary Research Center described the government's actions and crisis management at the onset of the COVID-19 epidemic in Iran as "weak." However, the center noted that currently, the provision of health services and facilities for hospitalizing patients is "acceptable." The report also mentioned that "pre-crisis management, including hardware prevention and software preparedness, such as the readiness of health and treatment sectors at a high level, preparation and issuance of guidelines, public information and effective community education, monitoring virus entry into the country and early stage identification, and ensuring strategic reserves were major weaknesses."

The World Health Organization reported 3,006 deaths in the past 24 hours due to the coronavirus as of May 17, 2020. The countries with the highest number of deaths during this period are as follows:

1-**United States:** 620 deaths. 2- **United Kingdom:** 468 deaths. 3-**Mexico:** 290 deaths. 4-**Brazil:** 229 deaths. 5- **Italy:** 153 deaths. 6- **Peru:** 131 deaths.7-**Russia:** 119 deaths.8-**India:** 118 deaths.9- **Canada:** 115 deaths.10-**Spain:** 104 deaths

This data highlights the ongoing severity of the COVID-19 pandemic in various parts of the world.

Also, the number of people infected with the corona virus in Iran and the world until Wednesday, May 20, 2020 can be seen in the infographic below.



It should be noted that during the three-month period of the COVID-19 pandemic in Iran, in addition to ordinary individuals, several healthcare workers, including emergency personnel, internal medicine specialists, infectious disease specialists, and nursing staff, lost their lives due to the coronavirus. Additionally, a few members of Parliament and religious scholars also passed away after contracting the virus. Furthermore, the deputy Health

Minister, the Speaker of the Parliament, and some other government officials were briefly infected with the coronavirus but recovered with special medical care.

Increase in cases of corona virus infection in Iran

Dr. Jahanpour, then spokesperson for the Ministry of Health in Iran, announced on June 1, 2020, that based on definitive diagnostic criteria, 2,979 new COVID-19 cases were identified in the country. Of these new cases, 652 were hospitalized, and 2,327 were identified through contact tracing. As of June 1, 2020, the total number of COVID-19 cases in Iran reached to 154,445 people. Unfortunately, in the past 24 hours, 81 patients of COVID-19 died, bringing the total death toll to 7,878. Fortunately, 121,004 patients had recovered and been discharged from hospitals, while 2,578 patients with severe COVID-19 symptoms are under intensive care. To date, 955,865 COVID-19 diagnostic tests have been conducted in the country. It is predicted that following the anniversary march of 15 Khordad, the number of coronavirus cases in the country will see a significant increase.

Narration the end of Corona virus in Iran from February 1, 2022 till April 1, 2023

the Minister of Health has claimed that the COVID-19 epidemic will come to an end by February 2022. However, there is also another narrative suggesting that the virus might persist until 2023, which has caused confusion and concern among the public. According to a report by Mehr News Agency, the tough days of the COVID-19 pandemic have left everyone exhausted, weary, and depressed, especially the healthcare workers who have been tirelessly treating COVID-19 and non-COVID-19 patients without any breaks from February 2020. Since the onset of the COVID-19 outbreak in Iran, we have gone through various peaks, with the fifth peak being arguably the hardest and most devastating phase of the pandemic. According to statistics from the Ministry of Health, the total number of COVID-19 cases in Iran has reached 5,184,124, and the total number of deaths had been reached 111,892 people.

According to statistics from the Ministry of Health, 4,422,740 patients had recovered or had been discharged from hospitals. Of course, this statistic includes up to September 6, 2021. A significant point in these statistics is the number of deaths, as the daily death toll fluctuates around 600. In this context, the issue of vaccination is critical, and accelerating the national vaccination program can protect a large portion of the population from the disease. Abbas Motavalian, an epidemiologist, stated that the vaccination rate against COVID-

19 in the country is less than half the global average relative to the population. He noted that out of the 220 million people worldwide who have contracted the COVID-19 pandemic, over 4.5 million have died. In Iran, the death rate relative to the population is twice the global average.

Slow start of public vaccination

The national vaccination program in Iran started in February 2021 with healthcare workers. It continued with Special patients, the elderly, the disabled, and Veterans of sanatoriums in care facilities, until the broader national vaccination program began. Since then, a little over 30 million people in the country have received the first dose of the COVID-19 vaccine, and about 10 million people have received both doses. The gap of 20 million people between those who received the first dose and those who received both doses indicates that the national vaccination program is progressing slowly. It is said that to achieve community immunity against COVID-19, at least 60 million people in the country need to be vaccinated. This means at least 120 million doses of the COVID-19 vaccine need to be provided. Considering the vaccines already administered, an additional 90 million doses are required. According to the Minister of Health in the 13th government, the goal is to vaccinate the entire target population until the Fajr decade (February 2022), with the hope that the COVID-19 epidemic will be eradicated in Iran by early February 2022. Meanwhile, Mostafa Ghanei, a member of the National Coronavirus Vaccine Committee, believes that COVID-19 will remain with us until year 2023. This pulmonologist in explaining his reasoning for the virus's persistence in the country until 2023, stating that first of all, we need enough vaccines and secondly, we need enough injections. Ghanei emphasized that the most effective vaccination strategy is to vaccinate the entire population within three months. He explained that those who received the vaccine in April 2021 might not have the same level of immunity in December 2021 as those vaccinated in October 2021. Therefore, it is recommended to carry out vaccinations this year to prevent deaths. Given the increase in domestic production, a short-term vaccination program should be designed for the entire population next year, including booster doses, to reduce the number of patients. The goal is to have no outpatient cases the following year and to be able to break the transmission chain of the disease.

The reaction of Minister of Health to the long vaccine queues

Meanwhile, Bahram Einollahi, the Minister of Health in the 13th government, expressed regret over the delay in securing the necessary vaccines for the country. He stated that the public vaccination process would accelerate,

aiming to administer 1.5 to 2 million doses per day to prevent further deaths. He emphasized that vaccines should not be stockpiled, and universities conducting widespread vaccinations will receive more vaccines accordingly. The speed of vaccine distribution depends on the vaccination rate at medical universities. Einollahi added that wherever vaccination has been implemented, mortality rates have decreased. He noted that while vaccinated individuals might still contract the disease, the severity is generally reduced. Therefore, the primary strategy of the Ministry of Health for controlling the disease is vaccination. He emphasized that the long queues for vaccines, which are currently seen for various reasons, need to be addressed. The goal is to create a situation where vaccination centers wait for people to come for their vaccinations, ensuring that people's respect and dignity are maintained. This goal will be achieved with everyone's cooperation.

Announcing the end of emergency situation of the Corona pandemic with at least 20 million dead in the world

With more than 7,607,000 infected with Corona and more than 146,000 deaths, Iran was ranked 18th in the global table of deaths caused by the pandemic.

Mass Poisoning in Girls' Schools in Iran

The serial poisoning in girls' schools in Iran consists of deliberate and sequential events in which students in numerous schools across Iran were suspiciously poisoned. This incident began on November 30, 2022, at a girls' high school in the city of Qom. Since that time, hundreds of students in 60 schools in Qom, primarily middle and high schools for girls, had been poisoned. These incidents were not confined to Qom and had spread to other cities across Iran, including Borujerd, Sari, Ardabil, Tehran, Fardis, Khuzestan, Kermanshah, Neyshabur, and Mashhad. Most of the affected students had been girls, with a few isolated cases of poisoning in boys' schools also reported. Additionally, the death of one girl in Qom had been attributed to these attacks.

According to Mohammad Hassan Safari, a member of the Parliamentary Fact-Finding Committee, by March 6, 2023, more than five thousand students across 25 provinces and about 230 schools had been affected by these incidents. Research into the type of poisoning remained inconclusive, but the Scientific Committee of the Iranian Ministry of Health confirmed the use of a "mostly inhalational irritant substance." The perpetrators behind these incidents were not identified, but there were speculations about the involvement of extremist Shia groups, reactionary religious sects with Taliban-like ideologies, Hazara-centric groups, and those believing in the imminent appearance of Mahdi, all of whom were opposed to girls' education in various ways. In response to these attacks, protests erupted in cities such as Tehran, Isfahan, Tabriz, Kermanshah, and Ardabil, where slogans like "Death to the child-killing regime" were chanted. Government forces attacked protesters in Tehran and Kermanshah, arresting several individuals. On March 6, 2023, Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, called for the harshest punishment for those responsible for the poisonings. The next day, the Ministry of Interior announced that several people had been arrested and others had been "guided."

Speculation about the type of poisoning and gas used

There is no precise information available about the type of gas used. Specifically, security forces have prohibited the delivery of test results to the families of the poisoned students. Students often reported seeing an object being thrown into the classroom or the school yard, which then released gas, causing symptoms such as fatigue, throat irritation, dizziness, nausea, and headaches. Some students reported smelling a scent similar to tangerines,

while others mentioned an explosion followed by mint-smelling smoke. Additionally, some students detected a strong smell of natural gas, and in one instance, a rotten egg smell similar to tear gas was reported. In at least one case, the source of the gas was identified as a capsule-like device, which released a colorless and odorless gas gradually. The potency of the gas was such that it affected not only those in the classroom but also individuals in the hallway. Three months after the start of these attacks, Alireza Monadi Sefidan, the head of the Education, Research, and Technology Commission of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, announced that "dinitrogen gas (N₂) was present in the poison released in schools."

Reactions:

Ned Price, the spokesperson for the U.S. Department of State, described the poisoning of schoolgirls in Iran's girls' schools as "horrific." Molavi Abdolhamid, a Sunni leader in Iran, characterized the poisoning of female students as an act of revenge against the uprising of girls and women against the Islamic Republic. The Sunni Friday prayer leader in Zahedan suggested that there is a real possibility that the poisonings are a means of suppressing protests. He stated, "These were the same girls protested in schools, and now if a group is behind these poisonings and those who know about it are not stopping them, it is because of the protests." United Nations experts expressed disgust over the "deliberate poisoning of more than 1,200 female students" in various cities across Iran and the government's failure to prevent further attacks and conduct swift investigations. The spokesperson for the U.S. Department of State called these attacks "disgusting" and demanded that "they must stop immediately" and that those who responsible for it should be identified and punished as soon as possible. The White House described the potential link between the poisoning of schoolgirls in Iran and religious efforts to force girls to drop out of school as "shameful." Karine Jean-Pierre, the White House Press Secretary, stated, "If these poisonings are related to girls participating in protests, it falls under the mission of the United Nations Independent International Fact-Finding Mission to investigate." Over 270 journalists, filmmakers, civil activists, and members of the cultural and artistic community issued a statement condemning the "deliberate and widespread poisoning disaster" of female students in Iranian schools, emphasizing that the act aims to instill fear and increase the costs for girls claiming their basic rights in Iranian society. Narges Mohammadi stated that "one cannot and should not remain silent" about the "serial and widespread poisoning of students" and called on the Iranian public to take to the streets and urged international organizations to respond and take immediate action. Farah Pahlavi appealed to the "police forces, army, IRGC, Basij, and plainclothes

officers" not to allow the "regime leaders" to use them as tools for oppressing the people. John Kirby, the spokesperson for the National Security Council at the White House, expressed deep concern over the poisoning of schoolgirls in Iran and urged the Islamic Republic to conduct a thorough and transparent investigation into the matter. UNICEF, the United Nations Children's Fund, stated: "Schools must be safe havens for children and adolescents to learn in a secure and supportive environment. Such incidents can negatively impact the high rates of children's education, especially girls, that have been achieved over the past decades." The European Parliament described the poisoning of girls in Iran as an "attempt to silence" them and passed a resolution condemning "in the strongest terms this heinous attempt to silence women and girls in Iran." The resolution was adopted with 516 votes in favor, five against, and 14 abstentions. It attributed these attacks to the policies of the Iranian regime against women and girls and reiterated its unconditional support for the demands of Iranian women and girls to abolish all systemic discrimination. The resolution called on the United Nations fact-finding mission on Iran to conduct an independent investigation into these incidents. Several prominent religious and political figures in Iran, including Zahra Rahnavard, Molavi Abdolhamid, and Abolfazl Ghadyani, attributed the attacks with unknown gases on mostly girls' schools to the government. Ten artists, civil activists, and lawyers, including Jafar Panahi, Nasrin Sotoudeh, and Katayoun Riahi, issued a statement declaring that the chemical attacks on girls' schools were "systematic."

Amnesty International, in a statement, declared the cause of the serial poisonings in girls' schools in Iran as "chemical gas attacks." The statement highlighted that "these attacks had targeted over a hundred schools so far, with girl students experiencing symptoms such as coughing, throat and nose irritation, breathing difficulties, heart palpitations, headaches, nausea, and vomiting." The Islamic Republic authorities are reportedly trying to suppress protests by intimidating families, teachers, and journalists. The statement also noted, "Many people in Iran suspect that elements affiliated with the government or their supporters are involved in these attacks, especially given the Iranian authorities' failure to take meaningful action and their efforts to silence public criticism and protests regarding this issue." The Ministry of Health had suggested that the incidents were deliberate and aimed at preventing girls from attending school, implicitly pointing to the possible involvement of extremist religious groups. Some sources had also drawn parallels between the serial poisonings of girl students in Iran and a series of incidents that occurred in Afghanistan before the Taliban came to power.

Nafiseh Moradi, a PhD student in Quranic and Hadith Sciences at Alzahra University, noted in an article the coincidence of the poisonings with the widespread adoption of the slogan "Woman, Life, Freedom" in high schools.

Given that most incidents occurred in girls' schools, she suggested the possibility of sabotage influenced by "Taliban-like views." The Qom News website, which had been covering the poisonings from the beginning, published this article but quickly removed it and was forced to apologize. Ali Pourtabatabaei, a journalist for Qom News, was also arrested. The newspaper Kayhan called for action against those who commented on the poisonings on March 6, 2023 issue. The next day, the judiciary announced charges against the newspapers Ham-Mihan and Shargh, the news and analysis website Rouydad 24, and also political activists Azar Mansouri and Sadegh Zibakalam, and actor Reza Kianian. On March 7, 2023, Majid Mirahmadi, the then Deputy Minister of the Interior, announced in an interview with IRIB (Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting) that several individuals had been arrested in five provinces. He mentioned that "some cases that were non-hostile in nature had also been identified, and the individuals involved had been counseled." Iran's then-President, Ebrahim Raisi, also instructed the managers of the Ministry of Intelligence to ensure that the intelligence agencies remain on alert.

Popular protests

On March 4, 2023, families of students gathered in front of the Education Department buildings in Tehran, Isfahan, Kermanshah, and Ardabil, chanting slogans against Khamenei and senior officials of the Islamic Republic. Government forces in Tehran targeted the protesters with beatings. Tehran students' families chanted slogans such as "Death to the child-killing regime" and "They killed our children and replaced them with clerics." Parents in Isfahan gathered in front of the Education Department building and chanted, "Acid attacks, poisoning, both are crimes." In Kermanshah, it was reported that some protesters were arrested by security forces. On March 7, 2023, teachers and educators held rallies in several cities following a call from the Coordinating Council of Teachers' unions. Security agents arrested some participants during these gatherings. In Rasht and Mashhad, the police used tear gas against the protesters.

Nationwide protests

On March 7, 2023, widespread protests were held in reaction to the serial poisoning of students in schools across various cities, including Tehran, Tabriz, Shiraz, Kazeroon, Isfahan, Mashhad, Neyshabur, Rasht, Karaj, Sanandaj, Saqqez, Marivan, Zanzan, Sari, Babol, Jolfa, Harsin, Hamedan, and Bushehr. In some cities, such as Isfahan, Rasht, and Sanandaj, government forces attacked

the protesters with tear gas and pellet bullets, resulting in injuries to several teachers in Sanandaj.

Protests outside Iran

Gathering of female students in Haskeh in the Democratic Self-Management of North and East Syria, April 13, 2023.

At Rojava University in Haskeh, within the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, female students who are members of the Democratic Students Movement held a gathering and read a statement in support of women in Iran and Kurdistan, condemning the poisoning of female students. As a gesture of solidarity and protest, they painted a mural on the university wall depicting a woman with a mask along with the slogan "Woman, Life, Freedom. "Members of the Young Women's Society of Zenobia gathered in front of the Baghdad Gate in eastern Raqqa, within the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, and called the poisoning of female students and attacks on women for their hijab a crime, expressing support for the women fighters in Iran and Kurdistan. On March 12, 2023, extensive rallies were held by Iranians in cities such as New York, Washington, San Diego, and numerous other cities in the United States, as well as in Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto, and Vancouver in Canada. These rallies were organized to condemn the attacks on female students in Iranian schools. The participants reiterated their support for the protests in Iran. Additionally, a group of Ukrainians living in New York joined the Iranian protest in Manhattan to condemn the attacks on schools and female students in Iran.

Condemnation of protesting students.

Hasti Amiri and Ziaeddin Nabavi, two students from Allameh Tabataba'i University in Tehran, were sentenced by the Tehran Revolutionary Court to one year of imprisonment after participating in a student protest on March 7, 2023, against the poisonings.

Statistical and geographical range of attacks

The attacks began in the city of Qom, a religious stronghold in Iran. After Qom, Borujerd city had seen the most chemical attacks in girls' high schools and a university dormitory. Historically, this city has experienced stringent religious practices due to being the birthplace of Seyyed Hassan Tabatabaei

Boroujerdi, the former leader of the Shia before Ayatollah Khomeini. Alongside Qom and Borujerd, Tehran, the capital of Iran, has also been one of the major targets of these attacks. by February 26, 2023 more than 800 individuals had been poisoned in schools over the past three months. Among them were two teachers, over 650 female students, and a few male students. According to the latest statistics, the serial poisonings of students, which began on November 30, 2022, continued for four months and spread to most provinces in Iran.

Chapter nine

Huge socio-cultural displacements and life movement in Iran

Political protests in Iran found a faster rhythm in the 2010s era, and alongside them, the everyday life movement also experienced restlessness. The protests that erupted over the death of Mahsa Amini in late September 2022 marked a shift from a gradual and progressive everyday life movement to a more radical level. The everyday life movement had shown signs of rejecting the ordinary since the 1980s through behaviors such as consuming videos and wearing jeans (see "The Everyday in Post-Revolutionary Society," 2016). In the 1990s, fashion and lifestyle, alongside satellite television, became more significant issues. By the 2000s, various forms of cosmetic surgery, bodybuilding, fashion, cosmetics, the consumption of diverse cultural products, and the unprecedented popularity of Persian bloggers and later Facebook gave a new shape to changes in everyday life. In the 2010s, forms of cultural resistance moved beyond the realm of individual creativity (which characterized the 1980s through the 2000s) and extended into cultural communities focused on life, such as gatherings of young people in front of Kourosh Mall. Despite this, these often small but influential communities that played a role through cultural resistance against the increasing boredom and monotony of everyday life in the 2010s were overshadowed by broader political-economic analyses. The scattered and rhizomatic protests that began with the death of Mahsa Amini highlighted the issues of hijab and the morality police, eventually escalating into a debate over freedom of dress and ultimately freedom of lifestyle. So far, the primary participants in these street protests had been those born in the 2000s and, to some extent, the 1990s. The visible presence of students and teenagers who, just a few months earlier, were considered apolitical and indifferent, created a significant gap in previous analyses. The question was how consumers, preoccupied with their bodies, beauty, and lifestyle, could stand at the forefront of protests. Students and other young people came together in search of their own meaning of life, intertwining very ordinary things (such as mixed-gender dining in cafeterias or freedom of dress) with very radical demands. However, the scope of the protests quickly extended beyond cultural issues. They not only became linked with the accumulated issues of "gendered youth" and women, but also took on ethnic and religious dimensions, and became associated with more formal and overt layers of dissatisfaction, including widespread corruption

and inefficiency, it seems that this recent protest movement was composed of multiple layers and was not easily captured by traditional analyses. Researchers likely needed more tools than those they had previously used, and new conceptual and analytical models were required to understand and analyze the complexities present in the protests. Considering that cultural and social phenomena are interconnected, they must be understood in relation to other phenomena both synchronically and diachronically. This phenomenon is complex, unstable, intangible, and difficult to comprehend. Additionally, like a living organism, it is dynamic and evolving. It is important to highlight that what has occurred in some provinces, such as Kurdistan and Sistan & Baluchestan, requires emphasizing the element of compounded ethnic and religious discrimination, which is beyond the scope of this analysis.

The protests in the fall of 2022 began as a reaction to the guidance patrol but quickly escalated to encompass broader demands. As Ted Robert Ger explains in his book "Why Men Rebel" (published in 2009), dissatisfaction is always present, and the key question is what makes protest possible. Sociological research conducted regularly since the late 1990s era has depicted a picture of dissatisfaction and the fracturing of the dominant hegemony in society. The first wave of Iranian values and attitudes was surveyed in year 2000 and the second wave in 2003. In both waves, people's pessimistic view of society and their future created initial concerns among sociologists and other analysts about the state of society. In 2002, Yousef Abazari highlighted some aspects of societal fatigue in the magazine *Aftab*. There was also a third wave of the Iranian values and attitudes survey conducted by the Office of National Plans in 2015, in response to the most significant concern, a total of 58.4% of the people cited economic issues such as unemployment, job security, economic problems, housing, and poverty. Additionally, regarding to future outlook on the gap between the rich and the poor, approximately 63.9% of the people believed that the situation would worsen and the disparity between the poor and the wealthy would increase.

Most national surveys have shown two sets of concerns among people: the first is economic (a set of issues including unemployment, livelihood, and housing), and the second is social (feelings of distrust, lying, hypocrisy, and flattery). In 2018, the *Ayandeh* ban report listed the country's issues, confirming the findings of sociologists. According to this report, the seven major crises in society are:

Water supply crisis.

Inefficiency of government functions.

Unemployment.

Erosion of social capital and public trust.

Widespread corruption (both economic and social).

Decentralization of formal normative patterns.

Structural anomalies in the Iranian economy.

Given these significant social issues, it is understandable why the grounds for widespread dissatisfaction have been laid over several decades in Iran without a clear path to resolving these problems. The people had minimal expectations from the government (proper administration of society) and attempted to provide different political groups with opportunities through their choices at the ballot box. However, it seems that over time, dissatisfaction has only intensified. Behind the initial layers of dissatisfaction, survey research has not delved into its finer details. Dissatisfaction, besides the aforementioned factors, also relates to the freedom to choose a lifestyle and the liberty to engage in ordinary aspects of daily life. Over the past few decades, the driving force of life, contrary to the superficial layers, has advanced resistance in softer forms within the fabric of life, and despite gradual successes, it has also endured painful experiences. One notable example is the experience of dealing with the morality police and the penalties for unveiling in cars, leading to a hidden accumulation of anger and a buildup of feelings of humiliation in society. Despite all this, it seems that now we are approaching a convergence of all forms of dissatisfaction at both micro and macro levels. In this article, I aim to provide a broader picture of the transformation of the everyday life movement in Iran by examining five significant shifts that have occurred in the past one or two decades:

Age shift: Changes in the demographic makeup and the roles of different age groups in society.

Generational shift: The differing attitudes, values, and behaviors between various generations.

Gender shift: Changes in gender roles and the status of women and men in society.

Population shift: Migration patterns, urbanization, and changes in population distribution.

Shift in reference groups and networked society: The emergence of new influential groups and the impact of social networks and digital communication. By analyzing these shifts, I hope to illustrate the broader transformation and evolution of the everyday life movement in Iran.

Age shift

Age, when referring solely to an individual or a specific group, might not hold significant scientific relevance. However, from a sociological perspective, if it encompasses a substantial segment of society, it can have long-term and profound impacts. In this sense, demographic characteristics can explain a qualitative transformation in the lives of Iranians. Demographers had predicted years ago that between years 2016 and 2026, Iran would experience a period of middle-aged population. After year 2031, Iran is expected to become an aging society. This statement seems simple, but sociologists need to pay closer

attention to its enormous social implications, one of the smallest outcomes of this demographic shift is that the active population during the February 1979 revolution in Iran, even if they were young and around 20 years old, now constitutes at best 10% of Iran's population. Moreover, the population over 65 years old comprises only 6% of the total population (about 5 million people). In other words, the generation that carried out the revolution now forms a small portion of society, and its ideas, which still dominate the general societal framework, have become non-hegemonic. This non-hegemonic state of dominant ideas is one of the main challenges for today's political society. Sociologists must consider the broader societal implications of these demographic changes. The aging population will impact various aspects of society, including the workforce, healthcare, and social services. As the population ages, there will be fewer working-age individuals to support the elderly, potentially leading to economic and social strains. Additionally, the shift in generational perspectives and values will likely challenge the existing political and social norms, creating a dynamic environment for potential change and adaptation.

Furthermore, the population that was too young to actively participate in the revolution but witnessed it and the early years that followed is now middle-aged. This demographic now constitutes a significant portion of society, comprising 44% of the population (approximately 35.8 million people). In contrast, our young and adolescent generation (ages 15 to 29) numbers only about 20 million people. Therefore, the structure of Iran's population, which during the revolution was largely composed of children and young people, has now shifted towards middle age. This demographic shift has led to qualitative transformations, including a shift in the concept of the past with the future, changes in the concept of hope, and transformations in ideals, realism, rationality, and increased conservatism. This qualitative difference can be illustrated from three perspectives: past, present, and future, and how their positions have changed relative to the younger generation.

Past: For the middle-aged population, the past includes the revolution and the early years of the Islamic Republic. These experiences have shaped their worldview, instilling a sense of idealism and revolutionary fervor that may now be tempered with the pragmatism and conservatism that come with age. This generation carries the memories of a significant societal transformation and the accompanying struggles and achievements.

Present: The present for this middle-aged demographic is characterized by their roles in society as the primary workforce and decision-makers. They are responsible for maintaining economic stability, social order, and political governance. Their focus has likely shifted from revolutionary change to maintaining stability and incremental improvements. The challenges they face now are different from those of their youth, involving balancing economic pressures, social expectations, and political realities.

Future: For the younger generation, the future holds more uncertainty and possibility. They did not experience the revolution directly and are more detached from its ideals. Instead, they face contemporary issues such as economic instability, unemployment, and social freedoms. Their concept of hope and ideals may be more centered on personal freedoms, economic opportunities, and global connectivity rather than the ideological battles of the past. This generation is more pragmatic, focusing on tangible improvements in their quality of life rather than broad ideological shifts. First, the middle-aged population views the future differently compared to the younger generation, for them, the future is closely tied to the present because their future has either already begun or is on the verge of starting. When they look towards the future, they see it as very near, as it is late for their future to begin. Young people who, in their imaginations over the past few decades, had hoped for a promising future are now middle-aged, having reached this future without their dreams and aspirations being realized, hopes and dreams can be intertwined, and if an individual concludes that their achievements have not been satisfactory, they may see themselves as part of the defeated. This middle-aged, defeated population will undoubtedly share their stories with the younger generations. And now he/she is heading towards the world of old age, he refuses to be caught in it, so he tries to take advantage of the remnants of his opportunity to build a better life. However, this generation (those born in the 1970s and 1980s) was raised to be self-sacrificing and community-oriented. They still grapple with the tension between individual and collective interests. One of the strategies for this generation to extend and perpetuate their youth. For middle-aged people whose youth never came or was of poor quality, through continuing education and staying single or white marriage, even divorce and going for new experiences such as sports, learning musical instruments, or other forms of extraordinary experience in middle age, they are looking to prolong their youth. As a result, the lack of a clear vision and a fragile outlook on the future becomes a significant factor for them. when we reflect on the past forty or fifty years in this context, we can expect a melancholy reading from the Iranian society. Some qualitative research has effectively highlighted forms of this failure and despair, showing that the effort to regain hope has largely taken on an individualistic and short-term nature, often in very basic forms. In a report titled "Qualitative Transformation of Public Opinion in Iran," Mohsen Goudarzi, by interpreting surveys conducted throughout the 2010s, revealed a collective mindset characterized by deepening dissatisfaction and distrust towards the rulers, as well as a significant fear and hopelessness about the future. According to this report, 90 percent of respondents said they have no hope that the situation in Iran will improve.

Secondly, for the middle-aged population, the past becomes meaningful. Having lived through at least three or four decades, they can critically reflect on their own history and the performance of society. The concept of historical

experience as described by Walter Benjamin becomes significant for this generation. As they rapidly approach the end of their lives, the idea of an end becomes meaningful to them, and their gaze turns towards the past. For a society with an average age over thirty, as Christopher Bollas suggests, it has become a generation that can stand on a height and look back at what is called the past. This generation can construct a somewhat shaky general understanding from their scattered memories and past experiences, forming a picture that allows for judgment. Consequently, the middle-aged population, which now forms a significant portion of the overall population, engages in a critical reflection on their lives and societal performance with a sense of despair. Thirdly, for this population, the present becomes suspended. The current moment, characterized as "this critical current moment," is filled with instability and anxiety. This is especially true for a population that has experienced forty years of inflation and economic stagnation, constantly living with the anxiety of time and the feeling of being left behind by it. The characteristic of such a society is that the time of regrets comes soon and "suddenly it is soon and how soon it is too late", for example when looking at "the past 5 years", everything turns into regretful memories, so that it feels like decades have passed!

Fourthly, unlike a young society that remains radical and in search of the future, a middle-aged society adopts more conservative orientations. However, its conservatism should not be seen as contradictory to the concept of the discontented citizen when faced with emergency situations. The middle-aged population is also a discontented citizenry, without hope for the future, angry about the opportunities lost, distrustful of the executors of society, and grappling with numerous social problems such as poverty, divorce, tenancy, marginalization, economic disparity, and inequality. Yet, this middle-aged population intersects with the young population in a post-idealistic moment. The decline of idealism, which initially stems from age and demographic roots, manifests socially as a type of rationality, accountability and opportunism. Both the young and middle-aged generations share a similar lack of vision for the future. The middle-aged look back to see what opportunities they have missed, while the young look forward to anticipate the opportunities they will miss. The discontented and rebellious middle-aged population, due to their material and familial attachments as well as their realism, have many reservations about turning their dissatisfaction into protest. Although this middle-aged population mentally empathizes with the protesters, they find it difficult to join the movement physically and actively. This approximately 36-million-strong demographic, due to their young age during the Islamic Revolution and the decade following it, were mostly spectators and often sympathetic observers. Now, due to their advanced age and various attachments, they remain largely spectators, albeit often sympathetic ones. They are well aware of the potential consequences of a revolution. Therefore, over the past decade, they have advanced their protests in the most peaceful and least costly ways possible (e.g.,

through labor strikes, statements, dialogues with those in power, voting, honking car horns, liking and posting on social media). Therefore, the shift in the demographic structure in Iran plays a dual role: on one hand, it contributes to the spread of despair and the deepening of dissatisfaction, and on the other hand, it injects rationality into the protest movement, slowing down the process of radicalization. Despite these explanations, the age variable alone cannot serve as a stable social factor for analyzing protests. However, when situated within the social structure, it plays a significant role in shaping the quality of society. Moreover, this variable is intricately linked with the concepts of generation and gender, migration, and other social factors.

Generational displacement

According to Mannheim, a generation participates in a shared period of collective destiny and distinguishes itself from other generations through a tendency towards certain behaviors. Additionally, each generation differentiates itself from the previous one through significant events or "great happenings," as Mujeh in year 2020 describes them. It is during these events (such as the protests in 2022 in Iran) that a generation meets and engages with the broader society and history, constructing its own meaning and identity while developing common generational issues and a collective mindset. we began with changes in age demographics to shed light on the 2000s era generation and how it differs from previous generations. The 2000s era generation is distinct not only due to its generational characteristics but also because of its historical context. In the 2020s, Iranian society faces a unique generation that is experiencing its adolescence and youth in an aging society. This generation interacts with the elderly from the revolutionary era, who now comprise only about 6% of Iran's total population. The 12 million-strong cohort born in the 2000s era is set to take on the responsibility of managing a predominantly elderly population in the coming years, in which a population that will increasingly require care due to its age. however, when the next generation reaches working age, one of the biggest challenges will be that the large middle-aged population moving towards old age will not easily relinquish their positions in the labor market and possibly in politics. Generational shifts in a smaller perspective refer to phenomena that occur every decade among the general population, but on a larger scale, these shifts can signal deeper transformations. For instance, those who born in the 1990s and beyond have not experienced the Khatami era or the periods before it, and those born in the 2000s only have memories from the post-JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) era; whereas the middle-aged generation, in addition to sharing experiences with subsequent decades, has lived through the revolution, war, and reforms. These experiences undoubtedly influence the political and social orientations of each generation. Therefore, the generation born in the 2000s has emerged into the world with completely different

generational issues and possesses an entirely distinct generational mindset. Due to their younger age (teenagers and young adults), they exhibit less conservatism, and most importantly, they live in a time that is the future envisioned by the revolutionary generation of 1979. This is the era where the future of the middle-aged generation intersects with the present of the current generation, allowing for a critical reevaluation. The generation of the 2000s, now on the threshold of adulthood, is not a product of formal institutions like schools or official media such as state television. Instead, it is a generation shaped by social networks, living its life through stories and experiencing life as a series of stories. Everything for this generation is defined by speed. It is said that even the time it takes to post photos on Instagram feels slow to them, which is why they prefer video content in reels. On the other hand, the social network generation has grown up in a more horizontal space compared to the hierarchical structure of the pre-network society. The boundaries that were significant in the previous society (such as gender boundaries) do not hold much importance for them. While the concept of a homeland still holds meaning for this generation, they have defined new territories for themselves that require setting aside the limitations of traditional state and nation constructs. If there haven't been comprehensive studies in this regard, it can be said that their relationship with religion and the traditional world is entirely different and they approach it more inquisitively. Abbas Abdi, in his book "The Transformation of Naming of Children," has shown us that the first place where this generation differs from us is in the completely different (secular) names they carry. Most of the names they have in their identification documents are new and innovative, completely different from the names of a few decades ago. Part of this difference arises from the desires of their families. In 2020, we conducted a study on intergenerational dialogue with the aim of analyzing the points of conflict and dispute between generations. Recent developments have made us realize that during such periods, the issue goes beyond generational problems, and different generations seem to reach an unwritten agreement in such situations. The issue of dialogue should not merely occur between generations but also between society and the governing structure. However, the study showed that generational stereotypes and the pessimism of older generations towards newer ones have always existed. Consequently, the negative attributes often mentioned about the emerging generation stem more from the concerns of the older generation rather than from current realities. What were those stereotypes? The 1990s and 2000s generations were often labeled by previous generations as aimless, uncommitted, and self-centered. They were often considered to be from single-child and single-parent families. However, when they spoke about their lives, they focused on the essence of living and the present moment as their goals. They are demanders of ordinary things! They are willing to pay the price for all these privatized ordinary things. For this generation, freedom and privacy hold a special place. This is the generation of

private bedrooms and smartphones that have deepened this private space. However, this generation was still too young to be considered responsible for social and political matters. So, what transformations brought students and teenagers to the center of events? Was it anything other than relative freedom within the family and the relatively closed external environment? In previous decades, children (the parents of the 2000s generation) sought refuge outside the home to escape the controlling atmosphere of their households. Despite its limitations, the outside world offered them a place for liberation (Coffee Shop, mountains, travel, cinema, university, and streets were all spaces of freedom). Through this process, external spaces gradually opened up, which their parents' generation called the "quiet movement." However, with the 1970s and 1980s generation becoming parents and the introduction of smartphones into bedrooms, the home environment became more liberating than the outside world. In this way, the children of the 2000s era found their homes safer despite the generational problems left with their parents because families were more accommodating compared to the government and disciplinary institutions. They resisted school and government pressure on lifestyle choices. This tension between the two worlds increased the possibility of actively confronting and resisting government restrictions. However, it might be said that this generation had little political awareness, having been socialized in the world of online games. But in the course of two months of protests, they gained as much political awareness as they would have in several years. They became familiar with reference groups, traditional and old figures. Social media accelerated their political maturity and, contrary to popular belief, directed their emotions towards a rational comparison of true and false news. They acquired high cultural and political literacy and began to recognize individuals, figures, and historical events.

This generation is among the rare ones whose sexual maturity has coincided with their political maturity, bringing sexual and gender disputes to the forefront of protests. However, we are dealing with a generation that is in the process of being formed, and it seems that based on the experiences it has gained, it possesses greater capacities for rebuilding society compared to the previous two generations. Throughout the 2010s, the daily life movement was elevated from an individual level to a collective level. Ordinary events occurred collectively, which appeared very strange to official observers, such as the water games for boys and girls in Iran Zamin Park, Karaj (in 2013), the funeral of Morteza Pashaei (in 2014), gatherings in front of Kourosh Mall in Tehran and Arman Shopping Center in Mashhad (in 2016), the gatherings of Otaku residents in Iran and their online communities (in late 2010s) to the skateboarding of boys and girls in Shiraz (in 2022). All these were signs of something larger. These cultural aspects of communities, organized by youth with the help of social networks and smartphones, lack something without considering the gender factor. All these cultural communities, characterized by unpredictability, lack of

leadership, focus on ordinary life, flexibility, networking, youthfulness, and breaking gender boundaries, created their enhanced form in the cultural-social movement of 2022.

Gender shift

In the past two decades, significant transformations have taken place in the field of gender in Iran, making gender one of the most crucial factors in explaining the new society. The book "Generational Encounters and Political Stability in Contemporary Iran" has illustrated how generational demands have been intertwined with gender-based demands. We are not only witnessing a gendered generation, but gender has also permeated as a determining factor within every other social component. In the early 2000s, for the first time, the gender ratio in universities shifted in favor of women, resulting in an increase in the educational attainment of women in society. Concurrently, women, due to their elevated status, have had a prominent social presence. The power structure within the family has become more balanced and democratic overall, thereby increasing the share of children and women in the family. Our research in the field of shopping culture showed that with the aging of couples, the distribution of power within the family has become more feasible. Particularly in the financial management of families, women have gained a more significant role. On another front, we encountered the cultural phenomenon of educated housewives and single-living women. These are two entirely distinct phenomena: one involves mostly non-working educated women, and the other consists of predominantly employed, educated single-living women. Both have, in different ways, reshaped the presence of women in society and their demands over the past few decades. The change in family structure is also very significant. We are facing various types of families, including single-child, single-parent, and single-living households. In Iran, 33% of families have only one child, 7% are single-parent families, and 9% are single-living households, with 66% of the latter being women, bringing their total number to nearly 6 million. According to one of the latest national surveys conducted in 2020, 60% of young people have shown a tendency towards living alone. This explains why the average age of marriage has increased. Currently, there are 13 million individuals of marriageable age who are unmarried. In major cities, the average age of marriage is reported to be 27 for women and over 30 for men. A significant portion of single-living individuals and the unmarried population are the middle-aged individuals who have adopted the policy of delaying youth, as previously mentioned. Our study on single-living women in Tehran (middle-aged singles) showed that one of their most significant concerns is independence and autonomy in their lifestyle. They are compassionate towards their families but prefer to live independently, a preference that their families have also accepted. Many of the demands of women arise from changes in

lifestyle. However, what is self-evident for the new generation, including women, is seen as rigid and unchangeable by the dominant generation. In the gender analysis of recent protests, the cultural and social spheres must be considered alongside politics and the labor market. What connects the described issues of age, generation, and gender is the substantial demand for eliminating discrimination and inequality, along with the cultural demand for recognition. As we mentioned, society has nurtured single women who have university degrees and have largely gained independence from their families. However, according to data from the Iranian Statistics Center, only 18% of the employed population in the country are women (19.46 million men and 4.34 million women are employed in Iran). Moreover, only 10% of women of working age have jobs. Gender inequality in the workforce reveals that the unemployment rate among educated women is 2.5 times higher than that of men. The situation is even worse in the political sphere. For example, in parliament, women make up only 6% of all representatives at best. Moreover, they generally cannot even conceive of holding many important political positions. It is evident that despite the progressive changes in women's conditions, the labor market and political sphere have not evolved accordingly. Although the structure of the family has become more female-oriented, the market and political structures have remained predominantly male-dominated. Over the past few decades, a new, more flexible, and democratic mindset has developed in the general society (individuals and family units). This new mindset is now revealing its incompatibility with the outdated structures in the other two realms: the market and politics. The fundamental gap between the family and society on one side, and the market and politics on the other, explains the story behind the protests. This means that the protests by women should not be reduced merely to the issue of dress code, although economic issues and politics should not overshadow the significant contention over dress code, lifestyle, and civil liberties for women. These phenomena are interconnected and have a synergistic impact on each other.

Population displacement

Alongside the factors related to age, generational, and gender structures in shaping the new society, massive population shifts have also played a significant role. Two general forms of displacement, internal and external, can be distinguished, both stemming from and leading to increased dissatisfaction. Over the past two decades, a massive influx of population from villages and small towns has moved to large cities. Migration from metropolises to the outskirts and from towns and villages to the urban periphery has created a different form of marginalization and instability. The pressures of migration, combined with persistent inflation and the high cost of living in large cities,

have led to settling in various forms, including in satellite cities and surrounding villages of major cities. The overflow of the population has completely transformed the nature of our villages. For instance, in Tehran province, there are over 30 villages with populations exceeding 5,000 residents, collectively housing more than 332,000 people. This population is equivalent to the size of cities like Rey or Kashan and is larger than about 300 other cities in Iran. Additionally, there are 13 satellite cities around Tehran that collectively accommodate at least 4 million people. Most of these villages and satellite cities are heavily dependent on Tehran for employment and leisure, suffering from dissatisfaction with living conditions, urban facilities, and inequalities compared to the center. The situation in cities like Islamshahr, Karaj, and Shahriar, which are not included in this calculation, is a separate matter. This phenomenon has occurred in more than ten Iranian cities with populations exceeding one million. The populations of the suburbs of these cities are almost equal to or rapidly catching up with the populations within the cities themselves. This massive population, restless and without clear structure on the outskirts, is fostering a great wave of dissatisfaction within itself in the pursuit of stable employment, cohesive identity, and better living conditions. This discontented population has altered the perception of marginalization compared to a few decades ago. An army of unemployed graduates is waiting for the right circumstances to express their dissatisfaction through various forms of protest. The large outskirts of the metropolises house a diverse array of forces side by side. This includes young, educated migrants from smaller towns, individuals from lower classes who lack both education and employment, and working migrants who have been pushed out of the central parts of the cities due to inflation and have joined the outskirts. Niloufar Baghban Moshiri's doctoral dissertation, "The Experience of Alienation in the Urban Space of Tehran," studies a small segment of this society. She has demonstrated how time feels very short and compressed for these individuals. As a result, they require immediate actions for survival, with death and illness being very immediate concerns, and hope being an inconceivable concept. The only thing that encourages them to keep living is the anticipation of change. This very anticipation has made the other side of the metropolises ripe for a massive uprising. On the other hand, a significant number of people gradually left post-revolutionary Iran over the span of four decades (although there are no definitive and reliable statistics, some sites report 8 to 12 million Iranian migrants). During various periods of political and economic crises, they left behind their universities, homes, jobs, and emotional attachments with regret and chose the path of migration. Massive numbers of educated and dissatisfied migrants from the existing situation tried over the years to continuously reconstruct an image of their ideal homeland in their minds. They engaged in dialogues with other migrants in exile and maintained their connections with residents of the homeland, such as friends and relatives. This point becomes significant when considering sociological research that

indicates even studying abroad is viewed as a pathway to migration. In the article "The Desire for Migration," researchers demonstrated how migration as a mental possibility in Iran places the image of an Iranian utopia against a Western utopia. Regarding this matter, the mental migration of children born in the 1990s must be taken seriously. This phenomenon is not unrelated to the shifts in naming conventions for children that were previously mentioned. The story is that, in the past couple of decades, middle-class families have increasingly chosen to give birth to their children in European and American countries, selecting neutral names that fit the place of birth abroad. They envision their children residing in lands other than Iran from birth. Therefore, the relationship between migration and despair must be seriously considered. These parents do not foresee even a glimmer of hope for the country in the coming decades. Hamid Nafici, in his book "Making Cultures in Exile," notes how Iranian television channels in Los Angeles produced and broadcast Persian series, films, and Los Angeles-style music as a way that, to fill the cultural gap for the immigrant generation of the 1979 Revolution. However, the new generation of immigrants does not want to rely on pre-made visual representations; they want to participate in creating the image themselves. The difference is that these individuals are no longer the television generation; they live in the era of social networks and prefer to interact directly with their homeland. Migrants, as a heterogeneous group, have come to the awareness that they share one commonality: displacement. They have realized that migration is a form of exile, and to alleviate the pain of exile, they make waiting their ideology. This increases their inclination to participate in protests. On the other hand, the children of the migrant generations, who have never seen Iran, rebuild their fractured identity by participating in protests. Migrants, like wandering spirits, still have a presence in their homeland, acting as a significant force for change. What connects both fronts of the migrant population (migrants on the fringes of metropolises and migrants abroad) is, the concept of waiting.

Movement in reference groups in networked society

Elements such as changes in age, generations, gender, and population dynamics have all made a new configuration possible within the framework of a networked society. Since the 2010s, Iran, like many other countries, has entered a new realm known as the networked society. The logic of such a society deals with a very complex form of organization and management. The empowerment of social networks and the emergence of new forms of social connections have astonished governments, which typically operate with vertical and hierarchical structures, while social relationships within these networks are more flat, horizontal and new leaders have emerged within these networks, interacting with their followers in new ways. Over the past decade, we have witnessed a popular shift that has increased the visibility of ordinary people. Both people

have constructed their desired lifestyles and identities, at least beyond the confines of state and national borders, and new influential figures have emerged in front of them. In Iran, quantitatively, there are on average 45 million active users on each of the Instagram, WhatsApp, and Telegram networks. According to the 2022 Social Commerce and Instagram Store Market report, the social network penetration rate in Iran is 71%. This indicates Iran's entry into an entirely new society where the power of information dissemination and control has moved beyond the reach of governments. In such a situation, where the complexity of relationships and interactions between individuals and groups is high, the role of celebrities and influencers who emerge within this context becomes extremely vital. New generations within the networked society organize their interests, find their opinion leaders, and increasingly distance themselves from official media. The transformations primarily driven by the emergence of social networks and the democratization of media have not only diminished the role of traditional reference groups but also challenged the credibility of traditional media, particularly state television in Iran. In the third wave of values and attitudes survey in 2015, a list of reference groups for individuals was provided, among which only the family managed to be influential to the extent of 38%. All known forms of reference groups had little impact on individuals' decision-making in political matters and important issues. Considering the significant time that has passed since 2015 and the inclusion of the 2000s generation, the decline in the role of traditional reference groups will become even more pronounced.

Conclusion

Post-revolutionary protest movements in Iran are characterized by two intertwined layers within society. The first layer, well-documented through surveys over the past few decades, manifests primarily at two levels: economic issues (unemployment, housing, and inflation) and social issues (distrust, dishonesty, hypocrisy, and overall weakening of moral values). The second layer is more cultural, associated with lifestyle and personal freedoms, generally encompassing the recognition of ordinary things (such as eating, walking, attending concerts, or going to the stadium). These aspects have been explored mainly through qualitative research in cultural studies, women's studies, and youth studies. This article demonstrates that alongside the deepening protests at the first layer, there has always been a form of protest that has received less attention, one that has emerged from the everyday life movement over several decades, following a different path. This form of protest or resistance has consistently been manifested by dissenting populations in name choices, travel patterns, clothing styles, makeup, ways of gathering and being present in specific places, and types and forms of media consumption. However, starting

in the 2010s, these forms evolved from more individualistic expressions into cultural communities, by the 2020s, these communities became explicitly political through their intersection with the first layer of discontent. The death of Mahsa Amini was merely a spark that connected these two layers through the symbolism of women's hair and bodies. Thus, the overt layers of protest as economic issues and political order met with the more covert layers of freedom of being and living under the shadow of Mahsa Amini. Women's hair, a perpetual point of fundamental cultural-religious contention in Iran, has now served as a bridge between social divides such as age, generation, gender, ethnicity, and religion, facilitating a kind of articulation between them. This has temporarily provided coherence and connection despite the inherent fissures. Simultaneously, women's hair and bodies have provided a solid basis for creating moral panic in official narratives about the recent protests. Based on this moral fear, the authorities believe that the protestors have characteristics such as alcoholism and drug addiction, nudity and moral corruption, children of divorce and have emotional problems, and are the hand of the enemy's media demons. Moral panic in the conditions of leaving the wall of hegemony due to the five displacements that I mentioned has a limited effect on the past society. Now, the huge changes that we have witnessed in Iran in the last two decades have made the necessity of fundamental changes in the political field inevitable. It is true that a coherent ideology has not yet emerged in the process of the late social movement, but it would be imprudent to imagine it without any value and ideological system. The slogans that have been chanted in these protests and the most important ones are women, life and freedom in a positive way (desire for a normal life) and elements such as lack of vision and hope and dissatisfaction with widespread corruption, feelings of discrimination, not being seen, themselves as it has worked negatively. These elements, as a cement between the different population of dissidents (social classes and seemingly conflicting groups), have had a binding role and have been able to take steps towards creating a powerful historical bloc.

The latest evaluation of democracy in Iran

According to the latest evaluation by The Economist Intelligence Unit on the Democracy Index in year 2017, Iran had improved by four ranks compared to the previous year, reaching the 150th position among 165 countries was located in the world. In comparison, Turkey was ranked 100, Pakistan 110, Iraq 112, and Afghanistan was in 149th place. Examining the trend of the Democracy Index in Iran from years 2006 to 2017 shows the lowest level of democracy in year 2010 with a total score of 1.94. The Democracy Index in Iran increased to 1.98 in year 2011 with a growth of 0.04 and remained constant until year 2014. After 2014, this index gradually and slowly followed a positive and upward trend, reaching a total score of 2.45 in year 2017 on a scale of 10. In the category of "Political Participation," which includes the number of voters, voter turnout, representation of women and minority groups, public involvement in politics, freedom of protest, and adult literacy, Iran scored 4.44. Meanwhile, in both groups "government effectiveness" - including the power of the legislature to influence policy, monitoring and balance of power, corruption, and public trust in the government - the "Democratic political culture" which includes the cohesion and consensus of the society and the general understanding of the people and their feelings towards democratic institutions Iran scores 3.21 and 3.13, respectively. Iran's score in civil liberties is only 1.47, which is considered relatively low. In fact, in terms of civil liberties, Iran's score is equivalent to that of Saudi Arabia, Guinea, and China. Factors contributing to civil liberties include freedom of expression, the presence of free and strong media, equality, human rights, gender equality, and individual freedoms, all of which are assessed as below the global average for democracies in Iran. Although the democracy index in Iran in year 2017 showed an upward and improving trend, this trend has been very slow.

The End

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